National Security Reform and the 2016 Election

By Christopher J. Lamb and Joseph C. Bond

There are few issues of greater intrinsic importance to the United States than national security reform—or one riper for resolution. Twenty years ago most senior leaders were skeptical of allegations that the national security system was “broken”; they believed the system functioned well enough to manage the Nation’s most pressing problems. Since then numerous prominent experts have been sounding the alarm from inside the system and from without.1 No fewer than nine blue-ribbon groups have argued in favor of system reforms (see tables 1 and 2).2 The overwhelming majority of scholars publishing independently on the issue favor reform.3 During the 2008 Presidential election, the momentum in favor of national security reform was so strong that many thought it was inevitable. This presumption was reinforced when President Barack Obama appointed well-known proponents of reform to senior positions in the National Security Council staff, Department of State, Department of Defense (DOD), and Intelligence Community.4 Yet reform did not take place during the Obama administration, and so far it has not been an issue in the 2016 Presidential race, either. This paper examines why reform was sidetracked, whether it could emerge as a campaign issue during the 2016 Presidential election, and why it is in candidates’ and the Nation’s interest that it does.

The Case for Reform

Before identifying reform obstacles, it helps to provide context by explaining the scope and definition of the topic and summarizing the arguments in favor of reform. The term national security system means the group of interacting, interrelated, and interdependent U.S. national security institutions that form a complex whole to provide critical security functions, including strategic warning, strategy, resource allocation, issue management, capability-building, system management, and performance oversight from the President and Congress down to personnel.
Sample Senior Leader Comments on the National Security System

“We end up spending incredible amounts of time that just kind of suck the life out of you at the end of the day spending 4, 5, 6 hours in interagency meetings and the reason is, is because the organization of the government fit the last Century instead of this Century.”
—Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 2003

“Wars of the 20th century taught us the need for joint operations rather than separate army, navy or air operations, as manifested in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 9/11 taught us that we cannot afford to act as independent agencies. Our success against the enemy largely derives from our mastery of joint, highly integrated operations that unify all the elements of national power into a coherent whole.”
—Ambassador (and Senior Intelligence Official) Henry Crumpton, 2006

“Over the years the interagency system has become so lethargic and dysfunctional that it materially inhibits the ability to provide the vast power of the U.S. Government on problems. You see this inability to synchronize in our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, across our foreign policy, and in our response to [Hurricane] Katrina.”
—General Wayne Downing, USA, 2006

“The essential ingredient for victory is . . . a comprehensive strategy that draws together all the resources of the U.S. Government [and] a new national security structure that can make it work. . . . There are too many bureaucratic impediments. . . . It’s too hard to balance elements that should be working together but are instead competing.”
—General John Abizaid, USA, 2007

“[There is still] no effective, consistent mechanism that brings a whole interagency team to focus on a particular foreign policy issue.”
—Ambassador Ryan Crocker, 2009

“America’s interagency toolkit is a hodgepodge of jerry-rigged arrangements constrained by a dated and complex patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes.”
—Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, 2010

“To put it bluntly, we’re trying to face 21st century threats with . . . a bureaucracy that sometimes seems to have been designed for the Byzantine Empire, which, you will recall, didn’t end well. We’re still too often rigid when we need to be flexible, clumsy when we need to be agile, slow when we need to be fast, focused on individual agency equities when we need to be focused on the broader whole of government mission.”
—Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy, 2010

“The complexity of the security environment . . . demands . . . a highly disciplined and adaptive military force . . . immersed in interagency skills and attributes.”
—Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, USA, 2013

“Despite thirteen years of experience—and innumerable opportunities to learn lessons from both successes and mistakes—there have been few significant changes in our cumbersome, inefficient, and ineffective approach to interagency operations in the field. [Our] current decisionmaking framework is an ineffective, stovepiped diplomatic, military, and intelligence chain of command relying on complex Washington decisionmaking procedures that operate by committee. It often produces confusion, mixed signals and slow reactions.”
—Admiral Dennis Blair, USN (Ret.), Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann, and Admiral Eric Olson, USN (Ret.), 2014

Note: These quotations are among the more colorful ones, but there are many more similar expressions of concern about the need for national security reform. The authors maintain a 40-page compendium of senior leader quotations on national security reform that is available upon request via email to lambc@ndu.edu.
deployed in the field. The term reform means correcting the problems that experts agree are crippling the system’s ability to generate desired outcomes—about which there is a great deal of consensus.

The nine major studies arguing for reform unanimously agree that the United States cannot integrate the efforts of its national security organizations well enough to pursue a common purpose. In other words, executive branch departments and agencies too often compete instead of collaborate, making it difficult if not impossible to achieve national security objectives. The majority of these studies also assert the system cannot produce the capabilities needed to effectively counter complex emerging security threats. It tends to overemphasize the military at the expense of other elements of power and invest in military capabilities for conventional rather than unconventional threats. Most people would agree that an enterprise is broken if it cannot generate and integrate the capabilities required to manage problems well. Studies also emphasize the system is too centralized, slow, and reactive rather than anticipatory.

