BOOK REVIEWS


For anybody interested in fisheries history, it is obvious that the term “White Fleet” refers not only to the fleet of U.S. Navy battleships that sailed around the globe (1907-1909), but also to the Portuguese fishing vessels that worked the Grand Banks with hand-lines up until the 1970s. While this “White Fleet” is mentioned in nearly every historical analysis of the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic, a comprehensive historical analysis of the Portuguese distant-water fishing activities with hand-lines is still missing. Although the title of Andrieux’s book suggests an attempt to close that gap, it does not fulfill this expectation, at least not in traditional scholarly terms.

As a pictorial history of the Portuguese hand-lining fisheries, this book was probably never intended to offer a comprehensive scholarly analysis, but rather, to provide an insight into a maritime world of the past and a fishery that was often considered anachronistic, outdated and doomed to disappear with the modernization and industrialization of the fishing industries and the introduction of factory-freezer trawlers.

Andrieux’s first 76 pages provide a brief overview of the history of Portuguese fishing activities in the Northwest Atlantic covering the time between about 1500 and the 1970s. Although this overview fails to meet a number of scholarly standards, such as references, and includes little information beyond what is well-established knowledge among fisheries historians, it does a good job in preparing the stage for the second and main part of the book—the photographs. The 200 remaining pages are filled with hundreds of black-and-white photographs that provide an amazing insight into the everyday life of the Portuguese dory-fishery, the life and work onboard the dory-schooners, the ships seeking shelter in Newfoundland harbours, the interaction of the dory-fishermen with local residents, the strike of the dory-fishers in 1974, and a number of other topics.

These briefly annotated photographs have been drawn from various sources, including a substantial number from private collections that have never before been published. They are the main reason for picking up the book. They tell a tale that has not really been told before; the story of Portuguese fishermen utilizing traditional, maybe even outdated, equipment while at the same time being part of post-war Europe and, more important, plying their trade during the 1960s and 1970s, a period of major societal change.

Therefore, while the book can be highly recommended to anybody interested in the wider field of fisheries history and maritime cultural history, it is not an analytical or traditional historical publication. Instead, it is a cornucopia of authentic photographs of a fishery that was already anachronistic during its heyday.

One question that needs to be raised is whether the chapter on eating...
Bacalhau (cod) in Portugal and the related photographs at the end of the book really fit into the book’s overall theme, particularly those photographs that look more like typical family vacation photos. From the point of view of the fisheries historian, it would have been much more appropriate to include at least some pictures of former dory fishermen working on factory-freezer trawlers from distant-water fishing nations like West Germany, after the end of the hand-lining period. This would have underlined the anachronistic conditions these fishermen had to face and their rapid transition into the world of industrialized fisheries once the “White Fleet” was no longer extant.

While one must appreciate a book offering such a wealth of historical photographs for such a reasonable price, it is regrettable that the reproductions and prints of the photographs are not always the best quality, often neither black nor white but only shades of grey. High quality prints would have made a wonderful coffee-table book of aesthetic quality, but perhaps the present format is even more appropriate, since the ships of the “White Fleet” were fishing vessels dedicated to working on the sea rather than enjoying the beauty of the ocean.

In conclusion, the book might not be the most relevant contribution to scholarly literature, but it is definitely a welcome addition to the bookshelves of historians interested in fisheries history, maritime labour history, and Portuguese and Newfoundland history.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


Riding the coattails of the *Pirates of the Caribbean* movies, there has been a flood of books on pirates in recent years. Often these books are sensationalist and rest on substandard research, especially those that try to make the most of the scant information we have on female pirates. While pirates like Ann Bonny and Mary Read loom large in popular culture, John Appleby shows that a significant number of women were involved in early modern piracy, although not in the roles that are so often seen or celebrated. While the author does devote a chapter to female pirates, the real story of women’s involvement in English piracy is far broader.

Appleby begins with an informative context chapter on the development of English piracy. In the sixteenth century, more English seamen indulged in piratical opportunities than lived exclusively outside the law: piracy was often a male-dominated, haphazard maritime pursuit in and around the British Isles. Even those seamen whose livelihoods were derived largely from illegal pursuits seemed to have had significant personal and business connections ashore. A fair number seemed to have maintained wives and children.

