Civil Resistance in Palestine: The village of Battir in 1948

Presented by

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Abstract

Instances of non-violent struggle have been successfully applied in Palestine. This dissertation focuses on and reveals the civil resistance campaign instigated by Hasan Mustafa, which saved the Palestinian village of Battir from destruction during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and the demarcation of the ‘green line’ in 1949. Battir abuts the Jerusalem Jaffa railway line and its fate was linked to that of the valuable railway line and the division of No-Man’s-Land (NML) south of Jerusalem. A cogent historical background situates and interrogates these events in context. Highlighting and describing how Hasan Mustafa developed a strategy for action implemented it and defended this achievement. A review of relevant features of non-violent struggle provides theoretical framework for analysis. Techniques, dynamics and outcomes of the civil resistance campaign are identified and commented upon in this case study.

The Preparing for Peace Project

In 2000, Westmorland General Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain, began a PEACE initiative, called Preparing for Peace, to explore these questions with international experts and witnesses. This is one of the papers.

The themes were:

- Can we demonstrate that war is obsolete?
- Is war successful in achieving its objectives?
- Can war be controlled or contained?
- What are the costs of war?
- What are the causes of war?
- Can the world move forward to another way?
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Abbreviations

MAC  Mixed Armistice Commission
NML  No Man’s Land
ICRC International Committee Red Cross
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Work Agency
UN  United Nations
GAA General Armistice Agreement
UNSCOP United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
Knesset Israeli Parliament
ICJ  International Court of Justice
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Civil Resistance in Palestine: The village of Battir in 1948

Jawad Botmeh

Introduction

This is a study of a civil resistance campaign in Palestine during the 1948 war and its aftermath. There is a hidden history of Palestinian non-violent struggle that has remained relatively unacknowledged. This study will try to shed light back onto one such case.

Non-violent struggle has been waged on behalf of many causes and groups in widely differing cultures and contexts. The dynamics and techniques of non-violent struggle have been successfully applied in the Arab world. Although this region seems to be in a perpetual cycle of violent conflict of one form or another caused by: western military intervention, foreign occupation, geography, oil, civil war, colonial legacy, disparities of wealth, artificial boundaries, ethnicity, religion and questions of legitimacy, there are remarkably many instances of non-violent struggle that are ignored and underreported (Crow et al 1990, pp 3-5). For example, several Arab states such as Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Sudan, Iraq, Jordan and the Gulf states, gained independence not through wars of liberation but through negotiations, mass strikes, demonstrations and civil disobedience (ibid.).

At the centre of this region’s troubles is the Palestinian Israeli conflict and whilst occupation, repression, armed struggle, war, terror and violence generally have dominated western media there are important non-violent images and cases. These include the Palestine general strike 1936-1939, Golan Heights Druze resistance 1981-1982, the Palestinian Intifada 1987-1993, the defence of Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem 1967-present. These forms of non-violent struggle are organic movements that found civil resistance to be the most suitable, available and effective technique to use.

However, there remain a large number of unpublicised yet successful instances of civil resistance in the region. This dissertation tries to uncover some of this hidden history of civil resistance in Palestine. It focuses on one case, the successful defence by Hasan Mustafa of his village Battir from Israel during the 1948 war and from the fateful demarcation of the ‘green line’ that followed in 1949. The purpose of the study is to explore how various ways of non-violent struggle were utilised and achieved within the historical context. In particular, it draws upon Sharp’s (1973; 2005) propositions regarding pragmatic non-violence, the dynamics of third party involvement, engagement and empowerment, Gultang’s (1989) ‘great chain of non-violence’, Martin and Varney’s (2003) communication perspective, to account for the successes in this particular case.

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4 See: Crow R.E. et al (1990, p.52)
Methodology

I lived my youth in Battir and witnessed the unique situation whereby the village used its lands inside Israel across the ‘green line’, the outcome, I was told, of actions by my grandfather, Hasan Mustafa, during the 1948 war. Although I never knew Hasan Mustafa, as he died in 1961 before I was born, family and villagers conveyed the image of a distinguished and highly respected man. Slightly sceptical about familial tendencies to pass on embellished and glorified accounts of ancestors, I thought it a worthwhile venture to test the popular narrative against more ‘objective’ and documentary evidence, as well as put my recently acquired insights regarding non-violence theory and practice to the test. I first embarked upon an attempt to reconstruct the historical context within which Hasan Mustafa acted drawing on documentary sources, in particular the writings of a new generation of Israeli historians. This was combined with the consultation of maps, historical documents, and, significantly, semi-structured interviews of those related to Hasan Mustafa (see appendix 11). Moreover, Hasan Mustafa’s own writings together with a number of articles about him and his work proved to be a valuable source of information. Finally, my personal extensive knowledge of the area was brought to bear in this study.

From the changes in successive official maps, contradictions between various testimonies, the broader historical knowledge and more specifically the recently exposed collusion between Israel and Jordan during the 1948 war, different pieces of the puzzle regarding Hasan Mustafa’s actions slowly emerged to provide a relatively good fit for a candid account of the practice of non-violence, and allowed to identify such mechanisms as ‘group lobbying’, ‘fraternisation’, ‘non-violent interjection’, ‘accommodation’, which, following Sharp (1973;2005), have come to be discerned as important elements of the praxis of non-violence.

This study was conducted with the constraint of limited access and movement to the outside and this has limited my capacity for presentation and often hindered me in further pursuing certain issues. Nonetheless, the main features of this particular instance of Palestinian civil resistance, dynamics and analysis have been laid out in the following four chapters as follows.

A first chapter seeks to chart the main features of two traditions of non-violence, principled non-violence and pragmatic non-violence with particular emphasis on the latter. The chapter discusses Sharp’s consent theory of power, non-violent action techniques, dynamics and outcome. It further outlines Boulding’s (1999) ‘three faces of power’, Galtung’s (1989) ‘great chain of non-violence hypothesis’, Martin and Varney’s (2003) communications perspective using ‘small world theory’. This chapter provides the theoretical framework to understand the dynamics and actions of protagonists in the case study presented in chapter three.

The subsequent chapter provides the historical background in which the case study is situated. I concentrate on certain aspects such as the British policy in Palestine, the collusion between Israel and Jordan and the Arab readiness for the 1948 war, as well as Battir’s history during the war. This is necessary in order to illustrate how Battir was successfully defended militarily during the 1948 war, forfeited by
King Abdullah when he ceded the railway line to the Israelis and was, subsequently, successfully won back through civil resistance in 1949.

The third chapter illustrates how Hasan Mustafa successfully mounted a civil resistance campaign to save the village and safeguard its lands in the spring of 1949. It illustrates how he developed a strategy of action after realising that Battir was forfeited; how he lobbied, engaged and interfered with the ‘division’ of no-man’s-land (NML) to secure Battir’s land, and how he defended this achievement by embarking on a constructive community development programme.

The final chapter provides analysis and conclusion to the case study. In the process, it teases out the mechanisms and dynamics of this successful civil resistance campaign, guided by the theory on non-violent struggle discussed in chapter 1. A table is constructed showing three distinct phases of action: developing a strategy, implementing the strategy and defending the movement. Examples of Hasan Mustafa’s actions and positions are allocated and categorised accordingly in this table. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks about the case study.
Chapter 1: Theory of non-violent struggle

1. Introduction:

In any social or political conflict people respond differently to oppression. Following Sharp (1973), responses to oppression can be divided between two categories: action and inaction. Some people instigate actions to defend themselves and try to influence change, while others do not. However, within the category of action, many forms exist. These include physical violence against persons, material destruction, peaceful institutional procedures, and non-violent action (Sharp 1973). The theory and practice of non-violent action can be divided into two traditions: principled non-violence and pragmatic non-violence (Martin and Varney 2003). This chapter outlines these two major paradigms of non-violence: the principled non-violence theories much associated with Gandhi; and the pragmatic approach spearheaded by Sharp. The chapter goes on to focus on Sharp’s pragmatic approach discussing his consent theory of power, non-violent action techniques, dynamics and outcome. It further outlines Boulding’s (1999) ‘three faces of power’, Galtung’s (1989) ‘great chain of non-violence hypothesis’ and ‘small world theory’ as discussed by Martin and Varney (2003). These authors provide the theoretical framework to understand the actions of protagonists in the case study presented in chapter three.

2. Principled non-violence:

In principled non-violence, refusal to use violence is a moral imperative. Gandhi is the most prominent figure from this tradition which believes that ends and means are inseparable; therefore means are ends in creation. Non-violence for Gandhi is a matter of principle; it is a moral necessity (Martin and Varney 2003). To tolerate or ignore oppression and exploitation is to support them. The best way to challenge evil is by opening the eyes of those who cause it. Violence shuts down the dialogue, which is the best way to bring about change of heart in the oppressor (ibid.). Richard Gregg proposed the concept of ‘moral ju-jitsu’ to describe how ‘the non-violence and goodwill of the victim act like the lack of physical opposition by the user of physical ju-jitsu to cause the attacker to lose his moral balance’ (quoted in Clark 2000, p.194).

Gandhi suggested that non-violent action worked through the process of conversion whereby principled non-violent activists demonstrated their commitment by refusing to fight back against vicious attacks, which would ‘melt the hearts’ of their opponents. Gandhi assumes that persuasion occurs through direct dialogue (Martin and Varney 2003). The calm perseverance of activists in face of brutal assault can lead to attackers reassessing their own values, touching the other’s heart and acting as a kind of ‘shame power’. But this requires the attackers to actually notice the

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5 Non-violent action has been given many names these include ‘civil resistance’, ‘positive action’, ‘non-violent resistance’, ‘passive resistance’, ‘non-violence’ and ‘people power’ (Sharp 2005). I will mainly use the term ‘civil resistance’ interchangeably with non-violent struggle.
activists. Pilots dropping a bomb are unlikely to see any protestor and are remote from consequences.

Johan Galtung (1989) submitted that direct persuasion is extremely difficult or unlikely because ‘there is a great social distance between the parties in conflict; sometimes the non-violent activists are dehumanised, so that their actions do not prick the conscience of the oppressor’. He sees the obstacle being psychological distance. The activists’ behaviour must resonate with the opponent’s understanding or subscribe to some shared meanings; otherwise there is no prospect for conversion (Martin and Varney 2003, p.138). They must share the same moral universe.