These system liabilities, highlighted by the terror attacks on 9/11 and thereafter by U.S. travails in Iraq and Afghanistan, helped stimulate multiple studies on system performance. The Project on National Security Reform is a case in point. Its major study, Forging a New Shield, offers an explanation for system performance problems. It argues that, structurally and legally, the current system is dominated by its large functional organizations. The system supports the equities of those strong departments and agencies at the expense of integrating their expertise and capabilities. The singular focus of those functional organizations on their core missions also helps explain the system’s inability to generate needed niche capabilities, particularly those required for nontraditional missions such as cyber security and irregular warfare. The result is poor performance that prompts executive branch intervention.

The White House intensely manages poor performance in an attempt to impose greater cooperation among the departments and agencies and, along with Congress, to promote investments in critically needed capabilities. The President and his small staff, however, are typically far removed from the problem and have only the capacity to intervene in a few select cases. This leaves important problems unaddressed in a timely way, and many emerging problems ignored completely. Moreover, the small National Security Council staff—consumed by the need to turn around performance in a handful of areas—cannot manage the system as a whole. Thus, strategic direction is weak, and system-wide needs such as better knowledge and human resource management are overlooked. The legislative branch, which mirrors the executive branch structure by aligning oversight committees with major departments, inadvertently reinforces these limitations.

We advocate solutions proffered in Forging a New Shield, but other workable reform options have been suggested (see tables 1 and 2). Complex problems frequently require a multifaceted fix, and there are often various ways to solve a problem. Any President intent on reform would want to be confident he or she understands the underlying causes of poor performance, but then could choose to implement a variety of solutions deemed fiscally and politically feasible. The main reason reform has yet to take place is not lack of agreement on problems or solutions (although there is more consensus on the former than the latter), but rather the existence of major political, substantive, and bureaucratic obstacles.

Political Challenges

Congress has overridden Presidential opposition to enact major national security reforms in the past. The National Security Act of 1947, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (which elevated joint military operations in DOD) and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003 are cases in point. Scholars debate what it would take to move Congress to pass legislation now to fix the national security system, but clearly it would be much more likely to occur with Presidential support and more...
Recent Presidents, however, have not taken action on reform. One reason is lack of experience. Since World War II, only 2 of 12 Presidents (Dwight D. Eisenhower and George H.W. Bush) were experienced national security professionals. Almost all Presidents arrive in office with much stronger domestic than foreign policy credentials and agendas to match. They also arrive in office flush with electoral victory and, arguably, a commensurate degree of hubris that inclines them to think their administrations will avoid the problems that beset their predecessors. Consequently, Presidents typically learn about national security on the job and especially how to manage the sprawling national security apparatus.

It is not uncommon to see early mishaps, such as the Bay of Pigs fiasco that blindsided the John F. Kennedy administration. President Kennedy learned from that experience and rebounded to manage the Cuban missile crisis much better. The same could be said of more recent administrations. President Bill Clinton recovered from a 1993 disaster in Mogadishu, Somalia, to achieve success...
in Bosnia. President George W. Bush was able to reverse a disastrous situation in Iraq with a change of strategy and a surge of U.S. forces that recovered the initiative and stabilized the country. President Obama was embarrassed by the 2009 al Qaeda Christmas bombing attempt on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 that appeared easily preventable but bounced back to oversee the successful raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan.

Over time Presidents learn what it takes to increase the chances of better performance. But they can only intervene in a small number of cases. By the time experience demonstrates the need for a better system that only requires a manageable number of interventions, the President is on the defensive. Presidents are loath to candidly acknowledge poor performance in the early years of their administrations for fear of making a second term less likely. If the President wins a second term, the political capital for carrying reforms through to fruition is much reduced by the President’s lame-duck status.

Reform is not possible without strong Presidential backing. National Security Advisor General James Jones, USMC (Ret.), was one of the many officials who supported reform that President Obama appointed to positions of authority on his national security team. He assumed his White House duties fresh from service in the Project on National Security Reform and began to implement a reform agenda. Jones, however, soon fell out of favor with the President and his political advisors who were intent on giving priority attention to domestic issues such as health care and the economy. The remaining reform advocates in the Obama administration could not engineer change without the support of the President and his new National Security Advisor.

It is also true that the popularity of national security reform diminished after the 2008 elections. Because national security reform did not take place when conditions appeared most propitious, those interested in the topic are now more sober about the prospects for reform. Any candidate considering whether to promote national security reform now as part of his or her party’s platform would likely hear a variety of arguments about its feasibility.

