Questions of ethnicity, migration, and statehood have been among the most salient and politically charged issues of the last two decades in Europe. They have figured centrally in political, cultural, and social transformations throughout the continent. In eastern Europe, they have often been understood to be linked in a vicious circle. States founded on ethnicity -- and understood as the states of and for particular ethnocultural nations – have been seen as engendering violent conflict and forced migration. Ethnic cleansing has come to epitomize this dangerous and destabilizing intertwining of ethnicity, migration, and statehood. In western Europe, by contrast, some observers have seen a more benign intertwining. The post-national erosion of sovereign statehood, on this view, has produced a continent-wide space for free migration, and has allowed previously suppressed ethnoregional cultures to flourish. Darker accounts of Western Europe, to be sure, have stressed migration from outside Europe, seen as generating unwanted ethnocultural and ethnoreligious pluralism, reactively ethnicized understandings of nationhood, and the emergence of a "fortress Europe" whose reinforced external walls keep outsiders at bay. While these accounts are not particularly nuanced, they point to the importance of the intertwined themes of ethnicity, migration, and statehood, and together they suggest that these issues can be configured in quite different ways. In this paper, I
seek to specify persisting differences in the way these questions are posed in different parts of Europe. I will draw broad contrasts between western and eastern Europe, since such contrasts are indispensable in any attempt to sketch the configuration of ethnicity in Europe as a whole; yet I seek to avoid the often caricaturally oversimplified east-west contrasts that inform many accounts of contemporary Europe.

**Ethnicity**

Almost all European societies, like most societies worldwide, are ethnically heterogeneous, but that heterogeneity takes sharply differing forms. In order to reveal crucial differences in the configuration -- the genesis, form, and political consequences -- of ethnic heterogeneity in Europe, I begin with a basic, though admittedly oversimplified, distinction between two ways in which ethnic heterogeneity can be socially organized and politically expressed. The first I call "immigrant ethnicity," and the second, "territorial nationality."¹

On the first model, relevant mainly to western Europe (and even more characteristic, of course, of North America), ethnic groups arise through migration and are generally territorially dispersed.² On the second model, relevant mainly to east central and eastern Europe, ethnic groups are indigenous (or at least make claims to be so); they are in many cases generated by the movement of borders across people, rather than that of people across borders; and they are generally territorially concentrated. Their members are ordinarily citizens of the country in which they reside, yet they often identify culturally --
and sometimes politically -- with a neighboring "kin" or "homeland" state, to which they see themselves as "belonging" by shared ethnicity or culture but not by legal citizenship (Brubaker 1996; Brubaker and Kim 2008). Lastly, and crucially, they define themselves in national terms. They see themselves as belonging not simply to a distinct ethnic group, but to a distinct nation or nationality that differs from the nation or nationality of their fellow-citizens. In this second model, then, ethnicity takes the form of nationality, and ethnic heterogeneity is coded as national heterogeneity. This territorial ethnicity-cum-nationality is very different from immigration-engendered polyethnicity. Using the same term -- “ethnicity” or “ethnic minorities” -- to designate both can be misleading.

The political claims that can be made in the name of ethnicity differ sharply in the two cases. Immigrant ethnicity evokes a politics of anti-discrimination, civic inclusion, and "soft multiculturalism" (involving claims to recognition, resources, and sometimes immunities and exemptions). Territorial nationality, on the other hand, involves claims for national self-determination; for symbolic recognition as a state-bearing “nation” rather than as a mere “minority”; for rapprochement, in some cases, with a neighboring "kin" or "homeland" state; for extensive language rights; for territorial autonomy; or even for full independence.

Clearly, the claims of territorial nationality can threaten the basic nature of the state in a way that the claims of immigrant ethnicity generally do not. (The main exception is that some claims made for the accommodation of Islam have
been seen as threatening to basic principles of the secular state.) When ethnic claims are framed as national claims, based on putative territorial nationhood and nationality, they become more fundamental, and potentially more threatening, precisely because they raise what Linz and Stepan (1996) have called the “stateness” problem -- the problem of the integrity and boundaries of the state.