While women were intimately connected to English pirates as lovers and wives, Appleby also demonstrates that piracy was heavily dependent on women who were buyers and receivers of stolen goods. These females had to have business acumen in order to hold their own in these transactions: “Doing business with pirates and sea rovers demanded flexibility, some degree of knowledge and skill, as well as access to goods, provisions or services” (53). As receivers and dealers, there was a very significant opportunity for female agency and women of all ranks of society
were involved. These dealings took many different forms: from small-scale exchanges involving hospitality to a sustained pattern of receiving, often involving taverns and lodging houses. Women’s “agency formed part of the hidden undergrowth of organized criminality and disorder at sea.” In the earlier part of the period under examination, these relationships illustrate the intimate connections and dependence between land and sea, as well as between genders (84).

During the seventeenth century, English pirates broadened their geographical horizons as their bases were increasingly stationed in the Mediterranean and Caribbean. As a result, English pirates had more contact and relationships with non-British women, in various types of unions, in paid-for sexual transactions and as violent episodes at sea. For women in the British Isles, business opportunities were altered by the dispersal of English piracy, but these women could be quite adaptive to their new realities and challenges.

Appleby maintains that piracy became an even more organized, masculinized activity in the later part of the period. This heightened masculinization corresponds with a rising tide of violence in piracy during the later seventeenth century and early eighteenth centuries. This meant that women were less likely to welcome contact with pirates as they were more likely to be victimized. And women were not the only ones: given that men were far more prevalent on all types of ships, they, too, were preyed upon which often affected women back in England. During the seventeenth century, there was a marked increase of the English seamen captured and held for ransom by Barbary pirates. The absence and uncertain return of the family breadwinner was financially and personally devastating to wives and children. In a fascinating chapter, the author demonstrates how women worked within the boundaries of the custom of petitioning those in positions of authority to aid them in their distress. While victimized by the growing lawlessness at sea, women could be proactive in reaching out to those who could help raise ransom money and negotiate the release of their spouses and loved ones. While they worked within channels that were established and acceptable for respectable English women, there were in stark contrast to those spouses, lovers and female kin willing to go to great lengths to harbour pirates or to help them break them out of jail. Clearly, women performed a variety of roles in the web of piracy with varying degrees of agency.

Overall, Appleby’s latest offering is well researched and written in engaging prose—a wonderful marriage of academic content and readability. Much of the argument rests on anecdotal evidence, making his assertions difficult to prove or disprove. There are only minor flaws in a book which is welcome for the light it sheds on women’s roles in piracy and the interplay between the genders. Stripped bare of the romance of Hollywood, pirates emerge—with a few notable exceptions—not so much as colourful swashbucklers, but more often as early modern people trying to cobble together a living through an increasingly dangerous occupation on the fringes of the maritime world. Their female loved ones, sexual partners, accomplices and victims around the globe were dramatically affected by these changes as they too sought ways to survive.

Cheryl Fury
Grand Bay, New Brunswick

Even though the Second World War ended almost seventy years ago, Winston Churchill continues to bulk Colossus-like in collective awareness of the conflict. His significant roles in shaping policy during the First World War and the twenties alone made had him an important political leader. His actions and pronouncements throughout his singular lifetime have also provided fodder for retrospective controversy. There is a vast literature about this forceful personality. Despite the crowded nature of this field, Dr. Christopher Bell of Dalhousie University has found an important aspect of Churchill’s role which has not previously received specific examination. In his own words, *Churchill and Sea Power* “aims to reach a balanced verdict on Churchill’s record as a naval strategist and the most influential custodian of Britain’s sea power during the modern era” (4). The author also points out that Winston Churchill’s relationship with the Royal Navy was unique because it was far more lengthy and closer than that of any other politician. This relationship was, of course, marked by Churchill’s forceful personality and energetic interest in how policies were being carried out—and in both wars, his interest in operational decisions. This rewarding book is about more than Churchill as a strategist and yields important insights into how policy was made in Whitehall.