Martin and Varney (2003) suggest that communication is essential for effectiveness of non-violent action given that the channels are open and that relevant meanings are produced. They cite Gandhi’s Salt satyagraha of 1930, in which activists endured brutal assaults by police. But this did not lead the police to alter their beliefs. The effectiveness of the campaign was through the communicative process when the foreign journalist Webb Miller reported on the campaign for an international audience. This caused outrage in Britain and US. Therefore the non-violent action had its biggest impact on third parties via messages produced by an observer. Communication was central to Gandhi’s success. It was not primarily through conversion but rather through mobilization of third party opinion.

3. Pragmatic non-violence:

The second main tradition is pragmatic non-violence. It is based on the assumption that non-violent action is more effective than other means of action for opposing oppression and producing change. In particular, it is more effective than violent action (Sharp 1973). It is a pragmatic choice identified by what people do, not by what they believe. Sharp (2005, p.19) submits that in many cases people using these non-violent methods have believed violence to be perfectly justified in moral or religious terms. Yet, he adds, that for the specific conflict that they currently face they chose, for pragmatic reasons, to use methods that did not include violence. This is also true, I would submit, in the specific case study of Battir I discuss in Chapter three.

In instances that non-violent action was used in, only rarely did the participants reject violence in principle. Nonetheless, a pragmatic non-violent struggle is seen by participants as morally superior to one with violence (Sharp 2005). In most cases the motive was practicality chosen because of effectiveness. It was spontaneously applied by imitating actions elsewhere without a comparative evaluation of the merits of non violent action or violent action (ibid., p. 20).

This type of struggle was practiced under democracies, foreign occupations, dictatorial systems, and for securing or defending social, economic, civil and political rights (Sharp 2005). However, many misconceptions remain about this type of action. For example, for it to be used effectively people do not have to be pacifists or saints. Moreover, it does not depend on the fact that people are inherently ‘good’. ‘Good’ and ‘evil’ potentialities in people are recognised including extremes of inhumanity
and cruelty. Basically, it is a technique or a way of struggle that has been used to promote, as well as prevent, change. Not all nonviolent action supports a just cause either. Nor is non-violence a peculiarly Oriental phenomena. Sharp (2005, p.22) stresses that it is probably more Western if the widespread use of strikes and economic boycotts in the labour movements is taken into account.

Furthermore, non-violent action has nothing to do with passivity. On the contrary, it is what it says - an action which is non-violent, not inaction. Sometimes its use has been mixed with limited violence, but many times Sharp (2005, p15) submits, it has been waged with minimal or no violence. It is a means by which to conduct conflicts and can be very powerful; it is a means of combat comparable to a war insofar as it requires planning, courage, discipline and sacrifice. Finally it does not guarantee success and there is no assumption that the opponents will refrain from using violence against civil resistance (Sharp 1973).

To use non-violent action one does not need to reinvent the wheel, requiring a fundamental change in human beings or accepting new ideology. Neither is it based on belief in ‘turning the other cheek’ or loving one’s enemies. Instead Sharp (2005, p.23) stresses that it is based on the undeniable capacity of human beings to be stubborn, to refuse orders and do what they want to do, whatever happens to be their belief on the use of violence or not. He adds that massive stubbornness can have powerful political consequences. Because all governments and systems of power depend on the subordinated population, groups and institutions to supply them with their needed sources of power (ibid.).

3.1 Power:

Gene Sharp suggests that the basic premise of non-violent action is refusal by subjects to obey. The power of the ruler will collapse if consent is actively withdrawn since ‘repression by the opponent is used against his own power position in a kind of political ju-jitsu, and the very sources of his power thus reduced or removed’ (Sharp 1973, p. 11).

Sharp proposed that a ruler’s power is not intrinsic or durable but comes from outside. Power depends on many factors such as authority and legitimacy on the number of people willing to grant obedience, their skills and knowledge and control of material resources. Furthermore power depends on psychological and ideological factors such as habits and attitudes towards obedience and the extent of sanctions available to ruler (ibid.). Therefore, ‘when people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic human assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchical system requires’ (Sharp 1973, p.16). If they persist, it is argued, a ruler’s power will collapse because the rulers are dependent on other people to operate the system. The extent of their power is determined by the number and the location of people that are willing to give their consent and cooperation. Hence, Sharp (2005) adds that rulers are continually subject to influences and restriction by both people’s direct assistance and its withdrawal. There are limits and boundaries within which the leaders have to stay for their commands to be obeyed and for the population to
cooperate.\textsuperscript{6} This view of ‘power as consent’ is also shared by other writers on non-violence (Vinthagen, 2006).\textsuperscript{7} However, Sharp’s view of power as consents has its critics.\textsuperscript{8} Yet despite this criticism the basic premise of the ‘consent theory of power’ remains valid.\textsuperscript{9}

Boulding (1994, 1999), then again, submits that power is a very complex phenomenon and distinguishes ‘three faces’ of power. First, threat power, whereby the person is forced to do something by means of a threat that something will be done to him or her if they fail to comply. The power of the law works with such specific threats, which result in considerable behavioural change. For example, pay for your parking space otherwise you’ll be fined. Military threats, Boulding continues, are much more vague and hence, are weak in influencing behaviour, ‘you do something nasty to me and I will do something nasty to you’. However, the dynamics of threat system depend on the responses to this threat, he lists four responses, submission, flight, counter threat (deterrence) and finally ‘disarming behaviour’ (Boulding 1999). This last possibility is important in the theory of non-violence which seeks to turn the generator of threat into a friend and draw them into a larger community which included the threatened. A second form of power is economic power.

The third is ‘integrative power’ which is the most important face of power according to Boulding. This is the power of legitimacy, persuasion, respect, loyalty, community and so on. ‘In a very real sense power is a gift to the powerful by those over whom the power may be exercised, who recognise the power as legitimate’ (Boulding 1999, p.11). Threat power and economic power would be hard to exercise if they were not supported by integrative power; that is if they were regarded illegitimate. Any actual exercise of power tends to involve all three faces of power. The loss of legitimacy has considerable effects in producing defiance in the threat system hence; integrative power is the most fundamental form of power (ibid.). This is a form of power which is central in the main case study described in chapter 3 below. Boulding (1999, p.15) suggest another fourth face of power which is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{6} Disobedience when it comes is not total or absolute, Sharp (2005) suggests that people may refuse to provide sufficient support to effectively maintain the rulers position and to enable them to implement their policies
\item \textsuperscript{7} Such as Zunes (1999), Ackerman and Kruegler (1994)
\item \textsuperscript{8} Burrows criticises Sharp for ignoring the fact that power can be sustained without the consent of certain groups, which are usually excluded, but still ruled (quoted in Vinthagen 2005). Also, some leaders might compensate for lack of internal power with external power alliances such as international finance agreements. Nevertheless, this criticism does not undermine the ‘consent’ theory in totality, but it means that to be effective non-violent action should be carried out by groups upon which the target power-holder depends (ibid.). Vinthagen (2006), depending on a Foucaultian analysis, maintains that citizens’ capacity to resist depends on whether or not power has the ability to shape people and if so, then power is within us as individuals and in our culture. Hence, Sharp ‘simplifies the ability of power to influence the conditions of resistance… With simplified concept of power, comes a simplified concept of resistance’ (Vinthagen 2006, p.9)
\item \textsuperscript{9} For a truly universal power theory the work of Foucault and non-Anglo-Saxon based conceptions of personality and society have to be incorporated and tested. Instead of a free willed bounded individual, social constructionist psychological approach of a dispersed personality living within society and is influenced/shaped by discourse and power. The ‘subject positions’ that individuals ‘choose’ to locate themselves within the discourse and the ‘interpretive repertoires’ that people depend upon are crucial for the understanding of power relations within different society especially those in ‘collectivist societies’ and high context cultures.
\end{itemize}
‘organizational power’ which stems from organized structures that help support ‘informal and unorganized non-violence’.

3.2 Dynamics and Techniques:

But how can activists practically challenge injustice to try and bring influence to bear? Sharp (2005) suggested this can be achieved by applying different methods and techniques of non-violent struggle. He listed 198 different types that can be used and these can be divided into three main categories:

a) Protest and persuasion; mainly symbolic acts such as demonstrations, marches, vigils, leaflets and slogans. These extend beyond verbal expression and stop short of non-cooperation and intervention. They seek to influence the opponents and to galvanise supporters. These are actions to send a message for example: communicating with wider audiences through newspapers and journal, group presentations and group lobbying, putting pressure on individuals by ‘haunting’ and ‘fraternization (subjecting persons to intense direct influence to convince them that the regime they serve or policies they are perusing are unjust)’ (ibid, p.53).

‘Fraternization’ as defined here by Sharp is, for example, one of the techniques used in the case study in chapter 3.

b) Non-cooperation; where people withhold and withdraw their social cooperation such as ostracism, stay at home and suspension of sporting events. Economic non-cooperation such as strikes, consumer boycotts, work to rule, and political non-cooperation such as stalling and civil disobedience. The impact of such methods depends on the numbers involved in the non-cooperation and the extent to which the opponents are dependent on the people or groups refusing cooperation.

c) Non-violent intervention in which the non-violent group takes the initiative by such means as sit-ins, non-violent obstruction and parallel government. Non-violent interjection is one such physical intervention technique whereby one’s body is placed between a person and the objective of his work or activity. Generally non-violent intervention is more risky for the participants than non-cooperation or protest and persuasion. This type of action is usually practiced by only small number of participants because of the form of the action and because participants must exercise more courage and discipline in face of severe repression than would usually be required, for example, from a strike participant. Non-violent interjection adequately describes the actions of Hasan Mustafa in the case study below.

When successful the non-violent action produces change in three different ways. First, conversion; when the opponent comes around to a new point of view. However, conversion is very difficult to achieve and many practitioners of non-violent struggle even reject conversion, believing it to be impossible or impractical (Sharp 2005).

Secondly, accommodation; when the opponent chooses to grant demands without changing his view point. Usually the situation would have been changed significantly by the conflict that the opponents must accept some changes. Some of the factors leading to accommodation include the perception that violent repression is no longer appropriate or that the authority is eliminating a nuisance by
accommodating some of their demands, and the authorities might be adjusting to opposition within their own ranks therefore acting to prevent its growth (ibid.).

Thirdly, non-violent coercion; when change is achieved against the will and without the opponent’s agreement, they are not converted and have decided not to accommodate the resisters. However, power shifts in a way that leaves opponents with no choice but to accommodate these demands. (Sharp 2005). Accommodation is the main way by which change occurs in my case study below, however, these three categories are not mutually exclusive or can be clearly demarcated.