In east central Europe, ethnicity speaks this potentially explosive language of nationality. Nationality or nationhood, in turn, is understood as based on ethnicity (language, culture, a vague sense of shared descent, and so on), rather than -- as in the putatively civic model of nationhood -- on political citizenship. One might say that ethnicity is nationalized, while nationality and nationhood are ethnicized. In western Europe, in contrast, after decades of heavy labor migration and subsequent family reunification, public attention has focused on immigrant ethnicity, while ethnic claims have not generally been framed as national claims.

There are, of course, important exceptions to this pattern on both sides. In much of east central Europe, there are fundamental issues associated with the large, socially stigmatized, spatially segregated, and in large part economically marginalized Gypsy or Roma population (Barany 2002). These issues are sui generis and cannot be neatly subsumed under our usual conceptual rubrics. Depending on how Roma are represented by others, and how they represent themselves, they can be conceived as an ethnic group, a national group, a caste, or a social underclass (Vermeersch 2003). In western Europe, on the other hand, ethnicity sometimes involves claims to territorial nationality or nationhood, and the politics of ethnicity then becomes
Brubaker, Ethnicity, Migration and Statehood in Post-Cold War Europe, East and West

a politics of national autonomy and self-determination. This is true above all in Spain, Belgium, and Britain, all of them multinational (and not simply multi-ethnic) polities. There is also the interestingly ambiguous case of Italy, where the Northern League sometimes claims that northern Italy, or Padania, is a distinct nation. Yet only in the case of Northern Ireland -- the western European case most similar to the classic national conflicts of central and eastern Europe -- is a cross-border “kin” state or ethnic homeland involved in any significant way. As a result -- and notwithstanding the political violence associated with Irish, Basque, and Corsican nationalist movements -- this type of ethnonationalist politics is less threatening to states than the characteristic eastern European configuration.

A further crossover, blurring the sharp outlines of the east-west distinction, is that just as ethnicity is nationalized -- understood as nationality -- in some western European as well as in most east central European cases, so too nationality and nationhood may be ethnicized in western as well as in eastern Europe. And this is true not only for ethnoregional nationalisms. In response to growing Muslim and non-European immigrant populations, national self-understandings have also been ethnicized, to some degree, even in the so-called state-nations of northern and western Europe, in countries with traditionally state-framed understandings of nationhood.

Ethnicity in east central Europe, I have suggested, often takes a specifically national -- and nationalist -- form. Yet despite this potentially explosive configuration, and despite the resurgence of nationalism that accompanied the collapse of communist regimes, ethnic violence has been less
widespread, ethnic mobilization less strong, and ethnic identity less pervasively
significant than is ordinarily assumed. Having made a good part of my
professional living recently off ethnicity and nationalism in eastern Europe, I have
no interest in minimizing their significance. In general, however, I think that
discussions of the region are overly ethnicized and that an exaggerated focus on
ethnicity and nationalism risks crowding out other, often more important
theoretical and practical perspectives (Brubaker et al 2006, chapter 6).

Of the ghastly violence in Yugoslavia and parts of the former Soviet
Union since the end of the Cold War we need no reminder. But as Tom Nairn
(1995, 91-2) put it, even though one would certainly not want to make light of
these terrible conflicts, one should also beware of "making dark" of them.
Ethnonationalist violence has been limited to a relatively small part of eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union – overwhelmingly concentrated in the former
Yugoslavia, Transcaucasia, and the North Caucasus. One should remember,
moreover, the violence that has not occurred, the dogs that have not barked. In
this perspective, what is striking is the relatively peaceful character of the
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Consider, for example, the 25 million
Russians stranded as minorities in nationalizing successor states by the breakup of
the Soviet Union. Many analysts -- myself included, in the early 1990s --
thought that at least some of these Russians would be the flashpoints of
ethnonational conflict and violence. Yet outside the self-proclaimed "Dniester
Republic" in Moldova, successor state Russians have been neither the objects nor
the perpetrators of nationalist violence (Laitin 1998, chapter 12; Melvin 1998; Braun 2000).