**Common Feasibility Arguments**

Some skeptics assert performance limitations are not fixable. This debate often hinges on whether one emphasizes continuity or change in the security environment. System performance expectations are more modest for those impressed by the enduring, anarchic nature of the international system with its numerous actors and competing interests. In such circumstances, even the most powerful nations can control only so much. Setbacks—even an occasional catastrophe—are unavoidable, even if it is not politic to say so. Observers with this perspective are more tolerant of poor outcomes, chalking them up to the limits of power.

**Table 2. Other Problems and Solutions**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Problems</th>
<th>Other Solutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign-domestic divide in organizational duties and authorities</td>
<td>Partner with nongovernmental organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Missing strategic guidance</td>
<td>Reform or create new international or niche capability organizations</td>
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<td>Inability to make resource tradeoffs</td>
<td>Empower existing organizations for better interagency coordination</td>
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<td>Insufficient leadership</td>
<td>Establish a new department</td>
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<td>Confused roles (who does what)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of institutional knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>No interagency personnel management</td>
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The Tale of Two Burning Bushes

Everyone working in the national security system acknowledges the President as chief executive and the need to accommodate Presidential style and preferences. That does not mean, however, that the system supports the President well. A comparison of the two Bush Presidencies illustrates the point.

President George H.W. Bush was an experienced national security leader who took office determined to minimize “the inevitable personality conflicts and turf disputes that would spring up between Cabinet members, advisors, and departments.”1 His national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, is widely admired for helping President Bush succeed in this aspiration. Even so, during his first year in office, Bush stumbled into an invasion of Panama precipitated by poor interagency coordination (the Department of Justice indicted General Manuel Noriega without informing other departments) and then poorly executed the aftermath of the invasion for the same reason (the Department of Defense shut out other departments).2 After that, Bush and Scowcroft centralized major national security decisions in a “core group close to the President,” which improved performance but exhausted the small staff and restricted decision capacity. Thereafter the administration concentrated on just two major issues—managing German reunification and the Gulf War—both of which it did quite well.

President George W. Bush had a different leadership style than his father. He had little experience in national security and by his own account was prone to make “gut” calls. Nevertheless, he was saddled with the same interagency troubles that fouled his father’s Panama operation. In his memoir, he deplored interagency squabbling following 9/11 and admitted he was unable to stop it.3 After learning on the job that the system would fail without his intervention, he did what his father had done and centralized decision-making in the White House to avert disaster in Iraq.

This same pattern is evident in other administrations regardless of the President’s decisionmaking style or preferences, and it generates the same behaviors. President Bill Clinton, for example, failed in Somalia and Haiti before getting more deeply involved and centralizing decisionmaking on Bosnia in the White House.4 Similarly, the administration of President Barack Obama suffered a number of foreign policy embarrassments before centralizing decisionmaking in the White House to the point that Secretary Robert M. Gates would state that it “was by far the most centralized and controlling in national security of any I had seen since Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger ruled the roost.”5

In other words, all these Presidents chose the time-honored expedient of working around the system rather than the much more difficult task of reforming it for better, consistent performance. This is precisely the point Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was making in his 1971 Foreign Affairs article, “The Machine that Fails.” (See the penultimate paragraph in this paper.)

Reformers are more impressed with changes to the security environment and the need to evolve with those changes. They note we have now entered the information age, in which knowledge diffusion is enabling smaller groups to inflict potentially catastrophic damage on nation-states. They argue this increasingly complex and dynamic security environment requires reforming organizations, so they can generate desired outputs faster and with better integration of functional expertise. National security reformers argue that organizations that do not reform in this manner face extinction, such as “E.F. Hutton, TWA, General Foods, RCA, and Montgomery Ward,” and that only “exclusive missions and the willingness of the American people to bear huge financial burdens during times of war have allowed the government’s national security institutions to delay organizational change.”

Another version of the “not fixable” argument asserts the U.S. Government is constitutionally inefficient. This view is sometimes encapsulated in the quip that American government was designed by geniuses not to work. The assumption is that poor national security system performance is a natural outgrowth of the Constitution’s system of checks and balances on centralized power. Vesting separate functions and powers in the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government does entail inefficiencies. However, the major system limitations identified by reformers—unified effort and fielding appropriate capabilities—are largely executive branch problems.

To be sure, Congress plays a role in both problems. The congressional committee structure reinforces competition among and sometimes within departments and agencies, but the President as chief executive has primary responsibility for unified effort. In the case of fielding capabilities to deal with nontraditional threats, Congress plays a larger role. It can be tight-fisted with funding, particularly for nonmilitary capabilities. But typically it gives the President what he requests or even more, both in terms of organizations and budgets. Congress allocated huge amounts of resources for Afghanistan and Iraq, but the executive branch failed to field the capabilities that irregular warfare experts argued were needed. For example, DOD suffered embarrassing scandals over its inability to provide body armor, properly protected vehicles, and overhead surveillance. Existing executive branch organizational cultures explain these capability shortfalls rather than a parsimonious Congress.