The application of non-violent methods and techniques mentioned above produces a fluid and changing situation therefore a grasp of the dynamics of these techniques is necessary. Sharp’s analysis of the dynamics of non-violent action provides a way of understanding the evolution of mainly mass campaigns, in which non-violent action provides the tools for challenge and eventual transformation of oppressive systems. The dynamics of non-violent action include

- Laying the groundwork for non-violent action by assessing resources, investigation, identifying sources of power, setting goals, organise the movement and assure quality of action.
- Making challenges, this usually brings on repression and creates changes in the resisters group as well as the targeted one. Polarisation occurs followed by shifting power. Repression is an acknowledgment of the seriousness of the challenge.
- Building solidarity and discipline to oppose repression by sustaining morale through maintaining rapport, generating incentives to carry on the struggle, reducing ground for submission and imposing restrain or sanctions.
- Building support, after repression ‘political jiu-jitsu’ then occurs in which violence by the regime against non-violent actors is used by activists to generate greater support and hence resistance. Try to win uncommitted third parties.
- Achieving success by conversion, accommodation or non-violent coercion as explained above.
- Redistributing power since the struggle against the opponent builds self-esteem in resisters. Individual and social empowerments are results of participating in non-violent action, which correlates with general power distribution (Sharp 2005; Crist et al 2002).

The nature of non-violent struggle makes it possible to elicit support from the opponents’ camp and from third parties giving the activists the opportunity to regulate and reduce the power of the opponent. Moreover Galtung (1989, p.13) presented the ‘great chain of non-violence hypothesis’ and his idea that liberation is not only the responsibility of the oppressed. Intermediate groups can play a key role since they are links in the chain of non-violence. If the oppressed cannot directly change or influence the oppressor they can create sympathy among third parties who themselves have more influence with the oppressors. The chain may be long with several intermediaries between the oppressed and the oppressor. Moreover, Martin and Varney (2003, p.140) develops this hypothesis using communication perspectives.
They suggest that the gap between the oppressor and oppressed can be conceived not as social distance alone but it can be interpreted as a communication failure. Furthermore, if appropriate messages cannot ‘get through’ from the oppressed to the oppressor, the problem may lie in the absence or shortcomings of the intermediate groups. However, how many links does one need to form a ‘great chain’? Martin and Varney (2003, p.140) answer that:

‘s small world theory’ shows that in a network, if there are even just a few random connections, then it takes remarkably few links to span the gap between any two parties in the network…Small world theory suggests that in communicating against repression, there are plenty of potential intermediaries to make a fairly short chain, and hence absence of action is likely to be due to weaknesses in links rather than their unavailability.

Therefore, the potential for third party involvement is considerable and lack of action is the most probable cause for non-engagement. Once engaged third parties would be found and intermediaries can have a more decisive influence on the oppressor. Finally, empowerment is another outcome of non-violent action; this comes through the experience of participating in action against perceived injustice, giving rise to satisfying feelings of solidarity and mutual validation (Martin and Varney 2003, p. 220).

The dynamics of third party involvement, engagement and empowerment, as described here using the ‘great chain of non-violence’ and ‘small world theory’, will be used to explain the successes in the case study below. However, some historical background is necessary to situate the argument in its context, which I present in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 2: Historical Background and Context

1. Introduction:

There is often a hidden history of civil resistance in communities across violent zones of conflict. This kind of action is usually ignored because it is deemed not newsworthy. However, in certain cases, such as the one studied here, the achievements of Palestinian civil resistance outweigh those of battle or violent confrontation. The case study below tries to shed light on a story that is rooted in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and its aftermath, especially the demarcation of the ‘green line’ and the Jordanian–Israeli armistice agreement in 1949. The story centres on the successful defence of the Palestinian village of Battir, which lies on the railway line, six miles south west of Jerusalem. However, to follow the story of Battir during the war and understand its significance, it is necessary to locate it within the context of the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, Palestinian dispossession/catastrophe (‘Nakba’) and the first Arab-Israeli war 1948.

Moreover, the dynamics of the Battir’s story could not be adequately understood if its narration occurred within the prevalent traditional historical narrative of the 1948 war, which has depended to a large extent on the Israeli traditional narrative of that war. The latter submits that after passing the UN resolution on 29 November 1947 calling to partition Palestine into two states one Jewish and one Arab, the conflict intensified. The Jews accepted the resolution, but the Palestinians and the neighbouring Arab states rejected it. Great Britain did it utmost towards the end of its mandate to frustrate the establishment of the Jewish state. Several Arab states sent their armies into Palestine with the intent of killing the birth of the state of Israel. In the subsequent struggle the infant Jewish state (David) fought a desperate, heroic and successful battle for survival against overwhelming odds (Arab Goliath). During the war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled to the neighbouring Arab states, in response to orders from their leaders. After the war, the Israeli story continues, Israeli leaders sought peace but found no partner to talk to, and it was Arab intransigence alone that was responsible for the political deadlock that lasted decades.

This traditional Israeli version has been exposed by many Israeli historians to be deeply flawed, mainly amounting to Israeli propaganda. Shlaim (1999, p. 189) submits that:10

The traditional version is deeply flawed and needs to be radically revised in the light of the new information that is now available. To put it bluntly, this version is little more than the propaganda of the victors.

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10 See also Pappe (1988; 1992); Shlaim (1988); Morris (1988; 1993); Flapan (1987). These are collectively called ‘revisionist historians’ They challenge the Israeli traditional narrative of the 1948 war which remained unchallenged outside the Arab world until recently. They helped discredit the orthodox Israeli narrative and bring us closer to what actually happened. This revisionist narrative was not new to Arabs or the Palestinians who lived the reality and wrote their own history. Although welcomed, Masalha (1999, p. 211) observes how ‘there was something disturbing and annoying in these claims becoming valid only after Israeli Jews made them as if Palestinian historians were suspect of non-professionalism’.
Or, as Habiby said (quoted in Shlaim 1999, p. 172): ‘Conquerors, my son, consider as true history only what they themselves have fabricated.’ It is necessary therefore, in the light of this, to try to provide a cogent historical background, as what happened in Battir in 1948/9 is intimately intertwined with this history.

I outline below the main elements of the 1948 conflict, with particular attention for the British policy at the time, the balance of power and Arab readiness, and the Israeli-Jordanian relationship. The latter allow to illustrate how the 1948 war, far from being an open war between all Arabs and the Jews, resembled more a choreographed affair, the outcome of which was to a large extent pre-determined. This was especially so between the Israelis and Jordanians with blessing from the British Mandate authorities. As a result, and as illustrated in detail below, local tactical advantage and gains, such as Battir’s successful rebuttal of many attempts by Israeli force to capture it and the railway line it straddled, were nullified in the end to fulfil this strategic unwritten agreement between the high contracting parties, Israel and Jordan. An understanding of the general strategic context is crucial to situate the dynamics of how the village was, successively, first militarily defended by Palestinians, then forfeited by King Abdullah when surrendering the railway, and finally won back again through civil resistance.

2. Historical Background:  

By February 1947, Jews and Arabs realised that the British Mandate of Palestine was at an end, the date of which would later be set at 14th May 1948. The continuing influx of Jewish immigrants and the opposition of the Palestinians to the Zionist project lead to civil strife in 1947. Many diplomatic initiatives, commissions, inquiries were instigated to try for a negotiated agreement and accommodation of conflicting interests, but no agreement was reached. The question of who would rule Palestine after British withdrawal was left to the UN (Pappe, 2001). The United Nations Special Committee On Palestine (UNSCOP) was established to report on the situation in Palestine and their report was turned into a draft resolution for partition, which subsequently passed at the UN on 29th November 1947. Matters came to a head with this resolution and civil war between Jews and Arabs erupted.

The British policy between 29th November 1947 and 14 May 1948 was not hostile towards the Jewish state as the traditional Israeli view suggests. Pappe (2001) summed up the key to British policy during this period in two words: Greater Transjordan. According to Shlaim (1999, p.179), Bevin, then British foreign secretary, felt that if Palestine had to be partitioned, the Arab area could not be left to stand on its own but should be united with Transjordan. The author continues that, by February 1948, Bevin and his Foreign Office advisers were pragmatically reconciled to the inevitable emergence of the Jewish State. Yet, what they did not seem reconciled to was the emergence of a Palestinian state. On the one hand, a Palestinian state at the time was conceived by the British as a Mufti state, headed by Hajj Amin Al-Husayni, whom the British detested for allying himself with the Germans during the war. This was a constant feature of British policy since the end of the Second

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11 This section draws heavily on Pappe (2001,1999).
World War. On the other hand, a greater Transjordan would compensate Britain for the loss of bases in Palestine (Pappe 2001).

Therefore, King Abdullah was given tacit support to enlarge his kingdom by taking over the West Bank. In a secret meeting on 7th February 1948 between Bevin and Abul Huda, the Jordanian Prime minister, Britain gave Jordan permission to send the Arab Legion (Jordanian army) into Palestine immediately after Britain’s departure. However, Bevin threatened to withdraw material support and personnel if Jordan invaded areas allocated to the Jews by the UN. Bevin did not try to abort the birth of the Jewish State, he merely endorsed the understanding between King Abdullah and the Jewish Agency to partition Palestine between themselves and leave the Palestinians out in the cold (Shlaim, 1999; Pappe 2001).

The Palestinian leadership for their part did not prepare well for the end of the Mandate. They were crippled by internal strife and external pressures which prevented them from effective organisation and mustering of resources necessary to meet the challenges ahead. Their earlier success, during the Arab revolt 1936-39, of overcoming sectarian, clan and religious antagonisms was not repeated in 1947-49 (Pappe 2001). The Palestinian leadership was ill prepared and was overwhelmed by strong foes. It gradually allowed Arab states the political initiative in Palestine and the ‘expropriation’ of the Palestinian cause (ibid. p. 69). However, the Arab states were not committed to the Palestinian cause either.

The Arab governments were neither prepared nor preparing to fight after their rejection of the UN partition resolution. They believed that actions by Palestinians helped by volunteers from neighbouring countries would succeed in persuading the world community to stop implementing the UN partition plan. The Arab leaders merely ratcheted up their rhetoric. This gave the false impression, to the Palestinians, that the ‘Arab Armies’ would decisively defeat the Jewish forces, to catastrophic effect (Pappe 2001, p104).

Moreover, none of the Arab governments wanted to fight, each confronted with its own domestic problems, and, therefore, preferred a compromise. However, internal public pressure and demonstrations, which the leaders had helped instigate, forced their hands in the end. So, Arab countries sent forces to Palestine, which amounted, however, to no more than a token (Pappe 2001, pp.104-108). As a result, the balance of military power in the 1948 war was in favour of the Jewish forces. According to British experts, the Arab Legion was the only Arab army that was fighting fit if pitted against Jewish forces in Palestine at the time, the rest were no better than a police force. By mid-May 1948, the total number of Arab troops, both regular and

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12 In April 1948 the Jewish forces took over Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias, Safad and the Deir Yassin massacre occurred. This caused a great deal of apprehension in Arab capitals. This was the moment of truth when Arab leaders needed to match their rhetoric with action. They failed miserably, however, as they had never prepared or had considered concerted military action a real option.