What about ethnic and nationalist mobilization? Here too there is a case-selection bias at work. We pay attention to the spectacular moments of high mobilization -- the human chain across the Baltic republics in 1989, the great crowds that filled the main squares of Yerevan, Tbilisi, Berlin, Prague, and other cities in 1988-90. But these have been the exception, not the rule. Moments of high mobilization have been few and ephemeral. Even where "nation" was a galvanizing category at one moment, it was not at the next. On the whole, especially since 1990, people have remained in their homes, not taken to the streets. In conspicuous contrast to interwar east central Europe, demobilization and political passivity, rather than fevered mobilization, have prevailed. Much has been written on the strength of nationalist movements in the former Soviet Union, not enough on their comparative weakness.  

There is, moreover, a kind of optical illusion involved in the view from afar. From a distance, one risks taking too seriously the claims made by ethnonational entrepreneurs -- who have indeed proliferated as ethnic modes of claims-making have become more legitimate -- and not asking to what extent they really speak for those in whose name they claim to speak. This is what anthropologist Katherine Verdery (1991, p. 6) has called the “is-anyone-listening problem.” One should not forget that people do not necessarily respond particularly energetically or warmly to the nationalist utterances of politicians who claim to speak in their name.
In the Transylvanian town of Cluj, where I conducted fieldwork for a recent book, a bitterly nationalist local politics set majority Romanian against minority Hungarian claims (Brubaker et al 2006.) Yet there was very little nationalist mobilization by ordinary people, and there was considerable public indifference to the endless cycles of nationalist talk, and to the Romanian national colors in which the town’s public space was saturated during the 12 years in which a radically nationalist mayor occupied City Hall. This made palpable for me the striking discrepancy between nationalist politics -- which often seems to run in a sphere of its own, unmoored from its putative constituencies -- and the cares and concerns of ordinary people in everyday life. And there are many parallels elsewhere in the region. The general political passivity of Russians in Soviet successor states, for example, has been striking, despite various attempts to mobilize them.

Nearly a half century ago, sociologist Dennis Wrong (1961) criticized Parsonian functionalism for its "oversocialized conception of man." Much social analysis today is informed by what might be called an overethnicized conception of history, politics, and social interaction. The ethnic categories deployed by political entrepreneurs are often uncritically adopted by social analysts. As a result, the salience of ethnicity tends to be assumed rather than demonstrated; ethnic identities are ascribed to persons who may define themselves in other terms. Ethnicity and nationalism need to be understood as particular ways of talking about and experiencing the social world and as particular ways of framing political claims, not as real boundaries inscribed in the nature of things. Reducing
this to a formula, I would say that ethnicity is a perspective on the world, not a thing in the world (Brubaker 2004, Chapters 1 and 3). In some contexts, ethnicized ways of talking about the social world and framing political claims have deep resonance, and they powerfully structure how people think and talk and act in everyday life, as well as how they understand and act on their political interests. At other times and places, the language of ethnicity and nationalism deployed by political entrepreneurs falls on deaf or simply indifferent ears.

Migration

Like ethnicity -- and in part, of course, in connection with ethnicity -- migration too has become a central issue throughout Europe. But just as patterns of politicized ethnicity differ, so too do patterns of migration. First, and most obviously, the problematics of migration in western Europe have focused on immigration, especially from outside the region, while in eastern Europe questions of migration have been, in the first instance, about emigration -- seen both as a problem (in so far as it involves the disproportionate outmigration of highly educated or skilled younger people) and as a solution (a solution for individuals, in so far as temporary work abroad or permanent emigration offers a means of coping with economic dislocation or a way of getting ahead; a solution for the state, in that it generates remittances; or a solution for nationalists, if it removes or weakens "unwanted elements").
As a corollary of this basic difference, migration has been experientially marginal in western Europe. Migrants and their distinctive cultural practices have of course become conspicuously visible and central to everyday experience in many western European cities and towns. But migration itself -- even in former countries of emigration such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, -- is something that others do. In eastern Europe, by contrast, migration has become experientially central, figuring pervasively in the way ordinary people think and talk about their plans, strategies, dreams, and hopes (Brubaker et al 2006, chapter 11).