Churchill’s performance right from the time he became first lord of the admiralty in October 1911 was marked by restless energy, close interest in many aspects of the Royal Navy and a determination to impose his views. Admiral “Jacky” Fisher, brought from retirement in 1914 by Churchill to be first sea lord, was similarly brilliant, forceful and absolutely sure that he was right. He and Churchill were bound to clash but it’s telling that Fisher, long used to winning arguments, wrote that “he (Churchill) out-argues me” (p. 16).

The narrative covers, among other episodes, a series of set pieces familiar to readers of earlier works about Churchill’s involvement in key decisions: the attack on the Dardanelles in 1915, his role as chancellor of the exchequer in the 1920s articulating his government’s rolling “Ten Year Rule” which limited capital spending on defence on the grounds that war was unlikely for the next decade, the Norwegian Campaign of 1940, the attacks on French warships later that year, and the despatch of *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* to the Far East late in 1941 as a deterrent to further military actions by Japan. Bell makes extensive use of archival documents. The value of his study is that it sets decisions in their contemporary context. Churchill was always a dominating force and, as documented in David Reynolds’s *In Command of History* (2009), subsequently succeeded in influencing the historical record and the way his roles would be remembered. By citing contemporary records, Bell demonstrates that, despite his towering personality, many of Churchill’s actions must be understood as having been collective ones. He argues that influential writers, including insiders like Maurice Hankey, have occasionally overstated Churchill’s role. Over his political career Churchill had responsibility for several ministries whose interests he addressed with characteristic dynamism. Despite the sayings and sentiments for which he has become famous, he was pragmatic and unsentimental. Bell deals with how Churchill’s roles as Secretary of State for War and Air (1919-21) and as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1924-1929) have to be seen as those of an influential senior member of government grappling with post-war adjustments and making decisions that would alter the relative importance of the Royal Navy among the fighting services.

Inevitably, Churchill was not unfailingly prescient. His consistently
unrealistic misreading of Japan’s capabilities and intentions is but one example. As late as March 1939, he dismissed the possibility of an attack on Singapore as a “vain menace” (154). It is sobering to see how a generation earlier, he (like others) could not accept Fisher’s pre-war prediction that, if war came, Germany would not adhere to international law and sink British merchant ships, writing “I do not think that this would ever be done by a civilized power.” The Great War would, of course, shatter many pre-war articles of faith, but it is also arresting that as early as 1913 Churchill would demonstrate both the ruthlessness and graphic images which would become his trademarks: “if there were a nation vile enough to adopt systematically such methods it would be justified and indeed necessary to employ the extreme resources of science against them” by spreading pestilence, poisoning the water supplies of enemy cities and assassinating individuals. (42) The book’s penultimate chapter covers Churchill’s twilight period as prime minister between 1951 and 1955, when the Royal Navy fought a bureaucratic battle to retain its heavy carriers.