13 The Egyptian army sent 10,000 troops joined by 3000 Syrians, 3000 Iraqis, 1000 Lebanese and 2000 volunteers and the Arab Legion deployed 60% of its forces. The latter was the only Arab army to devote such a large proportion of its troops to the campaign of Palestine.

14 The British envoys report at the time that the state of readiness of other Arab armies was dismal. The Syrian, Egyptian and Iraqi armies lacked ammunition, equipment and poor maintenance.
irregular, was about 27,000. The Jewish forces fielded 35,000 troops without counting second line troops in the Jewish settlements (Shlaim, 1999, pp. 181).\textsuperscript{15}

By April 1948, a few weeks before the end of the Mandate, when the Arab governments decided to go into action with inadequate forces, King Abdullah was in a good position to strongly influence events on the ground. He had the decisive force, the Arab Legion. Crucially, however, an understanding reached in negotiations with the Jewish Agency led the King to assign only limited objectives to his army, further weakening the Arab side (Pappe 2001, p. 113). It had been agreed with Golda Meyrson (Meir) in November 1947 that he would annex the UN-defined Arab state to Transjordan and in return had promised not to attack the Jewish state in the event of a war \textit{(ibid, p. 119)}.\textsuperscript{16} Pappe (2001, p.183) observes how this agreement ‘laid the foundation for mutual restraint during the first Arab-Israeli war and for continuing collaboration in the aftermath of this war’.

The only contentious issue that the Jewish Agency and King Abdullah could not agree on was Jerusalem and it was understood that the fate of the city would be determined on the battlefield \textit{(ibid, p.132)}. Except in the Jerusalem area, the Legion did not engage significantly in the war against the Jews. In this context, many Jordanian officers were dissatisfied about the way war was being run and considered the wholesale surrender of strong military positions unnecessarily.\textsuperscript{17} Similar dissatisfaction existed on the Jewish side, but the leadership by and large stuck by the agreements. The battle over Jerusalem ended in the de facto division of Jerusalem by September 1948.\textsuperscript{18}

3. Israeli-Jordanian Armistice Agreement:

Since King Abdullah had achieved his aims from the first week of the war, it was Arab pressure and the Israeli offensive that kept the Legion fighting. When the Israelis failed to take the Latrun area north of Jerusalem, negotiations started and an official ceasefire agreement for the Jerusalem area was signed on 30 November 1948 between the Jordanians and Israelis.\textsuperscript{19} The city would be divided according to the

\textsuperscript{15} Financially, the Jewish forces had the advantage as well since only 143,000 Palestinian pounds reached the Palestinians from the funds promised by the Arab league, compared with $28 million, which was the Jewish Agency’s military budget (Pappe 1994, p. 112). The situation deteriorated markedly after the first round of fighting for the Arab side whilst it improved in men and equipment for the Israelis as they replenished both (Shlaim 2000).

\textsuperscript{16} Some of the Jordanian ministers who knew of the secretive agreement with the Jews thought it was a risky and dangerous position to be effectively leading the campaign against the Jews whilst adhering to that agreement.

\textsuperscript{17} One such high-ranking officer was Colonel Abdullah Al-Tall. Some of these frustrated officers, and the general sentiment they engendered, would become instrumental levers of pressure utilised in the fight to save Battir as transpires further below.

\textsuperscript{18} There were two main bouts of fighting in the 1948 war: the first was from 15\textsuperscript{th} May until 11 June, followed by a ceasefire; the second was from 8\textsuperscript{th} July until the 18\textsuperscript{th} July. By the second bout, the Israeli forces had been replenished with new equipment, ammunition and men, whilst the Arab side was not. This overwhelmingly tipped the balance even further in favour of the Israeli forces.

\textsuperscript{19} The Egyptian army, which controlled Bethlehem and southern Palestine, did not sign a ceasefire and, from October onwards, the Israelis directed most of their attacks onto the Egyptian army controlled
respective positions of the two armies (Pappe 2001, p. 182). The Armistice negotiations continued without outside interference in December 1948 and January 1949 in Jerusalem and Shuneh (in Abdullah’s winter palace). Both parties preferred the negotiations to be continued locally, especially Abdullah, as this would allow him to intercede personally if need be and safeguard the agreement.

The real substance of the negotiation happened in Shuneh and Jerusalem, with the Rhodes negotiations of February 1949 mainly a sideshow. In March 1949, negotiations intensified, and, through belligerent posturing, the Israelis used their, by then, superior military strengths on the ground to extort more land from King Abdullah. Thus, on 30 March 1949, the bilateral armistice agreement was signed. A major component of the agreement was the establishment of a special Committee to finalise the partition of Jerusalem. Jordan attended the signing ceremony in Rhodes on 3 April 1949, where earlier Egypt, and Lebanon had signed bilateral Armistice agreements with Israel, and Syria followed suit in July 1949.

The ‘green line’ delimited in the armistice agreement at Rhodes, and demarcated on the ground at later date, resulted in the general armistice agreement map (see Appendix 2). The newly created lines were largely based on front line positions held by each side when cease-fire arrangements sponsored by the UN came into force at the end of the 1948 war (Brawer, 1990). In cases of irreconcilable disagreement on the division of a certain area between the pre-ceasefire battle positions, two parallel boundary lines were drawn, separated by a demilitarised zone of NML. This occurred mainly in and around Jerusalem as can be seen Figure 2.1 below. The green line marked the position of the Jordanian forces and the red line marked the position of Israeli forces and NML in between the lines. Battir in this map is firmly within NML.

areas. King Abdullah, however, was happy for the Egyptians to be neutralised and he did not come to their assistance. In addition both sides preferred this to Rhodos, since UN sponsored talks and resolutions where still talking about Jerusalem as an international city, while both sides wanted it as their own.

The Israelis demanded and got an area in the north of the West Bank called the ‘little triangle’ area. This consisted of fifteen Arab villages dotted in the Aara valley with a total population of 12,000. However, this agreement affected the lives of about 100,000 Palestinians living in 70 villages in the north of West Bank see appendix 9 (Abu-Sitta 2004). This was ratified by the Jordanian cabinet on 23rd March 1949 (Pappe, 1992; Newman 1995). (Pappe 1992, pp. 190-191) comments: “The Little Triangle passed to the Israelis on 1st June 1949. The Israelis lost no time and on the very same day began transferring some of the indigenous villages to make room for new Jewish settlements. In the view of Palestinian nationalists Abdullah had committed yet another act of treason.” This agreement was strongly criticised in public, although it was signed of as part of the Armistice agreement.

This is a bilateral committee without inter-nation supervision, which was set up under article 8 subsection 2 of the armistice agreement, to look into certain issues raised by the parties. The Special Committee ‘shall have exclusive competence over such matters as may be referred to it’. This is in contrast to the Mixed Armistice Commission, which had international supervision. Israel and Jordan preferred the Special Committee as it allowed them to carry on refining their understanding without outside interference.

Military officers from both sides and contemporary military thinking determined the course of the line and no thought was given to the emotional and physical dislocation of residents in areas affected. Communications routes, roads and railways, as well as commanding military positions were sought and contested stubbornly by both sides.
The ‘green line’ between Israel and Jordan was a barrier of total separation, hostile and closed. This resulted in a great deal of hardship and dislocation for the local population as it crossed the lands of 69 villages and two towns, separating them totally from their agricultural lands and sources of livelihood, and another 20 villages lost about 30% of their income (Brawer 1990; Morris 1993; Newman 1995). Battir was such a village.

24 The green line demarcation caused 28 villages to be emptied. The ‘green line’ roughly paralleled the foothills of the West Bank, therefore villages along the western fringes of the highlands lost most of their productive lands in coastal plains below (Brawer 1990; Morris 1993).
The Jordanian-Israeli armistice agreement was the most convoluted and least understood agreement of the four armistice agreements\(^{25}\). It represented a great achievement for Jewish forces and Israel wanted to consolidate its gains. In a speech to the Knesset on 4\(^{th}\) April 1949 Ben Gurion said, [Emphasis added]:\(^{26}\)

> I would like the Knesset to be aware of the fact that… these Armistice Agreements are not yet peace…nor are we even near to making peace with the Arab countries. Neither have we determined stability and security for all the areas covered by the agreements, particularly in and around Jerusalem. regarding which negotiations will still be held between us and Transjordan, without the participation of the UN. Negotiations will also still be held about… **renewing the railway connecting Tel Aviv-Jaffa with Jerusalem and Haifa**...

The fate of Battir village was intertwined with that of the valuable railway line.

### 4. Battir during the war:

Battir is a Palestinian village situated about six miles south-west of Jerusalem on the railway line and had a population of about 1,000 people at the time. During the war (1947-1949) Battir suffered regular shelling, attacks and skirmishes with Jewish forces since it was situated on the southern edge of the ‘Jerusalem corridor’ and also straddled the railway line.\(^{27}\) Control over the Jerusalem-Jaffa railway line was an Israeli war aim. As a result, Battir was a front line village, together with other villages that abutted the railway line such as al-Qabu, al-Walaja, al-Malha, Sharafat and Beit Safafa. However, despite repeated efforts, it was never occupied by Israeli forces. Tal (2004, p327) writes that on 17\(^{th}\) July 1948:

> General Staff [Jewish forces] ordered the 6\(^{th}\) Brigade to seize the opportunity and to occupy ‘Ayn Karim, al-Maliha and Batir… Batir controlled the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv railway, and its occupation would remove another obstacle to the undisrupted operation of the railway. Most of the area was occupied except for the railway route, which was successfully guarded by Palestinian and foreign irregulars.