Yet another version of the “not fixable” argument lays the blame on the President-centric nature of the U.S. national security system. Because the Constitution gives the President so much authority over national security matters, many conclude the President’s decisionmaking and leadership style are the major factors constraining system performance. One academic critic of the Project on National Security Reform offered a pithy summary of this view in testimony to Congress, stating: “It’s the President, stupid.” He meant the President’s personal preferences and predilections determine system performance and cannot be controlled through the fixes advocated by reformers. Some take the argument further and assert Presidents actually like the current system precisely because it is so responsive to their preferences. In a 2010 assessment of national security reform prospects, Harvey Sicherman argued to “those who would try to transform the system” that “it endures because [P]residents who understand it, like it.”

There is little to no evidence that Presidents like the system. Assuming they do because otherwise they would change it trivializes the challenge of fixing a broken system and ignores the many Presidential complaints that the system is unresponsive to their needs (see “The Tale of Two Burning Bushes”). As one observer notes, “Every new administration comes to office . . . assuming that the interagency process would serve [its] needs,” and “every administration discovers it has to reinvent the interagency wheel.” Rather than liking the system, “every [P]resident since Eisenhower has complained of his inability to move the bureaucracy in the directions he wished to go” and “sought means and methods by which [he] could be more flexible and agile in dealing with the issues before [him].”

Other skeptics believe performance problems are minor and easily corrected with simple fixes such as better
education, planning, or leadership. Better leadership is a particularly common bromide, one often summarized in the observation that “personalities matter.” Many senior leaders agree, asserting that if they maintain good relations with counterparts from other departments or agencies, their example should trickle down and improve cooperation among subordinates.

Yet good senior leader relations are not guaranteed, nor do they necessarily trickle down. President George W. Bush’s national security team was considered a “dream team” because the principals were experienced luminaries who knew and respected one another. Yet these relationships degenerated quickly. As for trickle-down collaboration, it has its limits. Secretary Robert Gates believed a personal effort to get along with Secretary Hillary Clinton “would radiate throughout our departments and the rest of the government,” but their relatively harmonious relations did not prevent enduring tension between Ambassadors and military commanders in the field. Similarly, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was determined to get along with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet because “close, visible personal cooperation between the two of us at the top could . . . encourage a joint approach for those down the chain of command.” Yet DOD-CIA tensions were an ongoing problem during the Bush administration.

What leaders discover is that William Edwards Deming was right about a bad system beating a good person every time. Good leadership is one necessary element of high organizational performance, but not the only one. Organizational structure, process, culture, and other variables also exert powerful influences over behaviors that affect performance. Over the years many system reforms focused on a single organizational performance variable have failed. The Clinton administration’s attempt to fix interagency planning is an example, as is the Bush administration’s attempt to manage nation-building missions better. The same could be said of efforts to improve interagency collaboration by reforming personnel management. Congress considered, and the Obama administration recently mandated, cross-organizational experience for senior executives, but such measures will have limited impact without complementary reforms and so long as civil service careers remain under the control of parent organizations.

Successful reforms take holistic organizational approaches to improving performance. When advocates of national security reform refer to a “Goldwater-Nichols” for the interagency community, as they often do, they are calling for comprehensive reforms that cover authority relationships, process, culture, personnel incentives, and other organizational elements. Both the empirical record and academic literature support the notion that system performance is a complex problem requiring a comprehensive, multidisciplinary solution (see table 3).

Some observers argue that conditions for reform are not ripe. For example, it has been argued that national security organizations should be designed to support the grand strategy they execute and that grand strategy requires a bipartisan consensus. Since a bipartisan consensus on grand strategy is not likely any time soon, there is no logic to guide organizational reform and the issue is moot. The problem with this argument is that grand strategy is not a prerequisite for the kind of fundamental national security reforms currently needed. Executing any strategy well requires unified effort and supporting capabilities. The current system’s inability to provide these basic functions could be rectified without a bipartisan strategy consensus, which is why leaders across the political spectrum have spoken out in favor of reform.

A final argument that needs to be addressed is cost. Some wrongly assume national security reform means an expensive restructuring that would entail large new bureaucracies such as the Department of Homeland Security. That need not be the case. For example, the Project on National Security Reform recommended only a small staff augmentation that easily could be supplied from the millions of civil servants currently in the system. Other than that, all the recommended changes address authorities, responsibilities, processes, leadership, and organizational
culture. These proposals are politically and organizationally difficult but not costly in terms of budget outlays.