Within western Europe, migration has of course become more free with the enlargement of the European Union (EU), the (delayed) introduction of free movement for citizens of new EU member states, and the abolition of internal frontiers within the Schengen zone. But in much of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, migration has become less free, in certain respects, as political space has contracted; as borders, visas, and new citizenships have been introduced; and as the initially open door with which Western countries welcomed migrants fleeing collapsing communist regimes quickly closed. In other respects, to be sure, migration possibilities there have expanded. In particular, citizens of most east central European countries no longer require visas to travel to EU countries. This does not, of course, grant them the right to work, and even after the eastward enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007, existing member states can limit labor migration from new member states for a transitional period of up to seven years, though not all have done so. But the ability to travel
without the hurdles and indignities of having to seek a visa nonetheless marks a significant improvement for citizens of these countries (and also, of course, makes it easier to work without documents).

In western Europe -- to highlight a final stark dimension of difference -- migration involves mixing, and generates new forms and degrees of ethnic, racial, linguistic, and religious heterogeneity, together with the new challenges to national self-understandings and the new forms of politicized ethnicity sketched above. In eastern Europe, much migration -- not only in the last decade, but over the last century -- has involved ethnic unmixing, reducing rather than increasing heterogeneity (Brubaker 1995). This is notoriously the case, of course, for the infamous instances of forced migration -- starting with the Balkan Wars at the beginning of the 20th century, via the massive displacements during and after the Second World War, to the Balkan wars at century's close -- that have come to be known as "ethnic cleansing" (Naimark 2001; Ther and Siljak 2001). But it is also the case for quieter, less dramatic forms of ethnic unmixing, involving, for example, the migration of Germans from Poland, Russia, and the former Soviet Union to Germany; of Hungarians from Romania, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Slovakia to Hungary; of Russians from various Soviet successor states to Russia; and of Jews from the former Soviet Union to Israel (Brubaker 1998; Joppke 2005).9

Of course, patterns of migration are a great deal more complicated than this. "Western Europe" and "Eastern Europe" are not single places but differentiated series of places, differently positioned -- for economic, political,
and geographic reasons -- with respect to migration flows. Consider just one example. In the more prosperous east central European countries -- especially Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia\textsuperscript{10} -- emigration pressures are weaker, while labor migration from points further east, and requests for political asylum from Asian and African as well as eastern European countries, have emerged as significant issues. In this respect, these countries may be following in the path of Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece, which made the transition from emigration to immigration countries during the last quarter-century. Russia, too, has become a key destination for migrants, mainly from other Soviet successor states.

More than a decade and a half after the end of the Cold War, it is worth keeping in mind the migration that has not occurred from -- and within -- eastern Europe. In 1990, experts warned of an "exodus," a "human deluge,"\textsuperscript{11} an "invasion" of "hungry hordes," a "mass migration on a scale unseen since World War II,"\textsuperscript{12} a "flood of desperate people," a modern-day \textit{Völkerwanderung} like that in which "the Germanic people[s] moved west and destroyed the Roman Empire" as Peter Jankowitsch, chair of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Austrian parliament, put it. "How many Poles will stay in Poland?" Jankowitsch asked rhetorically. "How many Romanians will stay in Romania?"\textsuperscript{13} Plenty, it turned out. Sizeable though westward migration has been in the experience and -- even more so -- in the social imagination of ordinary citizens of eastern Europe, its magnitude, for western countries, has remained modest. In the "frontline" states of
Germany and Austria, such migration has been much more significant, but even there its rhythms have been measured, not cataclysmic.

Around the same time, haunted by the Yugoslav refugee crisis, analysts envisioned convulsive episodes of forced or politically induced migration on a much vaster scale, pointing with special concern, in this context too, to the 25 million Russians outside Russia. Yet while many Russians have left Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the migration has been comparatively orderly, and the large majority of Kazakhstani Russians have chosen so far to remain in Kazakhstan.