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\(^{25}\) Following the general demarcation some small local rectifications of the local boundary took place over the next few months and years. These mainly adjusted the line 10’s of yards to reunite a well with a village or provide access. This happened in Jalboun, Barta’a and Wadi Foukin, for example, but these were the exception rather than the rule. These were agreed upon by MAC with UN supervision and amounted to only very small changes. (Brawer, 1990; Newman 1995)

\(^{26}\) http://www.jcpa.org/art/knesset2.htm

\(^{27}\) A strip of land taken by Israeli forces that linked west Jerusalem with the cost and called the Jerusalem corridor because it was enveloped from north and south by Arab controlled villages. Israel wanted to widen that corridor at the expense of Palestinian villages.
Although an official truce between the Israeli and Jordanians was enforced on 19th July 1948, random clashes continued. Another round of fighting for Battir occurred in mid-October 1948, when two operations were planned by Israeli forces which were mainly directed against the Egyptian controlled Bethlehem-BeitJala sector. Operation Hahar (mountain) sought to extend the Jerusalem corridor and was successful. Operation Yekev (Winery) was to take over the Jerusalem-Jaffa railway and failed. Moshe Dayan and his brigade (6th) failed in their mission to control the railway line, Battir and Al-Walaja were not occupied (Tal 2004, pp.407-8).

The inhabitants of Battir during this war hosted refugees from other villages closer to Jerusalem such as Ein Karem and al-Malha that had been destroyed or were under attack (INT2; INT4). Moreover, most civilians from the village had to leave the village for safety on two occasions, leaving primarily armed defenders behind. The first time was in mid-May 1948 when villagers left for just over a month. The second time the civilians left the village after the October 1948 attack and stayed away for about seven months. The Israeli forces controlled the rail track south of Battir up to the coast, but they did not control the station at Battir nor the tracks on Battir land. The situation remained tense in the village and the Israelis continued shelling and sniping sporadically at the village from across the valley (INT4; INT2).

When the war ended and the armistice agreement was signed, Battir, al-Walaja, al Qabu and half of Beit-Safafa found themselves in the NML (see Figure 2.1). This would have meant that these villages should be vacated. The Jewish forces wanted control of the railway line and Abdullah ceded it to them to the surprise and delight of Ben Gurion since nothing was requested in return (Shlaim 1988, p.446).

Abdullah al-Tal, the commander of Jordanian forces in Jerusalem narrates in detail how this was achieved through direct negotiations between Dayan and other Jordanian army officers in Amman at a meeting on 1st April 1949. He stresses that Battir, al-Qabu and al-Walaja were never conquered or occupied and were never in the NML, but Jordanian officers accepted Dayan’s map showing them to be so and they did not challenge him about this issue (1959, p550). Al-Tall implied that Dayan had tricked them and confused the maps, but also that the Jordanians had colluded with this. The agreed map was appended to the armistice agreement and signed on 3rd April 1949 (see Appendix 2).

Later the same officers from both sides met again on...
18 April 1949 to divide NML south of Jerusalem and replace the two truce lines (red and green lines in Fig 2.1) by a single line. 33 The Jordanian officers proposed a map that they brought from Amman and it was accepted by the Israelis. Another official Mixed Armistice Committee (MAC) meeting took place on 25th April 1949 where it was officially ratified. 34

However, the final agreement reached between the Israelis and the Jordanians, after King Abdullah’s concession, was that the new single line ‘dividing’ the NML in that sector (south of Jerusalem) would run 200 yards south of the railway line, hence awarding the Israelis the railway line, al-Walaja and dividing Beit Safafa (Al-Tall, 1959; Shlaim 1988, 446). According to this proposal Battir would lose 16 houses of the village and a substantial part of its agricultural land north of the new single ‘green line’ (INT1; INT4).

The Israelis were desperate to control the full length of the railway and the Jordanians had conceded to that demand by agreeing to hand over those four villages, which now fell within NML. In the face of the threat to Battir a ‘village son’, however, instigated civil resistance to save it and its lands. It is narrated in the subsequent chapter how this civil resistance was mounted.

Jerusalem, limiting the NML to the Latrun area. The ‘heavy handed, devious and plainly unscrupulous methods employed by Dayan’ (Shlaim 1988, p326-328), apparently paid off.

33 This was not a Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) meeting as it stated but a Special Committee meeting effectively between Col Ahmed Sudki E-Jundi and Capt. Ali abu Nowar on behalf of Jordan and Col. Moshe Dayan and Cr. B. on the Israeli side. The Special Committee structure allowed both sides this freedom to manoeuvre. Moreover, the outcome of this meeting was ratified by the official MAC meeting on the 25th April 1949

34 At the time the daily newspaper “Al Defa’a” published what Al-Tal called completely misleading news about these meetings to suggest that Jordanians had gained back some villages, which he contends they never lost in the first place (1959, p558). However, the population, especially in the villages concerned, knew the exact state of affairs: not only where these fictitious gains but also a sell out. Al-Tall’s (1959) account of the status of the NML villages is not only corroborated by the oral history of the villagers themselves. Tal (2004), an Israeli historian quoted above, also confirmed that al-Walaja and Battir were never conquered.
Chapter 3: Civil Resistance Campaign

1. Introduction:

As was documented above, Battir was never conquered. Nonetheless, it was forfeited by King Abdullah when he ceded the railway line to the Israelis. However, through a campaign of civil resistance, effective presence on the ground, political guile, lobbying, and sheer courage the village of Battir was not entered by the Israeli forces in 1949 and arguably saved from destruction by actions orchestrated by a ‘Village Son’, Hasan Mustafa (Al-Khalili 1983; INT1; INT2; INT3).35 Hasan Mustafa’s ability to influence events in a war situation and successfully safeguard his village did not come out of thin air. It was the result of a successful campaign that began years earlier and continued years later.

Below I explain how he succeeded and what enabled him to compel such a compromise from both the Jordanians and Israelis after they had already decided to evacuate the village and more crucially, how he defended that success and nurtured it. In order to understand exactly how such a success was possible this chapter narrates the story in a chronological order, reconstructed on the basis of both interviews and documentary sources. In the subsequent chapter, an analysis is provided with the intention of teasing out the mechanisms and dynamics of this successful action.

2. Development of Strategy:

Hasan Mustafa’s involvement was part of his strong commitment to his local community and country. He was a concerned individual, activist, writer and broadcaster. Hasan Mustafa was born in Battir in 1914 a son of a tribal chief. He graduated from American University Cairo in 1935. Hasan Mustafa shared many of his country’s burdens and was active in resisting Zionist and British authorities’ policies in Palestine through his writings, organising strikes and empowering local population and increasing their ability to stand fast (INT2; INT1). The British authorities considered him persona non grata and, in 1938 he, together with other activists, had to leave Palestine to Iraq, where he worked in a teachers training college in Baghdad, until 1941.36 Upon his return, he worked with Khalil Al-Sakakini in ‘Al-Nahda’ College in Jerusalem where he taught as well. He wrote articles in daily

35 It is worth noting that Battir’s fate could have been like those of al-Qabu al-Walaja or half of Beit-Safafa as they shared the NML status in south Jerusalem, indeed Al-Kalidi (1992, p.323) wrote about al-Walaja saying: ‘However, the occupation of al-Walaja was not permanent and a New York Times report on 20 October stated that the Israelis were driven out of the village by successful Arab counter attacks. The History of the war of Independence corroborates this account noting that the village was later handed over to Israel according to the terms of the armistice agreement signed with Jordan on 3 April 1949. The Israeli army entered the village, along with three other villages in the Jerusalem area (Bayt Safafa, Battir, and alQabu) in the weeks following the signing of the agreement.’ His remarks about Battir are not quite accurate as will become apparent from this narrative. Al-Walaja was ceded but so was al-Qabu which is south of the railway. Battir remained because of the civil resistance.

36 Activists such as Darwish Mukdadi, Abdul Khader Al-Husseini, Ibrabim Toukan, Anwar Abu Khadra and Rashad Labibi and many others.
newspapers and magazines at the time as well authoring 2 books. He also produced and presented a radio program at ‘Near East Radio’ in Jaffa called ‘Rawiat Al-Sabah’. He was an active and establishing member of ‘Nadi Al-Ithad Al-Karawi’ (Rural Union Club) in Jerusalem in 1945 with many other rural intellectuals. This was an influential forum for debating, promoting and furthering rural issues, which were largely ignored by the ‘urban’ intelligentsia at the time.

He was an avid witness to what was going on in Palestine before the UN partition resolution in 1947. Having witnessed the loss of many local Palestinian communities in the coastal areas, he was acutely aware of the shortcomings of the Palestinian institutions, lack of serious preparations, and the cavalier attitude of Arab officialdom as well as Mandate authorities’ acquiescence with the Zionist project (INT1; INT2). During 1947, he edited a Weekly magazine called ‘Al-Muntadah’ (the forum). Consequently he was very close to events on the ground before the war.

In 1947 he organised local villagers to patrol the village grounds and report back on any activities. With this, he was trying to foster vigilance and community spirit rather than develop any significant military capability. He also liaised with and had good relationship with local Palestinian resistance, Egyptian officers and Jordanian army officers (Arab Legion) in Jerusalem. In the mean time, the village prepared to defend itself as best as possible. Hasan Mustafa’s father, a tribal chief who had a good relationship with Al-Husayni, went to Egypt with a few men and bought 18 guns for defence of the village. The local Palestinian resistance, ‘Al-Jihad al-Muqadas’, and volunteers had a presence in the village as well especially during the war (INT1;INT2). Hasan Mustafa spent the war period in and about the village and was acutely aware of the fate of many Palestinian villages that the Israeli forces had taken. Battir, nevertheless, as explained above, had just survived the war so far but would it also survive the ‘peace’?


38 Dr. Ishac Musa Al-Hussieni (1983) (quoted in Abu-Goush 1997, p 269 ) said “Hasan Mustafa was a distinguished villager, he established the ‘Rural Union Club’, as he prophesises what enmity the future hides. I attended the Club’s meetings at his invitation and he was the most prominent and distinguished member in the meetings.” (Arabic)

39 It was called ‘Al-Qafila’ before and edited 4 issues under this name then another 52 issues under ‘Al Muntadah’

40 After the war in 1949 he worked with the International Committee Red Cross (ICRC) and after that with United Nations Relief Work Agency (UNRWA) he worked as section chief of the Hebron district and helped set up the education section of UNRWA. later he became manger of UNRWA’s welfare department in Palestine and then its public relations manager before his premature death in 1961. In mid 1950’s he stood for Jordanian Parliamentary election but was not successful. However, his brother, Ribhi Mustafa became an MP in the next round of elections after his death. (INT1;INT2, Al-khalili 1983; Abu-Ghosh 1997)

41 After the second truce (19 July 1948) “the official Israeli committee dealing with the refugee problem decided to erase from the face of the earth some 400 Arab villages which had been declared hostile (i.e. active in the fighting) and were by then deserted … repatriation thereafter became an impossibility” (Pappe, 1994 pp 156-7)
Hasan Mustafa’s goal was to save the village, he knew it was still in a perilous position, most of its inhabitants had left and it was obvious that the village and railway line were a target during the war and during the truce negotiations. By early 1949, he set out to talk to any Jordanian official to try and use persuasion and ‘shame power’ to compel them not to sacrifice the livelihood of more than a thousand people in Battir and many more along the railway line. He used his contacts, courage, wit and resourcefulness to meet with and lobby many Jordanian officials, pressuring them not to relinquish control of the villages and the railway line. He would explain to officials that it was their individual actions that would decide the fate of many thousands of individuals. He understood that relinquishing the railway was a political/strategic decision from the King. However, he was convinced he could influence matters so that the village would not be lost, after all it had not fallen militarily and was inhabited. So he made it his business to, harass, meet, lobby and talk to any official that was involved in the armistice negotiations to make sure that Battir and railway line villages were not just handed over to the Israelis (INT1; INT2).