Moreover, well-executed reforms would conserve resources. The more than $1.6 trillion that the United States spent in Afghanistan and Iraq failed to produce desired outcomes and often wasted large amounts of funds. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction asserts a lack of unified strategy, planning, and effort meant U.S. activities could not “actually contribute to overall national goals there” and instead risked having “agencies and projects work at counter purposes, spend money on frivolous endeavors, or fail to coordinate efforts to maximize impact.”23 The Special Inspector General for Iraq made similar observations, asking Congress to consider large-scale, comprehensive reforms that would “promote better integration among DOD, [the U.S. Agency

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<th>Category of Sources</th>
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<td>Books, Articles, and Public Policy Institute Publications*</td>
<td>The authors consulted 35 sources since 2001 on national security reform: 14 books (5 of which were Army War College publications); 7 policy institute reports; and 14 articles (some of which were Congressional Research Service reports). All but two identify the inability to integrate diverse department and agency efforts as the key problem. All but two address national security reform from a holistic organizational or multivariate organizational viewpoint. All but six identify the need for reform.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Academic Textbooks†</td>
<td>Textbooks are an exception to the trend in greater interest in and support for national security reform. Only two of seven popular textbooks produced over the past decade mention national security reform. One of the books unambiguously recommends a list of reforms. Notably, it was actually written at the height of interest in national security reform (around 2008). The other textbook not only notes that the national security system is outmoded and needs reform but also argues that the system is President-centric and that the President must provide the necessary leadership and vision.</td>
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<td>Congress*</td>
<td>A search of the ProQuest congressional database for hearings published, House and Senate reports, Congressional Research Service reports, and committee prints from 2001 through 2015 revealed sustained congressional interest in better interagency collaboration and/or national security reform; specifically: 7 Senate or House full committee hearings and 11 subcommittee hearings; 9 Congressional Research Service reports; and 25 committee prints.</td>
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*Books, articles, and congressional hearings: copies of the list of publications can be requested by emailing lambc@ndu.edu.
for International Development], and the Department of State." Copious documentation from these sources links massive waste to the structure and processes of our current national security system and suggests the Nation cannot afford not to fix the profligate system it now has.

**Bureaucratic Obstacles**

Although national security reformers and skeptics can be found in every organization in the national security system, their distribution is uneven. A disproportionate number of supporters come from DOD, and a disproportionate number of the skeptics come from the Department of State, and to a lesser extent the CIA. Both State and CIA have cultures that celebrate individual capabilities rather than organizational performance. They have highly selective entry standards, and promotion is largely dependent upon individual achievements. In contrast, DOD accepts a wide cross-section of the American populace, and the higher its members rise, the more promotion depends on the ability to perform well as groups and organizational units. In addition, military leaders have seen how the Goldwater-Nichols legislation improved DOD performance and are thus more inclined to believe reform can be effective rather than the empty administrative exercise that often accompanies changes of leadership.

This organizational imbalance in the origins of reformers and skeptics complicates the chances of reform. Leaders from other national security components often leap to the conclusion that DOD—the largest and most powerful member of the national security enterprise—is trying to impose its organizational model on the rest of the system. This assumption reinforces their resistance to reform. Reportedly it was just this concern that muted Secretary Gates’s support for national security reform. He wanted State or some other element to take the lead, reasoning that if DOD did so, it would provoke a backlash against reform.

The State Department is the most resistant to reform in part because it is so prone to nostalgia for a bygone era when it exercised greater influence. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke’s classic 1971 “back to the future” case for reform raises just this issue. Holbrooke highlights many of the same problems cited now to justify reform. He lamented the system’s inability to produce unified purpose and effort. He noted that in a crisis the President and his aides could sometimes decide on policy and—if it involved few enough agencies and people—perhaps even carry it out. But, he argued, the “number of issues that can be handled in this personalized way is very small.”

Ambassador Holbrooke explained poor system performance with one system attribute: the “sheer, unmanageable size” of the system. He thought too many people and organizational layers had sprouted up within national security departments and agencies. Even worse, he stated, the number of organizations involved had grown exponentially. He dismissed critics who charged State with incompetence for not taking charge of the morass of competing “chains of command,” arguing that “at its present size and with its present structure,” the system “cannot be pulled together under any central agency—not even the White House.”

Even in 1971 there was no way for the State Department to turn back the clock or reverse growth trends, and the system has only increased in size and diversity since then. More than 30 organizations are now represented in U.S. Embassies overseas compared to the 16 Holbrooke bemoaned. Since Holbrooke complained about size, other distinguished State leaders such as Lawrence Eagleburger have commented on State’s declining ability to manage increasingly complex governmental processes. Some attribute declining influence to State’s relative poverty compared to DOD and advocate a rebalancing of budgets in favor of diplomacy. Still others lament weak leadership, yearning for the days when strong Secretaries of State were *primum inter pares* exercising disproportionate sway over U.S. foreign and national security policy.