Two take-aways stand out in this rewarding study. The first is the tendency of naval historians to focus on operational aspects of the Battle of the Atlantic rather than its overall strategic direction. How both sides made decisions about resource priorities and marshalled resources have received insufficient attention. The trade-offs in allocating long-range aircraft for the Allied bombing campaigns rather than to the defence of shipping is an aspect of strategic direction which is particularly well developed in Bell’s thorough examination. This is arguably the most closely argued and masterful portion of the book. Bell shows how Churchill, who was always drawn to offensive projects, had come to see naval power as essentially defensive because of its role in the Great War. As Britain’s leader during the Second World War, Churchill was convinced that the bombing offensive merited priority in resource allocation. His statement “The only thing that really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril” appeared on page 529 in Their Finest Hour in 1949 and has become an oft-quoted cliché. Bell shows that, in reality, Churchill’s interest in the Battle of the Atlantic waxed and waned while the prime minister was always determined not to weaken the bomber offensive. Logistics and infrastructure were not his strong suits. The author sketches in the main bureaucratic episodes which determined why land-based aircraft were not allocated to the defence of shipping. It was apparent at the time that the numbers involved were small. The Royal Navy was also not allocated resources in other areas. Bell’s verdict is robust: “By the end of 1941... it was equally clear that the navy alone could not exert decisive pressure against even a second-tier power like Italy. Churchill concluded that the navy should only be maintained at the lowest level necessary to fulfil its essential defensive functions, and that national resources should be channeled as far as possible towards the other services, and particularly the air force to enhance Britain’s offensive power. As prime minister during the Second World War, Churchill did not just neglect the foundations of Britain’s sea power: he willingly sacrificed the nation’s maritime interests in the pursuit of victory over Nazi Germany, and in so doing hastened the process by which the United States replaced Britain as the world’s greatest maritime power” (10). The polemic tone of these sentences does not accurately reflect the nuanced and balanced nature of this study. Bell has written an earlier study on British naval policy between the wars and this book is based on extensive archival research and use of the rich literature about the vast subject of Winston Churchill.
Churchill’s influence over British naval policy had extraordinary longevity, starting in 1908 when he became President of the Board of Trade and stretching over nearly half a century to 1955 when he retired as Prime Minister. Churchill and Sea Power is a real contribution to an understanding of how this gifted and forceful leader influenced naval policy at various stages in his long career. Churchill and Sea Power won the CNRS Keith Matthews Award as the best new Canadian work of maritime history published in 2012. Buttressed with solid scholarship this readable and engaging study is a fresh and balanced examination of Winston Churchill’s impact on how two world wars were fought at sea and on peacetime naval policy.

Jan Drent
Victoria, British Columbia


This first soft-cover version follows the same layout and design as its earlier hardcover version published in 2005 and reprinted in 2006 and 2009. It follows the usual format of the Anatomy books which is divided as follows; introduction, which contains sections on the ship’s history, the wreck, and then the design and specifications followed by a notes section; continuing with a short, but excellent photographic section, and then the extremely comprehensive drawings; and ending with a section on sources, and lastly, a bibliography. The cover indicates that the Anatomy of the Ship Series books are “The ultimate references to the world’s greatest ships from the inside out.” While there may well be additional material in other books, publications and locations, I know of no book that combines the wealth of material this one does on Bismarck.

The introduction indicates Bismark (1939) was the sixth ship named to honour Otto von Bismarck, considered to be the founder of the German Empire. The first of the five ships named after the chancellor began with a flush-decked corvette used as a training vessel, the second was a liner, SS Furst Bismarck built for the Hamburg-America line, the third, the armoured cruiser Furst Bismarck, while the fourth was another liner for the Hamburg-America Line, SS Furst Bismarck, and the fifth, intended to become SS Bismarck, another Hamburg-America liner of 56,550 tons, had her construction halted due to the start of the First World War. After the treaty of Versailles, the liner was completed, and handed over to the British to become RMS Majestic. The sixth, the Battleship Bismarck was launched on 14 February 1939, the same year as her sistership Tiptitz.

Following German naval protocol, Bismarck was not named until she was launched, when a name-board was hung over her side as she was christened. Beyond that, the introduction outlines the ships of the Kaiserliche Marine. When Germany signed the Armistice on 11 November 1918 it was required to have 74 of its ships interned in neutral ports. On 19 November 1918, the German fleet sailed for the Firth of Forth and eventually to Scapa Flow where, while still interned, the entire fleet, except one was scuttled on 21 June 1919 to prevent the fleet falling into British hands. The introduction is then taken up with lengthy discussions about the development of replacements for older battleships, while complying with the Treaty of Versailles. On 16 March 1935 Hitler unilaterally chose to ignore the restrictions placed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles and declared German
sovereignty in defence matters. This meant the new ships were no longer bound by the 10,000-ton limit.

The historical section is thorough but brief, due to the Bismarck’s short life from awarding her building to Blohm and Voss on 16 November 1935, to her destruction by the British on 27 May 1941.

There is also a detailed report on the battle that destroyed her. The wreck of Bismarck was eventually discovered by Dr. Robert Ballard on 8 June 1989, and is well recorded elsewhere. There is a very complete section on the design and specifications of the ship including details of the final design for Bismarck (1936) where her official displacement is listed as being 35,000 tons, while her actual displacement under battle load was 50,405 tonnes. This is followed by nine pages of tables and specifications included in the final design broken out into the following categories: hull structure, protection, machinery, armament, fire control, aircraft and equipment and lastly, boats.