Battir was now on the periphery and most of the decisions regarding its future were being taken not in Jerusalem but in Amman. During the first part of 1949, Hasan Mustafa spent a lot of time in Amman meeting officials lobbying them about Battir. Amongst them was Col. Mohamed El-Maayte who was part of the armistice negotiating team. In March 1949, Hasan Mustafa worked with the International Committee Red Cross (ICRC) and spent time in Jerusalem where he later met and knew Col Al-Tall. Meanwhile, Battir was still under sporadic firing and harassment from Israeli forces across the valley. During this period he instigated some villagers to return to the village despite the dangers. He suggested switching to low maintenance crops in the areas exposed to Israeli fire, planting wheat instead of vegetables even in irrigated areas. He waited to see the result of the armistice negotiations but was not hopeful about the outcome (INT1; INT2).

3. The division of the NML:

Immediately after the signing of the Armistice agreement in Rhodes on 3rd April 1949 it became apparent that Battir fell within NML (See Fig 2.1). Hasan Mustafa was now sure that the village’s future was in immediate danger because according to the terms of the agreement no people should be allowed to remain within NML. This would have meant evacuating the village of Battir. Similarly, the Israelis would not have acquired the railway line which still existed officially within NML. In order for

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42 It became clear in early 1949 that the Israelis had asked for the railway line as part of the armistice negotiations in al-Shuneh. This was reported widely in the newspapers in Amman. Moreover, many disgruntled Jordanian officers and officials in Transjordan administration had leaked any such news by the end of 1948.

43 He made sure it looked fully inhabited

44 Earlier on he wrote a small light-hearted article in the daily newspaper ‘Filastin’ illustrating Al-Tall’s centrality in negotiation for Jerusalem. It was a deliberate tactic to try to hold him to account and make it clear that people are watching and expecting no more surrenders. I’ve read the article.

45 The armistice agreement stated “Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties which prohibit civilians from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the Armistice Demarcation Lines defined in article V and VI.” (Israel-Jordan Armistice agreement, 1949, article IV subsection 3)
the Israelis to acquire control of the valuable railway line, they needed to divide the NML in their favour. Consequently, the Israelis had asked for total evacuations of these villages within NML and the Jordanians agreed that their forces would evacuate by 25th April 1949 (Al-Tall, 1959). Hasan Mustafa devised a two pronged strategy to save the village: first, to make sure that the village appeared to be fully inhabited and defended; and, secondly, he intended to strongly lobby the Jordanians to save the village and its lands during any further negotiations with the Israelis regarding NML (INT1; INT2).

Hasan Mustafa wanted to prevent the village from being evacuated or its lands given away. Moreover, he had the help in the first two weeks of April 1949 from many disgruntled Jordanian officials and officers. He visited the Jordanian Armistice committee with a number of officers and lobbied hard arguing that Battir is still inhabited, not conquered and should not be evacuated (INT2;INT1). He knew it would be difficult to change their mind, as the armistice agreement had already been signed, but he thought he could influence the negotiation of the division of the NML. His efforts must have borne fruit. Unbeknown to him a meeting of MAC/ Special Committee took place on the 18th April 1949 to define the NML in Jerusalem area outside city limits. The Transjordan minutes of the meeting state (Al-Tall, 1959, p556):

2. Col. Ahmed Bey El Jundi presented a map which he brought from Amman showing the line of new demarcation, which gives us QATTANAH, BEIT IKSA and BATTIR villages and gives the Jews WALLAJA and railway to JERUSALEM. The Jews accepted the proposal and both parties signed that:

(a) The evacuation of Battir was cancelled as it has come to our side

(d) It was agreed upon that BATTIR inhabitants will continue having ownership to their lands falling in the Jewish Territory, but they will not be able to cross the wadi South of the railway line until further arrangements are made.

The 3rd meeting on the 25th April 1949 reaffirmed the above and decided that the demarcation of the new single line would be effective from 1st May 1949 (see Appendix 4). Hasan Mustafa, having read the newspapers on the 25th April 1949, knew that the bulk of Battir village was saved but did not know the details. He

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46 Another testimony submits that upon visiting the committee Hasan Mustafa, with the high ranking officers, inferred that this concern for Battir is not only theirs alone but shared by ‘higher authorities’ (which was not the case), the bluff worked and the committee members seemed to be impressed by that.

47 This was dubbed ‘unofficial meeting’ of MAC in the Jordanian minutes, since the independent observer was not present. However, this does not make it unofficial because this is exactly the set up required for the Special committee (article VIII, Israel-Jordan Armistice agreement, 1949) which had exclusive competence on matters such as the railway line. In addition the content of this meeting was ratified and accepted again in an ‘official’ MAC meeting on the 25th April.

48 This situation Battir is quite unique, neither Qattannah nor Beit Iksa or any other village along the green line managed to hold on to the ownership of all its land across the green line. This was a direct result of the work done by Hasan Mustafa to compel the Jordanian officials and in turn the Israelis to accept that compromise through presence of mind, lobbying, political guile and civil resistance.
realised the Israelis had ambitions to take the village and did not trust them or the Jordanians. He made sure in the last 10 days of April 1949 especially that the village looked lit, defended and totally inhabited. He instructed about seven young men to go and light the lamps in the houses at night, put out washing on the lines, let out the animals into the yards and make the village look busy and fully inhabited. (INT4; INT2; INT1) Moreover, there were a few families and some defenders in the village anyhow.\(^{49}\)

On the morning of the 2\(^{nd}\) May 1949, Hasan Mustafa told his wife that he was going to meet the Jews at Battir’s station that day. He said that he did not know if he would be back, but that he would make sure that Battir’s land was preserved (INT1). That morning the Israelis arrived at the Battir railway station, watched by all who were in village.\(^{50}\) Hasan Mustafa walked half way down the hill with six villagers towards the station. He walked the last 300 yards alone with his hands up as he approached the Israeli soldiers and MAC officials. MAC officials had come to implement the agreement of the 25\(^{th}\) April 1949 with a large contingency of Israeli forces.\(^{51}\) Still, Hasan Mustafa went down defiantly to protest and make sure that none of the lands of Battir would be compromised and that full access would be granted after the division of the NML. He made it clear that the village was fully inhabited and ready to defend itself. He asked to speak to the commander to know the details of what was about to be done to the village and its land. Duly, Moshe Dayan arrived from Jerusalem, and in the presence of MAC officials, discussed the details of the agreement with him (INT1; INT2).

Moshe Dayan made it clear that it was the railway line, station, and safety of the trains that was his prime concern. He also insisted that this was fully agreed upon with the Jordanians and that they were here to implement this, and that it would be implemented. Hasan Mustafa asked about Battir’s land and rights. Moshe Dayan said that Battir’s land, apart from the railway line or station, would remain its own as per agreement, which was shown to Hasan Mustafa. There was then a lot to finalise and mark, the 200 yards south of the railway line which was the new line agreed with the Jordanians and which meant that 16 houses would fall inside the new line as well as most of the irrigated land (see FIG 3.1) Moreover, Battir’s land border within the land that had been ceded to Israel between the 3\(^{rd}\) and 18\(^{th}\) April 1949, north of the new demarcation line and north of the railway line, had to be set (for full details see Appendix 10). Abu-Sitta (2004, p.66) stresses that:

Doubts about the location [during demarcation] were always interpreted against the villagers’ interests. It did not help matters that Arabs officer… accompanying the Israelis were ignorant of the territory. They did not appreciate the value of a hill, a valley or a road to the village life. Villagers’ protestations rarely succeeded.

\(^{49}\) At this time he was trying to return villagers from Al-Shuneh to Battir to make sure it is fully populated. The villagers were understandably scarred and reluctant to return. He nevertheless said that he would send for them soon and they should come if they want to have any homes left.

\(^{50}\) This area is still militarised NML and any civilian in this area risked being shot.

\(^{51}\) Which stipulated that the new line would run 200 yards parallel to the south of the railway line.
Not only did Hasan Mustafa lobby the Jordanian officials earlier on, he was also present on the day of the demarcation of the border and made sure that not one square meter of village land was given away unduly by the disinterested MAC officials or through Israeli deception. He called the other six men from the village and went with the MAC officials marking Battir’s land inside the green line, the villagers marked their land and reaffirmed its ownership (see Fig 3.1).

![Fig 3.1: Battir’s Land boundaries inside the ‘green line’ (Abu-Sitta 2004).](image)

They agreed that villagers would have ownership and total access to their land, houses and school beyond the demarcated line but they would not be allowed to go on the railway line itself (INT1; INT2). Effectively, the division of NML meant that the railway line and station were Israeli controlled and the rest was as it was before. This finalised the agreement and it became legally binding that this land is still owned and to be used by villagers as before. However, this was still a precarious situation for the village and villagers and it would take more effort for the village to survive.

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52 The Israelis did the same by starting a huge forestation drive to mark the territory they claimed, (See Appendix 8)
53 There were about 4 points (bridges) where the villagers could cross under them to their lands on the other sides of the tracks without having to ‘breach’ the railway line itself. This was still a tense and militarised area and the Jordanians and Israelis stationed troops across the valley from each other’s to monitor all this.
54 Later on the Israelis-Jordanian signed on the maps in January 1950 (see Appendix 7)
55 The offer of aid, food, shelter from humanitarian agencies, as well as the present real fear of death in the front line villages, acted as a pulling agent to empty these front line villages from their inhabitants. One was only entitled to receive aid if a refugee outside one’s village. Many, from other villages, left for food and safety for that reason and thought they could easily return to their villages later on. Many
Hasan Mustafa sent trucks immediately to Al-Shuneh and brought back the rest of the village inhabitants. They were at first reluctant to go to their homes especially closer to the station/railway line. However, he walked with them to their homes. He also walked down with the farmers to the lands on the other side of the track for the first week. Four days later the MAC officials put up some fence posts and much later on some razor wire. There was a curfew in the beginning from 6pm-6am for the houses inside the green line but this was abandoned weeks later. The Boys’ school was also next to the railway station and students and teachers carried on as usual (INT1; INT2).