What State leaders need to understand is that State’s declining influence is a symptom rather than the cause of poor national security system performance. The system does not perform poorly because Presidents downgrade their relationships with Secretaries of State. Presidents downgrade State’s leadership role because the multidisciplinary problems confronting the Nation require multifunctional (that is, interagency) responses. State neither
desires nor currently has the means to lead interagency teams well. It argues the opposite, but in truth, and for reasons sometimes beyond its control, most Ambassadors never rise above their status as State employees and their Country Teams perform poorly as a result.

As a State Department advisory group has noted, “Other agencies often view the Ambassador as the Department’s representative, rather than the President’s.” State rates and rewards Ambassadors for maintaining access to foreign government officials, so Ambassadors are reluctant to risk these relationships. If forcefully promoting foreign agricultural sales, defense security cooperation, or other U.S. interests would alienate host-nation officials, then many Ambassadors would demur, valuing access above impact. This preference is reinforced by the system’s inability to generate strategy at higher levels that could better inform a local Ambassador’s priorities. Representatives from other departments and agencies who see an Ambassador protecting his or her access more than promoting their organizational interests feel justified in working around the Ambassador (and are often encouraged by their parent organizations to do so).

State’s advisory group rightly concluded that the “Ambassador is left with the responsibility, but not the authority, to coordinate the activities and address the often competing needs of the mission.” Holbrooke made the same point in 1971. He acknowledged that State was not up to serving as the “Presidential agent of coordination” but then insisted that “no one is equipped to run the foreign affairs machine today—a machine that fails.” Although he misdiagnosed the problem, attributing too much to the mere size of the then much smaller national security system, Holbrooke rightly understood that restoring coherency to the management of diverse security issues required major reform. He argued for “a complete remodeling” backed by a President “personally committed to action.”

Factors Favoring Reform

Political, substantive, and bureaucratic obstacles to national security reform make it a difficult but not an impossible proposition. As has been observed, the odds always favor the pessimist in any great undertaking, but “all the great changes have been accomplished by optimists.” In the case of national security reform, there is reason to be more optimistic than usual because the majority of prerequisites for successful reform are already in place.

Galvanizing disasters help propel reform forward. Pearl Harbor, the mismanagement of the invasion of Grenada, and the terror attacks on 9/11 helped stimulate, respectively, the 1947 national security act, 1986 Goldwater-Nichols, and the 2003 creation of the Department of Homeland Security and National Counterterrorism Center. But all of these reforms were also accompanied by in-depth studies that provided direction (the Eberstadt report, Senate Armed Services Committee Defense Organization report, and Hart-Rudman reports, respectively) and extraordinary leadership that guided the reforms successfully to final fruition.

The first two of these three prerequisites for reform are already in place on the eve of the 2016 Presidential election. The Nation has experienced a cumulative disaster in poor system performance over the past decade and a half of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite expending prodigious amounts of blood and treasure, sweeping enemy forces from the field, and targeting terrorists and insurgent leaders on an industrial scale, the United States could not engineer the outcomes it wanted in those countries. This happened because the national security system “had no guiding strategy, worked at cross-purposes, and did not furnish the capabilities necessary for irregular warfare.”

Senior leaders from both the Bush and Obama administrations expressed great frustration with these impediments in their memoirs. On occasion, they were able to mitigate or temporarily overcome them, “but in the main, these problems persisted through 15 years of war.” Most
leaders now understand that unless the national security system is reformed, it will not prove effective at managing cyber attacks, space warfare, eroding strategic deterrence, state-sponsored economic espionage, novel antiaccess/area-denial strategies, or other emerging security challenges. Hence the broad support for reform and the associated in-depth studies advocating it (tables 1 and 2).

Recommendations

The third reform prerequisite is committed political leadership. One way to overcome the political obstacles identified earlier is to adopt reform as a policy priority during the Presidential campaign, preferably by both parties. A model in this regard would be military transformation, a priority the Bush and Al Gore campaign teams both adopted in the 2000 election. Both parties believed transforming U.S. military capabilities made sense, which ensured the issue would receive priority attention after the election.

Numerous academics, journalists, national security experts, and leaders in and out of government—some indirectly and others directly through their advice to candidates and later the President’s transition team—have the potential to influence whether political parties adopt national security reform as a priority. Two important considerations are whether the issue would resonate with the public and whether reform would increase the chances of a successful first term in office. A strong case could be made in the affirmative for both propositions.