The photographic section contains six pages of photographs, the first taken while Bismarck was in Grimstadfjord on 21 May 1941, taken from Prinz Eugen it shows almost a full starboard view of Bismarck painted in Baltic Sea camouflage. Note: The outside back cover has a profile illustration of Bismarck wearing this camouflage, along with her paint specifications. This is followed by seven superb on-board close-ups taken in the August-September 1940 time-frame, followed by photos of the battle scene, ending with a photo of the nine Swordfish of the 825 Squadron, along with two Fulmars of 800Z flight, awaiting attack orders on the flight deck of the carrier HMS Victorious.

Pages 30 to 159 are taken up with the series of superb drawings of the ship. These are broken out as follows; A: general arrangements. B: hull structure, C: superstructure, D: rigging, E: armament, F: fire control, G: ground tackle, H: fittings, J: aircraft, K: ship’s boats.

The use of the soft covers addresses one of my peeves with the hard-cover versions of the Anatomy series where items such as lines, profiles, etc., were printed across gutters, rendering them effectively useless. In this soft-cover version, the plan view and starboard profile are reproduced on the inside of the front fold-out cover, while the lines and body plans are inside of the rear fold-out cover, presenting them in a far more useful manner, with no gutters.

This is an extremely well researched and presented history of what was a formidable ship where I am certain that Brower’s research in the Bundesarchiv Kriegsmarine was aided significantly considering the German penchant for record keeping.

Highly recommended to model builders and historians.

Roger Cole
Scarborough, Ontario


Bernard D. Cole’s latest contribution to scholarship should grace the desk of any serious student of international relations in what the author broadly refers to as the Indo-Pacific region. His The Great Wall at Sea has served for years as a highly respected source on the history and modern emergence of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Cole, a retired Navy captain and long-time professor at Washington’s National War College, speaks with authority once again in Asian Maritime Strategies.
This work looks at the vast region and its maritime nations from the North Pacific to the Indian Ocean, and even beyond to the Persian Gulf/Arabian Gulf. Vital to any understanding of international relations is a solid grasp of geography, and Cole does not disappoint. He describes both the geographic advantages and disadvantages the maritime nations of Asia contend with, such as access to the open sea and passage through strategic “choke points”; the Malacca, Taiwan, and other straits come in for particular attention. Cole’s observation that “China relies on the SLOCs [sea lines of communication] for more than 60 percent of its imported oil, while Japan relies entirely on imports” (p. 34) drives home the importance of the sea to the national security and economic prosperity of these and other Asian nations. Hence, differences over maritime concerns frequently take center stage in the Indo-Pacific region.

It is no surprise then, that the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which entered into force in 1994 and which 162 nations (not including the United States) have signed, has not settled many significant maritime issues. Media attention has focused on China’s especially partisan interpretation of access to its offshore, 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by foreign warships, merchantmen, and fishing vessels. Cole, however, makes the point that India and a number of other nations also dispute various provisions of the treaty. The United States Congress has repeatedly refused to ratify the document.

In similar fashion, he relates how historical animosities are often reflected in the names assigned to the seas and islands bordering Asia; Tokyo, for example, refers to the water to its west as the Sea of Japan while South Korea calls the same body of water the East Sea; to reinforce its claims in the Spratly Island chain of Southeast Asia, the Philippines recently began referring to contiguous waters as the West Sea, known to most nations historically as the South China Sea. Russia and Japan contest ownership of the same islands (Kuriles to the Russians and Northern Territories to the Japanese); China and Japan claim the uninhabited Diaoyu or Senkaku islands between them; and so on.

The current work takes a broad approach to the topic, focusing on how maritime power has influenced the course of history and contemporary affairs in Asia from the fifteenth century voyages of Chinese Admiral Zheng He to the present. The first chapters admirably introduce the subject by detailing the evolution of thought that sprang from the works of geopolitical analysts Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman and naval strategists Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian S. Corbett, and Theophile Aube. Cole relates how their ideas helped shape America’s overwhelming naval victory over Japan in the Second World War.