**Statehood**

My final cluster of themes concerns the state. The restructuring of the state has been a major issue throughout Europe. But in this domain, too, questions have been posed in very different ways in different parts of Europe.

The most striking difference would seem to be this: while the reorganization of political space in western Europe has pointed -- at least in anticipation -- *beyond* the nation-state, the spectacular post-Cold War reconfiguration of central and eastern Europe has involved a move *back to* the nation-state. Apart from unified Germany, twenty-one of the twenty-three successor states to the multinational Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and binational Czechoslovakia expressly understand themselves as nation-states, i.e., as the states of and for the particular nations whose names they bear (and the two exceptions -- the Russian Federation and Bosnia and Herzegovina -- are
themselves closely linked to particular nations). If western Europe is entering a post-national age, the political context for much of eastern Europe is post-multinational. Just as the great Habsburg, Romanov, and Ottoman empires crumbled at the beginning of the "short twentieth century" (Hobsbawm 1994), leaving an array of nationally defined successor states, so too, at the close of the century, multinational states have again fragmented into sets of would-be nation-states.

Yet this view requires qualification, and not only because the massive eastward enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007 has blurred the west-east distinction. More fundamentally, the EU does not represent a linear or unambiguous move "beyond the nation-state" to a supra-national form of political authority, though the current crisis may be forcing certain moves in that direction. As Milward (1992) argued, the initially limited moves towards supranational authority worked -- and were intended -- to restore and strengthen the authority of the nation-state. What has been occurring is a complex unbundling and redistribution -- upwards, downwards, and in various oblique directions -- of previously tightly bundled powers and competencies. The resultant "multi-level" or even "neo-medieval" polity does not look much like a supra-national super-state: an oft-quoted remark describes the EU as an "economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm."14 Events of the last decade and a half, notwithstanding the Treaty of Maastricht and the announced formation of a common security and defense policy, have done little to undermine that view.15
Although there is no clear move beyond the nation-state, the classical model of unitary, centralized, sovereign statehood, in which all authority derives from a single central point, no longer comes close to describing political reality. Authority has been reconfigured, and competencies unbundled and redistributed -- not only to the EU (itself a set of institutions and authorities, not a single entity) but also to other international organizations, and to sub-national polities and jurisdictions. This raises fundamental questions about the changing nature of statehood and political authority.

Granted that the EU is not very state-like at present, how might it become more state-like in the future? What attributes historically associated with statehood might it come to acquire? What does its development imply about the statehood -- or, following J.P. Nettl (1968), the "stateness" -- of existing states? Are they becoming less state-like as they give up conventional sovereign powers, such as control over borders and over monetary and fiscal policy?

Once we revise our understanding of statehood to allow for the unbundling and sharing of powers and competencies previously monopolized by a single sovereign center, then questions of stateness also arise for lower-level polities emerging within federalizing or otherwise decentralizing states. To what extent do more or less autonomous but non-sovereign polities such as Catalonia, Flanders, and Scotland take on attributes of stateness as they gain new and often quite considerable powers and competencies, even while remaining parts of larger, more embracing states? This is a familiar issue in the literature on federalism, but that literature has been quite separate from the historical and
political sociological literature on the development of the modern state. The latter has defined the modern state as centralized and sovereign -- as monopolizing the means of coercion within a particular territory, in Weber's classic formulation -- and has cast the story of its development in teleological form, involving the progressive appropriation of previously dispersed powers by a single center. This perspective has marginalized the experience of federal states. Their very existence is something of an anomaly; they are by definition not very state-like.

The complex unbundling and redistribution of powers and competencies, in short, is forcing a fundamental rethinking of the very notion of "the state." The notion may prove too heavily encumbered by the political theory of sovereignty and its monist, unitarist connotations to be of much analytical use in conceptualizing the complex multi-level polity that is emerging.