The public’s interest in national security is malleable, but clearly the sense of urgency generated by the 9/11 terror attacks has dissipated. As others have noted, polls indicate Americans are more concerned about the economy, unemployment, illegal immigration, health care, and other domestic issues than national security, which rests near the bottom of the list when the public is asked to identify “the most important problem facing the country today.” U.S. foreign policy elites strongly support international engagement and are concerned about the decline in U.S. prestige over the past decade, but not the public. Large majorities across the political spectrum agree that the United States “should concentrate on problems at home” rather than “be active in world affairs.” Concern about terrorism in particular is sharply down from the immediate aftermath of 9/11 when about half of those polled agreed that it was the country’s most important problem. That figure has hovered around 1 or 2 percent in recent years despite periodic spikes in response to terrorist atrocities.

However, there is reason to believe that if candidates promote national security reform, the public would be supportive. Recent polls indicate public concern about national security shot up after the terrorist attacks in Paris, California, and Brussels. More generally, public distrust of and dissatisfaction with the government are running at historic highs (70+ percent majorities). Thus the notion that government performance needs to be improved should be an easy sell. Polling also suggests the public would be supportive if the candidates explain the purpose of reform is to better protect the homeland, reduce wasteful spending, and partner more effectively with other countries.

Given the trend in expert opinion favoring reform, one might assume most advisors would recommend it to a candidate. However, there is no guarantee that this would be the case. Advisors would probably find it easier to assert the system could be managed well despite its limitations than to explain what it would take to improve performance. In addition, self-confident candidates running for President may be prone to think their leadership skills alone are sufficient to tame the unruly national security system.
security system—despite all the evidence to the contrary. Ultimately the deciding factor may well be whether candidates conclude that promoting national security reform would advance their political fortunes. A strong argument could be made that this is the case, both before and after the election.

Americans are skeptical of both political parties’ foreign policy and national security records. Since 2000, the percentage of Americans dissatisfied with “the position of the United States in the world today” increased from 45 percent to more than 60 percent, and the percentage who believe leaders in other countries do not have much respect for the U.S. President increased to large majorities by 33 and 38 points, respectively, during the Bush and Obama administrations. Presidential candidates in both parties are trying to portray themselves as competent national security leaders without tying themselves too closely to their party’s unpopular records. A public disillusioned with government performance in general is not likely to be impressed by efforts to walk such fine lines.

An alternative to tap-dancing around unpopular records is readily available to any candidate. He or she could simply tell the American people that the national security system is broken and prone to produce poor and sometimes disastrous results no matter who inhabits the White House. This has the triple advantage of being true, well documented, and believed by the large majority of national security experts inside the Washington Beltway. They could cite any number of studies or experts, including the trio of national security luminaries who recently explained in detail how our “cumbersome, inefficient, and ineffective approach to interagency operations” handicaps our national security performance, and why our “ineffective, stove piped diplomatic, military and intelligence chain of command” that relies on “Washington decision making procedures that operate by committee . . . often produces confusion, mixed signals, and slow reactions.”

An even more compelling reason for candidates to support national security reform is to maintain their popularity after they are elected. The next President will inherit a system that is sure to come up short against complex threats. When that happens, the news media and public demand an accounting, and Presidents promise investigations and answers. This happened to not only President Bush but also President Obama. After al Qaeda’s 2009 Christmas day plot to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253, it was discovered that the United States had been forewarned of the attack. Initially administration officials claimed “the system worked” because passengers thwarted the attack, but then agreed the system “failed miserably.” After an investigation, the President declared that “the incident was not the fault of a single individual or organization, but rather a systemic failure across organizations and agencies . . . to integrate and understand the intelligence that we already had.” President Obama promised to “learn from” and “correct these mistakes.”

This explanation would have been more compelling if the President had already been on record favoring reform.

It is not hard to imagine a similar near or actual catastrophe in the future. The most likely worst case event would be nuclear terrorism. As Graham Allison asks in his compelling analysis of the subject, if Presidents ignore our unpreparedness and terrorists succeed in attacking us with weapons of mass destruction, “how will the President explain why he spent [time] engaged in other pursuits?” Allison calls nuclear terrorism the “ultimate preventable catastrophe” and lists 10 elements of a prevention plan, almost all of which depend on unified effort from the executive branch—something the current system notably lacks. Allison argues that citizens and elected representatives should challenge Presidential candidates
on the issue. He makes a good point. The question that needs to be posed is, “How confident are you that the current national security system can prevent terrorists from using a weapon of mass destruction in the United States, and if you are not highly confident, how do you intend to reform it?”

**Conclusion**

Over the past 20 years, there has been a sea change in senior leader views on national security reform. Numerous studies and individual senior leaders representing a massive body of expertise have concluded the national security system is not serving the Nation well. As with any large organizational reform effort, fixing the system would be politically, substantively, and bureaucratically challenging. Yet major prerequisites for success are in place, and the only missing requirement for success is committed political leadership.