Well-grounded by the introductory material, Cole’s text then intersperses coverage of maritime conflict and cooperation in North, Southeast, and South Asia with individual treatments of the many Indo-Pacific nations and their navies. The author devotes considerable attention to the rise of the Indian Navy.

 Appropriately, the author provides a comprehensive analysis of the United States. He traces the evolution of American maritime strategy from the birth of the republic through the Second World War, the Cold War, and the twenty-first century with the current focus on leveraging multinational support. Cole aptly observes that “since the late 1940s, successive generations of national leaders in Washington have pursued policies based on a U.S. role as guarantor of world peace” (p. 57). The main pillar of that policy in Asia has been the U.S. Navy, which despite recent budgetary cutbacks remains a vital
factor in the region’s stability.

Lest we forget, Cole reminds us that Japan, with the world’s third most powerful economy and its Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF), is an ally of the United States and a major “force multiplier” in the calculus of naval power in Northeast Asia. He observes that the JMSDF operates with highly trained sailors and the most advanced ships, aircraft, and weapons and is “capable of twenty-first century warfare.” In stark contrast, the author found only three attack submarines and seven cruisers, destroyers, or frigates of the “weak” Russian Pacific Fleet operable as of August 2012. Given events in Crimea as this review is being written, however, Cole’s contention that “Russia in the second decade of the twenty-first century is . . . no longer either an empire or a world power” (p. 80) may have been premature.

Many observers in the United States are voicing concern that China’s feverish economic growth, diplomatic clout, and military build-up will soon outpace that of the United States and undercut America’s influence in Asia. Some analysts foresee the PLAN as determined to challenge the U.S. Navy’s supremacy, not only along the Asian littoral, but in the broad Pacific Ocean. Hence, it is refreshing when Cole concludes that “there is little in China’s decades-old program of naval modernization that would support an offensive maritime strategy” (p. 101). Nonetheless, China’s aggressive behaviour in its various island sovereignty disputes with all of its maritime neighbours gives pause for reflection.

This reviewer also found it curious that Cole contends, in almost a throw-away line, that “the wars in Korea and Vietnam lacked almost any maritime aspect” (p. 35) when he earlier alluded to the emphasis in the writings of Mahan, Corbett, and J.C. Wylie on control and denial to the enemy of the sea and the projection of naval power ashore. Maritime power in the form not only of carrier strikes but amphibious assaults (Inchon comes to mind); naval bombardment; air, surface, and submarine patrols; and logistic reinforcement and sustainment significantly influenced the course of those conflicts. A case can also be made for the benefits U.S. maritime power brought to resolution of the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955, 1958, and 1995-1996.

Cole also questions the continued relevance of U.S. treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia because “these agreements arose out of Cold War concerns about Soviet-sponsored international communism” (p. 58). One might argue that, before and after the demise of the Soviet Union and global communist ideology, the treaties have served to bolster America’s commitment to defend allies against threats from various other bad actors.

These points aside, Bernard Cole has written a comprehensive, well-documented, and impressively argued work highlighting the importance of maritime power in the Indo-Pacific region, which may hold the keys to future global peace and prosperity.

Edward J. Marolda
Dumfries, Virginia


The choice of title offers a clue to the author’s approach to the history of the storm and tsunami that engulfed the coast of Newfoundland in November 1929. The story of the great storm and its aftermath is woven mostly from oral histories, from the memories of people who lived along the rugged coasts and in the little ships that
were caught in the great gale. With some narration on the wider history of the event for context, the stories of eleven schooners are carried along by the author’s imagined conversations among the participants. In the preface, the author sets the story among the great human journeys of literature and imagination, with those of Gulliver and Odysseus. Then, he modestly leaves it to the reader to decide whether his method of presenting history works: whether the recreated dialogues of the people involved succeed as a way of creating interest and immediacy in the mind of the reader. The voices of the actors are in the dialect of Newfoundland using the set of words and expressions peculiar to that place.