The unbundling and redistribution of powers and competencies has important implications for ethnicity. These implications are particularly far-reaching where ethnicity is organized and expressed as territorial nationality. The devolution of power to regions may have no relation to ethnocultural nationality; but where regions with substantial powers of self-government coincide more or less closely with the territories of ethnocultural nations (as they do in the UK, Spain, Belgium, and to a certain extent in Switzerland), this provides a potential way of satisfying the claims of national self-determination within the framework of a wider state, rather than by secession. Ethnoterritorial federalism, however, has been vehemently rejected in East Central Europe and
Brubaker, Ethnicity, Migration and Statehood in Post-Cold War Europe, East and West

(despite – or precisely because of – the legacy of Soviet ethnoterritorial federalism) in Soviet successor states (Kymlicka 2001b).

The deepening and widening of the EU also has important implications for ethnicity. The EU provides various institutional sites for recognizing non-state actors, including ethnonationally distinct regions and transborder populations such as the Roma. Moreover, the eastward enlargement of the EU to include Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania has in a certain sense – largely but not exclusively symbolic – reunified the state-spanning Hungarian ethnocultural nation, which had been torn apart after World War I.

In eastern Europe, questions of statehood and stateness have been posed in quite different terms. There is, in the first place, the sheer proliferation of new states. Almost all of them, as noted above, have defined and constituted themselves as sovereign nation-states, drawing on highly institutionalized -- if outdated -- rhetorics and models of sovereignty and nationhood (Meyer 1987). These institutionalized "performances" of sovereign nation-statehood do not represent an unambiguous move "back to the nation-state." Almost all the new states are involved, in one way or another, in processes of regional integration, notably as members or candidate members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and/or the EU on the one hand or the Commonwealth of Independent States on the other. Yet the invocations of sovereignty and nationhood are not mere rhetoric. There is a real tension between the model of sovereign nation-statehood and that of supranational integration; the latter does not automatically trump the former. The model of sovereign nation-statehood
remains normatively more robust in eastern than in western Europe; it has its
attractions not only for newly constituted states but also for those newly freed
from the Soviet economic and security embrace.

Second, the successor states to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are not
only nation-states but *nationalizing states* (Brubaker 1996, 2007). They are
discursively construed as the states *of* and *for* the “core” ethnocultural nations
whose names they bear, and not as the states of and for all of their citizens,
regardless of ethnicity. Nationalizing states, moreover, involve not simply a
claim to primacy or “ownership,” but a call to action. The core nation is
represented as being in a weak or unhealthy condition, and action is needed, it is
argued, to promote its language, cultural flourishing, demographic robustness,
economic welfare, or political hegemony. Such action is understood and justified
as remedial or compensatory, needed to redress previous discrimination or
oppression suffered by the core nation. To varying degrees, and in varying ways,
these states have adopted formal and informal policies and practices informed and
justified by these ideas.

Third, there are the special "stateness" problems -- in the Linz and
Stepan's sense, not Nettl's -- posed by politicized ethnicity in eastern Europe. As I
indicated above, the ethnically framed challenges -- or perceived challenges -- to the
territorial integrity and boundaries of existing states are particularly delicate
in eastern Europe because they often involve cross-border links connecting
ethnonational claimants within particular states and a patron state abroad that
represents the same ethnocultural nationality.
Finally, while early understandings of post-communist "transition" posited the need to liberate economy and society from the grip of an overly strong state, more recent analyses have made almost the opposite argument. The post-Cold War moment of triumphant anti-statism has long passed. As Stephen Holmes and others argued in the late 1990s with respect to pre-Putin Russia, -- although the point had broader relevance for the region -- it was not the strength of the state, but its weakness, that threatened the basic rights and well-being of citizens. The "withering away of the state" in Russia and elsewhere in the 1990s destroyed the capacity to provide the most elementary public goods and services. Neoliberals increasingly concede what paleoliberals knew all along: a strong, even powerful state is a pre-condition for everything that they hold dear, including the orderly workings of markets, the protection of citizens against violence, and the enforcement of human rights. Hence the calls to strengthen and build up the state, to liberate what are in theory the distinctively public powers of the state from the clutches of those who have expropriated and in effect privatized them.