Presidential candidates have to choose who they are going to believe: those who maintain, “It’s the President, stupid,” which puts the entire onus of future national security system performance on their shoulders, or those who argue, “It’s the system,” which justifies support for national security reform. The good advice that Ambassador Holbrooke offered four decades ago should inform the candidates’ deliberations:

> The person who has the most to gain from a massive reform of the foreign affairs machine—besides the American taxpayer—is the President himself. If a manageable and responsive apparatus is a true Presidential priority, then he personally must order major changes. Each President must decide whether or not he will attempt major changes, or instead choose to build small, personally loyal, bypass mechanisms with which to carry out policy on those matters of overwhelming high-level interest.

Recent Presidents have chosen the bypass mechanisms, a mistake the finalists in the 2016 election campaign do not have to repeat. Candidates could demonstrate their knowledge of national security affairs, their gravitas, and their own political savvy by embracing national security reform as a policy priority during the Presidential campaign. Doing so could be the first best national security decision the next President makes.

**Notes**

1 For example, during their tenures, several Secretaries of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for national security reform, including Donald Rumsfeld, Robert M. Gates, and General Peter Pace, USMC.


3 Virtually all published products examining the performance of the national security system argue in favor of reform. Among hundreds of books, articles, and reports on the subject, only a handful dispute the need for reform. Where possible we cite the exceptions in this paper.

4 Notable appointees of President Barack Obama from the Project on National Security Reform include James Jones, Dennis Blair, Ashton Carter, Michele Flournoy, and Jim Steinberg. Hillary Clinton also had expressed support for the project.

5 For example, during their tenures, several Secretaries of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for national security reform, including Donald Rumsfeld, Robert M. Gates, and General Peter Pace, USMC.

6 Charles A. Stevenson, America’s Foreign Policy Toolkit: Key Institutions and Processes (Los Angeles, CA: CQ Press, 2013, 106).


8 Forging a New Shield provides examples for both Democratic and Republican administrations, 23ff.


rather than the dearth of resources provided in any area by Congress. See Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Washington, DC: SIGIR, 2009), 331–337.

11 See William W. Newmann, "The Structures of National Security Decision Making: Leadership, Institutions, and Politics in the Carter, Reagan, and G. H. W. Bush Years," Presidential Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (June 2004); and Patrick Haney, "Foreign-Policy Advising: Models and Mysteries from the Bush Administration," Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (June 2005). Both do a good job of surveying the literature that emphasizes a President-centric view of the system, but Newmann concludes the President’s personal trust relationships are especially influential, whereas Haney admits it is hard to understand how Presidents can simultaneously appear constrained by exogenous forces and yet repeatedly demonstrate their unilateral control over the system.


16 Gates, 92.


20 Of the 35 sources on national security reform the authors consulted (9 books, or 14 if the 5 books by the Army War College are included; 7 policy institute reports; and 14 articles), all but 2 address national security reform from a holistic organizational or multivariate organizational viewpoint. See table 3.

21 This literally is the bottom line in D. Robert Wolley, Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System (Raleigh, NC: Lulu Press, 2012), 474. Cambone also argues that “a major overhaul of the National Security Act of 1947” is not possible for this reason. See Cambone, 2.


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.


32 Ibid.


34 This quotation and the broader summary of performance in Afghanistan and Iraq is drawn from Lamb with Franco, 242.

35 Ibid.


41 The majority of Americans are satisfied with the Nation’s security from terrorism, although that sentiment fell last year from about 70 to 60 percent. See “National Security Concerns Are Growing,” Rasmussen Reports, May 1, 2015, available at <www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/april_2015/national_security_concerns_are_growing>.
“Some 40% of those polled say national security and terrorism should be the government’s top priority, and more than 60% put it in the top two, up from just 39% eight months ago.” See Janet Hook, “Poll Finds National Security Now a Top Concern,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2015.


For example, Americans strongly support multilateralism. See “Beyond Red vs. Blue: The Political Typology.”


Holbrooke.
The 2016 election was one of the more remarkable events in the history of U.S. politics. It brought to the presidency, in Donald J. Trump, a true “outsider,” a figure who had never before held public office and whose campaign was explicitly directed against the political establishment. As we go to press, there remains great uncertainty about how the eight-week-old Trump administration will evolve in the months and years to come. It could also demobilize voters by fanning cynicism regarding the candidates and the election. False stories create a blanket of fog that obscures the real news and information communicated by the campaigns. The available academic evidence suggests that viewers have considerable difficulty distinguishing between real and fake news, and that trust in. Like it or not, the 2016 presidential election will be about national security. And most Americans and most voters will be very fearful of the threat that... Yet with all of its failings and the oddity of some of its alleged champions, the Enlightenment is looking better and better. The alternatives now on the march around the world are hideous. At least, that's how most Americans see it. So, like it or not, the 2016 presidential election will be about national security. And most Americans and most voters will be very fearful of the threat that the Islamic State represents and confused about how we should respond. In its lifetime, the United States has faced countless threats, and it has overreacted to many.