This achievement could not be underestimated especially considering the war context it was accomplished in. The reality on the ground at the time was totally militarised and belligerent, which instilled fear into villagers. Moreover, the main artery of the village was cut (the railway), and isolation, lack of food and work threatened the survival of the village (Mustafa, 1959).

4. Defending the achievement:

Hasan Mustafa had to ensure that the agreements were adhered to by both sides and encouraged villagers to use the land inside the line as usual. The results of the partition however had had devastating effect on the spirit of the villagers. In Hasan Mustafa’s (1959,p.2) own words:

Then came ‘The Troubles’ followed by the establishment of the fateful Demarcation Line in 1949 and contact with the outside world ceased. Train service stopped, Jerusalem was inaccessible…during the first weeks they [villagers] managed to get along, and there was always the hope that peace would come soon and life would be secure, busy, and happy again. But the days passed into months and the effect of isolation, loss of income, of health and educational services began to be reflected in bitterness and unhappiness. Something needed to be done if this village was to be saved.

Hasan Mustafa embarked on a community development scheme for the village. He managed to help villagers rebuild a better water supply and irrigation system by April 1950. He convinced UNRWA to fund a 6½ Km road linking the

villages laid empty partly because of fear and that pulling factor of food, aid and safety which the Israelis exploited. Battir didn’t because of Hasan Mustafa’s insistence on keeping it inhabited. Hasan Mustafa met the Muktars (village chief) of Al-Qabu and Al-Walaja and urged them to return to their villages to no avail at the time.

56 There was an atmosphere of sheer horror from the Jewish forces. Dier Yassin and many other atrocities were fresh in people’s memory and border hostilities were still occurring.

57 This agreement is alluded to in literature about the conflict; for example Morris (1993, p. 183) and Al-Tall (1959, p. 556, Prof. Gidon Biger (Tel Aviv University) emailed to say “Local arrangement let the Betir people to cultivate their land north of the line, although it was never agreed in writing” (17/8/06) However, it is written as shown above. This agreement have endured since 1949 despite many obstacles, however, the building of the Israeli separation wall threatens it.

58 Eight years of community development available on line at http://www.battir.i8.com/hasan.html

59 Similar to the constructive programme of Gandhi – the two sides of satyagraha, civil disobedience and constructive work for change.
village to Bethlehem, which was completed in February 1951. A girl’s school with eight classes opened in 1952. Internal roads linking different parts of the village were made (1952-53). He brought in the telephone and post office (1955), a clinic (1959), and community centre. The main irrigation pool/reservoir was repaired and a full size football pitch prepared and inaugurated it with football match played by village elders (1958). Many cultural, educational, vocational opportunities were introduced such as sewing machine workshops (1957) and adult literacy classes. Moreover, 16,000 trees were planted as part of town planning during this period (Mustafa 1959; Ahmed 1957; Wallach 2002) (see Appendix 5 for details)

This community development drive managed to foster hope, provide employment and make the villagers understand that not only could they survive but they could also improve their lives markedly. This strengthened internal discipline in face of continued Israeli threat to the village and its land. In addition, Battir became an example of community development and its success brought the village many external admirers. Hasan Mustafa harnessed the power of external allies to make sure that outsiders had a stake in or at least witnessed Battir’s prosperity and progress, bringing it protection and support. His real achievement, though, had been in harnessing the power of the indigenous concept of “a’aoneh” (community service/public help), infusing it with enlightened thinking and transforming it into a collective, potent, positive community force. (Ahmed 1957, pp14-16; Mustafa 1959) He used this successful model to influence change in nearby villages such as Husan and Nahalin as well. Now I will turn to analyse this successful defence and development of Battir village.

60 Hasan Mustafa was a pioneer in girls and women education in rural Palestine. On 2nd June 1952 he opened Battir girls’ school. It developed into 13 classrooms, 9 teachers and equipment (laboratories, language and chemistry, sports etc). He linked the girls’ school to the community which developed the school with help from UNRWA. He ensured that all girls attended school by talking to their parents and interfered to defer marriage ceremonies until after graduation. He enrolled high achievers in further education, for example girls trained as nurses and worked in the village health centre (1959), other worked as a radio broadcaster in 1958. He championed girls’ education in the frontline villages through his work with UNRWA. He lobbied the UNRWA hard in 1953 (during the first educational conference) to open girls schools, not only in refugee camps but in frontline villages as well, to afford girls a chance for education. He was successful and many other girls schools where opened in these villages at UNRWA’s expense.

61 It is striking to see even today, in what supposed to be Palestinian traditional rural environment, many mothers and grandmothers usually in traditional dress able to read and write competently and use those skills in their daily lives such as reading newspapers, for shopping, home accounting and leisure.

62 During the 1950’s, 14 villagers were shot dead by the Israelis in incidents on village lands. (Interview), Morris (1993, p.138) writes when talking about atrocities across the green line “A similar atrocity occurred five days later [1952] when an IDF patrol seized three villagers from Battir working in a vegetable plot on the Israeli side of the border which Israel permitted them to cultivate under a long-standing arrangement”

63 Admirers or visitors to Battir: Arab league and officials, Arnold Toynbee’s visit in 1957, John Dennis UNRWA’s boss, Bishop of Washington DC Dean Sayer and many others.

64 ‘a’aoneh’ is best described as a form of tribal community service/public help, which the tribal/village culture expects from its community members in time of crisis or need. It is invoked and used in emergencies or in real need. For example when somebody have to bring in a large harvest in limited time, when terraces has been swept away after a harsh winter .etc. Villagers will help each other with their expertise and labour to complete the task. The tacit agreement or knowledge is when you are in need you will be helped as well.
Chapter 4: Analysis and Conclusion

This chapter provides analysis of this successful action by trying to highlight the mechanisms and dynamics involved. A table is constructed and examples of Hasan Mustafa’s actions and positions are allocated and categorised accordingly. The most prominent features that categorisation are subsequently expanded upon further. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks about the case study.

1. Analysis:

When looking at Hasan Mustafa’s successful defence of Battir, one can see that he achieved this without firing one bullet, although it was a war situation. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the armed defence of the village against Israeli attacks during the war played a crucial role in preventing the Israelis entering and destroying the village. However, as explained above, that alone would not have been enough to save the village. Falling in the NML of the armistice agreement of 3rd April 1949, the village would have been depopulated in accordance with Israeli requests. Had it stayed as such, the Israelis and Jordanians would easily have forced the implementation of their agreement with total disregard for the local population, as they did in other areas, such as Beit Safafa (Shlaim 1988, p.447). It was the civil resistance campaign that Hasan Mustafa engaged in which ensured that Battir and its lands were saved. Equally important was the constructive community development work done after the demarcation of the line to shore up the achievements and help the village survive and prosper again.

Looking back at Hasan Mustafa’s actions one can see three critical phases, in accordance with the typology of Crist et al (2002): Firstly, the development of a strategy for achieving goals; which includes setting goals, assessing resources and analysing opponents’ vulnerabilities; Secondly, implementing the strategy; Thirdly, defending the movement/achievement, which includes maintaining internal discipline and using the power of external allies. Although these categories are more suited to larger movements, when superimposed onto the case study and narrative above, they produce the following table:

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65 Beit Safafa’s residents were steadfast according to testimonies heard, during the war 52 people were killed by the Jewish forces from the village whilst the Jews tried to dislodge them (INT1). But they stayed put, when the Israelis and Jordanians came to demarcate the line they faced stormy protest and violent resistance from the hapless inhabitants. They came back the next day with more ‘disciplined’ troops and forced the division (Shlaim 1988, p. 447)
### Developing a strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>1- Setting Goals</strong></th>
<th>To safeguard Battir village and its land.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2- Assessing resources:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) 'Integrative power'; 'organisational power' and lower 'threat power'.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Contacts &amp; friendship with disgruntled Jordanian officers willing to help.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c) Ability to organise, motivate, lead, use media, self confidence and firm belief that people can influence change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Bravery, resourcefulness, creativity, negotiating skills and political guile</td>
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<tr>
<td>e) No other actor on the scene, he became a conduit for action/hope. Able to expose and hold people accountable for actions. Son of tribal chief, strong knowledge of local society and people.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>f) Worked for ICRC and later on with UNRWA- resources and influence.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Against, King’s ceding control of railway line to the Israelis, Israel’s military dominance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3- Opponents’ vulnerability:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Low ‘integrative power’, law, NML, armistice agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Could not take control of the village militarily without significant cost. Battir’s ability to threaten/be a nuisance to the safety of railway.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Village is inhabited</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) People’s sentiments and rights/ Jordanian officers unhappy about NML</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Implementing the strategy | a) Present on the ground, ‘Fraternization’, meeting and lobbying armistice officials, ‘group lobbying’  
b) Held officials accountable, influenced division of NML negotiations.  
c) Lights on in the village, washing on line, noise etc as ‘evidence’ of presence of inhabitants, sent trucks to bring back villagers  
d) Met forces on day to protest, demand rights, stand fast and non-violent intervention, ‘non-violent interjection’  
e) Supervised full return of villagers and encouraged normality; used to go down with villagers to their land beyond the ‘green line’.  
f) Use of ‘great chain of non violence’ mechanism, used Jordanian officers as intermediaries with government, then government intermediary with Israel.  
g) Campaign succeeded through ‘accommodation’ and use of third parties.  
h) Empowered villagers by asking them to mark their land and stand firm, development drive through ‘a’aoneh’ (tribal community service/public help)  
h) Worked with ICRC |
| Defending the movement/achievement | 1- Maintaining internal discipline  
a) Constant vigilance to protect against any transgression or provide pretext.  
b) Started many projects to sustain, empower and improve village life; improve irrigation, build roads, girl’s school, clinic, post office.  
2- Power of external allies:  
a) Worked with UNRWA used ‘organizational power’ to serve refugees.  
b) Made sure Battir became a model for community development and spread this model to neighbouring villages: Husan, Nahalin  
c) Attracted attention of government, Arab league, visitors e.g. Toynbee etc. |

From this table, one can see the classic elements of a successful civil resistance campaign. Hasan Mustafa used the ‘integrative power’ concept well to challenge the lack of legitimacy of the NML and subsequent agreements. A crucial factor is that Hasan Mustafa was fully committed, brave, present on the ground and engaged.
During and after the war, many communities and villages fled the Israeli brutal advance. They were left without independent national Palestinian or local coordinated strategy or presence. This made the task much easier for the Israelis, and the Jordanians, to implement their schemes. Hasan Mustafa’s intervention and activity made a real difference at a time when there was no guidance and when most ‘leaders’ had left the country and saw engagement as futile and ineffective. This was not the case with Battir where both sides (Jordan and Israel) were effectively challenged and the needs of the village and its inhabitants upheld. This led Al-Shuqeri, the Syrian representative to the UN at the time, to wonder why Qalqilia could not be like Battir (Al-Khalili 1983; INT1).