The force of renewed calls for a “strong” or “powerful” state depends of course on how we understand these terms. Here Michael Mann’s (1993, pp. 59-60) distinction between “despotic” and “infrastructural” power is helpful, the former denoting arbitrary power over civil society, the latter the power of state institutions to co-ordinate and regulate social life by penetrating and working through civil society. Despotic “strong” states may be infrastructurally “weak,” and vice versa. What is urgently needed in much of eastern Europe -- and throughout the Third World -- is an infrastructurally strong state, one that can
keep the peace, punish force and fraud, enforce contracts, collect taxes, provide
basic services, protect public health, implement legislation, and prevent wholesale
plundering of the land and its people by criminal and quasi-criminal networks.

State-building, then, is still very much on the agenda in eastern Europe. While western and parts of east central Europe move towards the unbundling and redistribution of previously concentrated powers, in much of eastern Europe we see (or at least hear about the need for) moves in the opposite direction, toward the rebundling and reconcentration of previously dispersed -- and in considerable part privately appropriated -- powers.23 Whether such changes will succeed -- whether an effective, infrastructurally strong state can be built -- is by no means certain. Over the long sweep of European history in the last millennium, sustained military competition eventually led to the weeding out of the most blatant forms of patrimonial administration.24 Today, however, pressures to reform conspicuously corrupt, grossly inefficient state administrations are much weaker. States (and other actors) continue to make war, but war no longer makes states the way it used to.25 The world-wide club of states includes a large and perhaps increasing number of “quasi-states” (Jackson 1990) -- organizations that are officially recognized and certified internationally as “states” yet fail to do the most elementary things that states are supposed to do, such as maintaining order throughout a given territory. Today, thanks to the reification and sacralization of existing state borders in prevailing international discourse and practice,26 such quasi-states can continue to exist, irrespective of their abysmal performance, with little threat that they will go out of business. Eastern Europe may not harbor the
worst specimens of this lamentable genre, and of course there are great differences within the region. In much of the region, however, the making of the modern state, far from being a completed chapter of history, remains a matter of great contemporary urgency.
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Notes

1 As the rich comparative literature on ethnicity makes clear (see, for example, Akzin 1966; Schermerhorn 1970; Francis 1976; Rothschild 1981; van den Berghe 1981, Part Two; Horowitz 1985), these are not the only ways in which ethnic heterogeneity can be socially organized and politically expressed. But this distinction does capture a key dimension of variation in the organization and expression of ethnicity in Europe. A broadly similar distinction has been introduced into political theory — especially into discussions of multiculturalism — by Kymlicka 1995. For an attempt to bring Western political theory to bear on ethnicity in eastern Europe, see Kymlicka 2001a.

2 Even when immigrants are concentrated in immigrant neighborhoods or enclaves, the nature and consequences of such territorial concentration are quite different than they are in the case of territorial nationality.

3 It is important to emphasize that ethnic heterogeneity is not intrinsically “national” in Eastern Europe; rather, it came to be understood in national terms (Brubaker et al 2006, p. 30).

4 This is obviously an important and contested topic in its own right, but it is beyond the scope of this paper.

5 For a critical analysis of the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, see Brubaker (2004), chapter 6.

6 Just as Roma straddle conceptual borders, they cross state boundaries as well. Some of the ugliest episodes of immigration control in the 1990s were driven by efforts to control their unwanted movement.
A similar point could be made about western Europe. Substantial literatures address the rise of xenophobic, radical-right, or national-populist parties (for overviews, see Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall 1998) and of anti-immigrant violence (Björgo and Witte 1993). Again, without minimizing the significance of the new right parties, or still less that of the appalling attacks on asylum seekers and other foreigners in Germany and elsewhere, one should not overestimate the strength of xenophobic nationalism in western Europe.

There has been a good deal of concern with intra-EU migration, but mainly in terms of how it articulates with immigration from outside the region, given the need -- since abolition of internal frontiers within the Schengen zone -- for EU states to harmonize external admissions policies.

Even as it involves a reduction in ethnic heterogeneity in the countries of origin, such migrations of ethnic unmixing generate new forms of ethnic or quasi-ethnic heterogeneity in the putative national homelands: ethnic Hungarians from Romania are treated as "Romanians" in Hungary, while Jews from the former Soviet Union are treated as "Russians" in Israel. On the ambiguous and contested national identity of ethnic Hungarian migrants to Hungary, see Fox 2003.