Collins begins his story in the first seaport in the new world, St. John’s, as the schooners depart for the outports where their homes were. He touches on the long history of the colony and paints a vivid image of the port of Saint John’s, recreating the motion and noise of wind and weather, and conjuring up the sounds, stinks and aromas of the little seaport as it goes about its business. The introduction describes the cargoes carried, each with its uses and method of handling, like salt, molasses and fish and most of all—the cod fish. He describes the all-important process of selling the cod to buy the commodities upon which the people depend in their far-flung coastal villages and small towns or outports, to the north of St. John’s.

Each of book’s eleven chapters is named after an individual vessel: from the 50-ton Water Sprite to the 126-ton, three-masted Neptune II. Among the accounts of events involving the vessels are descriptions of the storm in the outports and its impact on the people waiting for their loved ones and breadwinners out in the ships. When not in the grip of the storm, the people discuss events in the outside world, like the Great Crash and, at one point, a young politician named Joey Smallwood, the first premier of Newfoundland in 1949, makes a cameo appearance to promote his political platform. Interspersed with the stories of the storm, the author explains the process involved in catching and preserving the cod, like sun drying and salting.

The reader who manages to overcome the slight obstacle of language and navigate the local dialect of the conversations will be rewarded with a vivid and dramatic picture of conditions on the little ships and in the ports along the coast. Each story is full of human drama. Many people have amazing adventures, like a rescue at sea of the survivors of the sinking schooner Northern Light by a giant liner, the RMS Baltic, or the crew of the Neptune II, weak and exhausted and sick after the storm, being blown by wind and current across the ocean to the Scilly Islands off the coast of Britain. Then there is the safe return of crew members to Newtown and Princhard’s Island after being rescued from a lifeboat. The author also describes the peoples’ struggle for survival in outports devastated by the tsunami that occurred almost contemporaneously with the storm. Throughout their adventures, crew members emerge as family members and friends belonging to tightly-knit communities.

The author’s technique somehow imparts an amazing amount of colour and detail to scenes and events. With nothing more than words, the author succeeds in entertaining and instructing, while telling the story of an event little known in the rest of Canada.

This is a wonderful book, and in many respects, quite captivating. It not only puts the stories of the ships and the people who sail them into human terms, it also teaches a great deal about life and society in the remote communities during the early twentieth century while focusing on the technical detail required to operate a schooner. The lone appendix gives a list of
the names of the schooners caught in the
gale with their captains and the port from
which they hailed.

The book does need a map and a
glossary of terms, specifically of archaic
Newfoundland nautical terms. Nevertheless, it works, and any effort
required to puzzle out the dialect and
unknown terms will be rewarded. Perhaps
the reader will have the extremely satisfying
experience of learning a little about their
own linguistic history, as did this reviewer.
The author applies the word “fousty” to
some sails that tore in the storm, a word that
my mother (a Scot) used occasionally to
indicate that a thing was rotten.

The next edition will no doubt clear
up problems with dates, continuity and
digressions. Despite a few problems, The
Gale of 1929 is a rewarding read. Anyone
interested in the history, language and
society of the east coast should purchase this book.

Kathy Crewdson and Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario

Quinton Colville and James Davey (eds.).
Nelson, Navy & Nation. The Royal Navy
and the British People 1688-1815.
Greenwich: Conway Books and The
National Maritime Museum,
www.conwaypublishing.com, 2013. 246
pp., illustrations, notes, bibliography, index.
UK £ 20.00, hardback; ISBN:
9781844862078

This handsome volume is a companion
piece to the establishment of an eponymous
gallery at Britain’s National Maritime
Museum that brings together “Nelson, navy
and nation.” The gallery is intended as a
long term display of artifacts illustrating the
identified themes for an early twenty-first
century audience for whom “Nelson is as
likely to be followed by Mandela as
preceded by Horatio” (6). It is indeed worth
some reflection to consider how much
society—Britain’s and Canada’s—has
changed over the past fifty or sixty years in
terms of received wisdom, homogeneity and
shared history and myths. What was a
simple given in this reviewer’s youth, for
example, is truly a foreign country for
today’s youngsters and their families. It can
be conceded then that the National Maritime
Museum’s initiative has the real merit of
need rather than a simple marketing ploy to
get nautical historians and enthusiasts to
buy yet another book with “Nelson” in the
title.