Furthermore, Hasan Mustafa used intermediaries and third parties to influence the oppressor; this is what Galtung (1989) refers to as the ‘great chain of non violence’. Hasan Mustafa could not directly challenge, influence or bring pressure to bear on the Israelis, so he tried to create sympathy with another party, the Jordanian government. However, they were in turn equally intransigent and unsympathetic. He continued to look for another link in the chain and went to speak to disgruntled Jordanian officers whom he found to be more sympathetic. Their impact as intermediaries was decisive. Together, the officers and Hasan Mustafa managed to bring pressure to bear on the Jordanians who negotiated with the Israelis. Hasan Mustafa’s status as son of the village, part of the Palestinian landed strata, his personal courage and charisma enabled him to impose himself onto officials and events. He gained the ear of officials through his self confidence, bravery and presence when the rest of the Palestinian leadership was absent or had fled.

When success was achieved in this civil resistance campaign it was through what Sharp (1973) calls ‘accommodation’. Whereby Jordan and Israel chose to grant the demands without changing their point of view, the Jordanians still ceded the railway to Israel. However, the villagers also maintained their land integrity, the village and livelihood. Amongst the factors that might have led to this ‘accommodation’ are: first, the authorities (Jordan and Israel) believed they are eliminating a nuisance by accommodating the civil resistance’s demands. Secondly, the Jordanian authorities were adjusting to a budding opposition within their ranks and acting to prevent the growth of that opposition.

The dynamics of how this campaign succeeded are easily revealed. When this civil resistance campaign managed to raise the question of Battir’s lands as an issue in the Special Committee and the MAC this became enough to merit a reasonable reply. Furthermore, the campaign stressed to both parties that the village was inhabited, defended and inhabitants’ rights must be upheld, to evacuate the village would be committing an injustice. Hasan Mustafa’s approach depended on using ‘integrative power’ and ‘protest and persuasion’ to influence both parties. Moreover,

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66 Qalqilya, as well as many other villages on the green line, lost most of their fertile agricultural land after the demarcation of the ‘green line’ of 1949. See Appendix 13.
67 Because Sharp (2005, p411) tells us that this would have been seen as internal dissention and opposition, which is more potent than international third party action
68 what is striking about the loss of many Palestinian villages and lands is the fact that they were easily handed over rather than conquered by the Israelis because of collusion with the Jordanians, Palestinians dependence on ‘Arab armies’ to do their bidding and the disintegration and flight of Palestinian leadership. Where people organised and defended they were largely successful in influencing events.
Hasan Mustafa became a conduit of action when no body else acted, he initiated action and attracted others, who were equally dissatisfied, to act through him. The many disgruntled Jordanian officer, who could not disobey orders completely, help him instead. Dynamically speaking this is equivalent to them disobeying orders themselves (Sharp 2005). This process put pressure on Jordanians, MAC and the Israelis to compromise. However, it needed the civil resistance campaign to bring the question to the table for it to be answered, once the question was asked the outcome was a positive one.

In trying to understand the reasons for the success of Hasan Mustafa, it is also evident - through interviews, reading his work, reading about him- that his personal characteristics were a formidable asset to him and a defining feature to his success, which earned him great respect. He has been described on various occasions as hard working, dedicated, charismatic, humble, principled, courageous, witty, tenacious, enlightened and a pioneer. This enabled him to foster support, motivate, lead and achieve, moreover he had vision (See appendix 6).

2. Conclusion:

Battir found itself in a unique position after the division of NML and the successful outcome of the civil resistance campaign. This defence has endured the test of time. Villagers still use the main bulk of their land as they did in 1949. However, this position has had to be defended all along to make sure that the Israelis did not infringe this agreement. For example I’ve witnessed, from the 1980s onwards, how the Israeli forestry authorities planted forest trees on any land, covered by this agreement, which was not utilised even if for one season. Many battles were fought when Israeli pine trees where planted on Battir land. Olive trees and other productive trees would be planted instead straight away. Hasan Mustafa’s brother and villagers have maintained this struggle until today relying on the original agreement. However, on 20th February 2005, the Israeli Government approved a new route for the Segregation Wall which effectively expropriate 330 dunums of Battir land for the construction of the wall, around 550 dunums will be restricted as a buffer zone and another 1297 dunums will be isolated behind the Wall (Isacc et al. 2005, p.7).

This Segregation wall now terminally threatens the 1949 agreement regarding Battir’s land. The villagers fear for their homes and land again. A clear ruling from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which stipulated that the wall is illegal and should be dismantled, was totally ignored by Israel and the international community. Hasan Mustafa has proved through his civil resistance campaign that such action can be potent and enduring. Nonetheless, this was particular to its historical context characterised by a particular balance of power, the ability to influence third parties when a modicum of international and moral concern existed.

Unfortunately, nowadays Israel and the international community continue to ignore the ICJ’s ruling on the wall. Israel has continually shot at Israeli, Palestinian and international protestors against the wall without any censor or any ‘moral

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69 Wallach (2002, p 28) wrote “Hassan Mustafa died long ago, but young villagers were surprised when I asked if they had heard of him, ‘Of course we know him,’ they would say. ‘He is a hero to us.’”
outrage’. The logic of militarism that gripped the West with its ‘war on terror’ has further suffocated the tiny space that exists for civil resistance action to the detriment of both Israelis and Palestinians. The art, craft and science of diplomacy, negotiation, peace building and reconciliation were/are totally compromised by a pervading, inhumane, destructive, short-sighted logic of militarism.

The sooner this military logic ends the sooner some successful civil resistance action opportunities will appear in Palestine and Israel around the segregation wall and other issues of conflict. This ‘Western’ paradigm shift from diplomacy and negotiation to militarism affects Palestine and Israel directly and help obscure, through polarisation, the necessary moral outrage that provides the dynamics which are needed for non-violent actions.

However, when Hasan Mustafa embarked on this civil resistance campaign the odds against success were negligible but he achieved his goals when many saw his efforts as futile and in vain. Although contexts, balance of power, dynamics of international politics and other particularities, are different, there is one thing I am certain of in my optimism. It is the ability of the Palestinian oppressed people, like oppressed people elsewhere, to formulate responses, actions and struggle against injustice despite overwhelming odds. What is needed though, is for observers, scholars and pundits to monitor, identify, nurture and publicise the next organic civil resistance campaign that is no doubt coming out of Palestine.
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Appendices

Appendix 1: Armistice agreement
Appendix 2: General Armistice agreement map
Appendix 3: 18th April 1949 MAC meeting
Appendix 4: 25th April 1949 MAC meeting
Appendix 5: Eight years of Community Development
Appendix 6: Obituaries
Appendix 7: 2nd January 1950 map
Appendix 8: Photos, Forestation round Battir’s land
Appendix 9: Ceded land in March 1949 in north West Bank
Appendix 10: Photos of irrigated land, Battir full map and full explanation
Appendix 11: Interviews
Appendix 12: Some of his writings

Editor’s note: We have been unable, for technical reasons, to reproduce these appendices. It is hoped that the full paper may be downloaded from Coventry University’s Department of Forgiveness and Reconciliation website in due course.
Westmorland General Meeting

Westmorland General Meeting is a Meeting for Worship and Business of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), comprising Friends from the Swarthmoor, Kendal and Sedbergh, Lancaster and Preston areas in the north-west corner of England. George Fox, founder of the Society, made his first visit to these towns, villages and dales in 1652, and the region continues to be known among Friends as the birthplace of Quakerism.

Quakers seek "that of God" in everyone, worshipping together in silence without doctrine or creed. For three hundred and fifty years Friends’ Peace Testimony has been at the centre of a corporate witness against war and violence, through conscientious objection, conflict resolution, service in the Friends’ Ambulance Unit or alternative paths of conscience. In the 21st Century we face fundamental changes to the ‘engines of war’, and new social and international challenges in a changing world, yet the Peace Testimony of 17th Century Friends still bears powerful witness.

In 1660 Friends declared:

All bloody principles and practices we do utterly deny, with all outward wars, and strife, and fightings with outward weapons, for any end, or under any pretence whatsoever, and this is our testimony to the whole world.

Today the Society’s book of ‘Advices and Queries’ advises members:

We are called to live ‘in the virtue of that life and power that takes away the occasion of wars’. Do you faithfully maintain our testimony that war and the preparation for war are inconsistent with the spirit of Christ? Search out whatever in your own way of life may contain the seeds of war. Stand firm in our testimony, even when others commit or prepare to commit acts of violence, yet always remember that they too are children of God.
Following is a list of battles and operations in the 1948 Palestine war. Following is a list of operations undertaken by the Yishuv and later Israel to acquire munitions abroad. Following is a list of operations between May 15, 1948, the Arab invasion of Palestine, and June 11, 1948, the first truce of the war. Following is a list of battles and operations between the first and second truces of the war, July 8, 1948, July 18, 1948. This period was named "Battles of the Ten Days" in Israel. Also listed are FayezGMT™s story illustrates the role of farming in Palestinian resistance culture, as well as highlighting the struggles that Palestinian farmers face on a daily basis. â€œI didnâ€™t want to be a farmer when I was young,â€ Fayez told al-Araby al-Jadeed. â€œI wanted to study. I got a scholarship to go and study in the USSR in 1979, but when I tried to take it up, the Israelis arrested me at the border and prevented me from leaving the country.Â Many of those who attended came from the â€œpeace villageâ€™ of Tamera, a sustainable community based in Portugal. â€œThat was when I started to hear about permaculture, and to realise its potential. From Tamera I received the message that water, food and energy are available to all humanity if we work with the laws of nature,â€ Fayez told al-Araby al-Jadeed. The first phase is the 1947â€“1948 civil war in Mandatory Palestine. It began on 30 November 1947, a day after the United Nations voted to divide the territory of Palestine into a Jewish and Arab sovereign states, and an international Jerusalem (UN Resolution 181).Â On this date, when the last remaining British troops and personnel were on departure at the city of Haifa, the Jewish leadership in Palestine declared the establishment of the State of Israel.