These are the main "buffer" or "transit" countries between eastern and western Europe.


Boston Globe, November 1, 1990.

Leading European intellectuals critical of the war in Iraq called for a "core Europe" capable of serving as a counterweight to American hegemony (Derrida and Habermas 2003), but as Paul Kennedy (2003) pointed out in reply, there are substantial political and institutional obstacles to this occurring.

In certain respects these powers and competencies may be more substantial, and more state-like, than those of the EU.

The unbundling and redistribution of powers and competencies has implications for immigrant ethnicity as well. The German Länder, for example, have adopted differing policies regarding the wearing of Islamic headscarves by teachers (Joppke forthcoming).

In this context, of course, “Eastern Europe” and “Western Europe” increasingly overlap, thanks to the eastern enlargement of the EU.

One could also include Slovakia in this category; and while Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary are not new states, they too have displayed certain nationalizing tendencies since the change of regime.

What constitutes a challenge to the territorial integrity of a state is open to dispute. In Romania, for example, the demands made by the ethnic Hungarian party for autonomy are perceived (or at least publicly represented) by much of the Romanian political elite as a threat to the territorial integrity of the state, even though Hungarian minority politicians insist that, while they are challenging the
internal structure of the Romanian state (and its constitutional definition as a unitary nation-state), they pose no threat to its territorial integrity.

21 See Stark and Bruszt 1998, chap. 4, for an analysis and critique of this swing in the intellectual pendulum.

22 Holmes (1997) was writing before Putin's accession to the presidency in 2000. Putin has sought to strengthen and recentralize the state, notably by recovering powers previously appropriated by regions (Orttung 2001).

23 Note that powers may be dispersed in two senses: through the formally acknowledged decentralization of power (as in the various agreements that ethnofederal polities within Russia made with Moscow during the 1990s); and through the de facto appropriation by regional or local officials (or even by persons with no official standing, such as some warlords and criminal bosses) of powers formally held by the central state. On the concept of appropriation, Weber's discussion of patrimonial authority remains pertinent and richly suggestive (1978, 231ff).

24 For a comprehensive treatment of this theme, see Ertman 1997.

25 Much warfare in the ex-second and Third Worlds is carried out not by states, but by an array of quasi- and non-state forces (Fairbanks 1995, Kaldor 1999). Another, more fundamental reason, as Tilly notes, is that, with the gradual "filling-in of the state system," states have increasingly been made -- literally created, and allowed to exist, regardless of their infrastructural strength -- chiefly by other states (1975a, p. 46; 1975b, p. 636; 1990, Chapter 7).
Much has been made, in the last two decades, about the weakening of this tendency. But this confuses the weakening of the model of sovereignty, which has indeed occurred, with the desacralization and de-reification of state borders, which has not, at least not to a very substantial degree. Borders are normatively more permeable, but they remain highly reified, despite the important (though contested) exception of Kosovo. Note that (with the exception of Kosovo) the new states that emerged from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia already existed as states within formally federal states and already possessed their own borders, territories, and even (in principle) the right to secede from the wider federal state.
Creole Identity, Interethnic Relations, and Postcolonial Nation-Building in Guinea-Bissau, West Africa. PhD diss., Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle (Saale). Google Scholar. 2014. The Reform of Guinea-Bissau’s Security Sector. In challenging the post–cold war European security order so brazenly, Russia also chose to make a firm, and probably lasting, break with the West. Given Russia’s economic weaknesses and dependence on foreign financial institutions as well as foreign technology (especially in its energy industry), this break could have severe consequences for Russian competitiveness, and ultimately for the sustainability of the geopolitical challenge Putin’s Russia aims to pose to the West, it argues, that never broke with the logic of containment. That said, the authors were prescient in warning that Europe’s ability to sustain assistance to and interest in Ukraine should not be taken for granted (p. 154) in the face of mounting internal and external challenges.