The book is edited by Quintin
Colville and James Davey and they have
persuaded the “great and the good” of the
nautical scholar community to contribute
chapters or articles on various aspect of the
subject from the period of the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 to the end of the
Napoleonic Wars (1815). It addresses,
therefore, the early days of Britain’s
emerging naval dominance in the late years
of the seventeenth century to the time in
which it was established as the
unchallenged and pre-eminent naval power
in the early years of the nineteenth century.
Both Colville and Davey are curators at the
National Maritime Museum and both were
directly involved in the production of the
“Nelson, Navy and Nation” gallery.

The contributors are some of the
giants in the field, including a short
introduction by N.A.M. Rodger, and
chapters from Andrew Lambert, Roger
Knight and Brian Lavery. Rodger’s
introduction, while short, is insightful and
an excellent overview of subject. He asserts
that the role of the navy in British history
and its influence on the British character
and identity is enormous. Interestingly, the
professionalism that the navy required of its
officers and admirals had a subversive
effect on societal norms with regard to
leadership and the notion of “gentleman.”
There was no role for aristocrats in the
The amateur tradition of military leadership simply did not work, and so there was never the purchase of commission element in the production of naval officers. Hence the navy was open to talent and drive, and was not restricted to society’s natural leaders. If a naval officer then one was by definition a gentleman no matter one’s actual antecedents. In this way, the navy had a similar influence on British society as did the Protestant revolution triggered by Henry VIII, which led to an indigenous leadership in the church without reference to the “natural” and “inherited” dominance of Rome. This latter influence had a significant role to play with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 with which the story opens.

Another critical theme identified by Rodger, and touched on elsewhere in the book, was the financing of the navy through Parliament. The need to secure consent of the taxed to pay for the navy and the large bureaucracy and dockyard infrastructure that was required to run and administer the navy, were crucial factors in the development of British democracy and government. Few think on these matters and the navy’s role in fostering such developments is essentially unknown to the public. Perhaps this is the source of the tongue-in-cheek observation that naval officers, with their inherent sense of good order and discipline, should be running the world.

The individual essays that comprise the book are not a chronological history of the navy between the two bookend dates; rather they are thematic in nature. Nor do they cover battles, tactics or strategy in any kind of comprehensive way; rather they focus more on the social history perspective. Colville, for example, provides an article on “Life Afloat”; Lambert an article on “Nelson and Naval Warfare”; and Roland Pietsch on “The Experiences of War.” These, and the other eight articles, are worth dipping into as the mood strikes as there is no need to read them in order.

The book is wonderfully illustrated with paintings, photographs, artefacts, and ship models. While a goodly percentage of the paintings, for example, are very well known and commonly seen in many other publications (e.g. the book cover), there is enough that is new to spark one’s interest. The photos of the artefacts, which are in the gallery, are well done and pertinent to the article in question and will be new to most.

As might be anticipated this is not a scholarly work per se, with the articles based entirely on secondary sources. These are described in a set of brief notes at the back of the book, as well as suggestions for further reading.

Is this book worth acquiring? My answer is the ever helpful: “It depends”. On the one hand, the book is derivative, and designed to accompany a new gallery in the British National Maritime Museum. If you have not seen the gallery, or are not likely to, and if you have a reasonable accumulation of volumes on the period, then perhaps there is little here of use. However, on the other hand, the merits of the book are considerable. It is attractively illustrated, the contributors are top drawer nautical historians, and the focus on the social side of naval history a likely useful addition to personal libraries over weighted with operational and more traditional accounts. I recommend it accordingly.

Ian Yeates,
Regina, Saskatchewan

This collection of eighteen essays appears just in time for the 250th anniversary of the Treaties of Paris and Hubertusburg which ended the Seven Years’ War. It has coverage of exceptional breadth: ten chapters deal with the war in Europe, three with the war in North America, three with the hostilities in Asia and the western Pacific, and one apiece with the conflicts in Africa and in the West Indies. (The fighting in South America is given only two sentences in an essay on the Spanish-Portuguese war.) It thus complements nicely a wonderful collection of eleven essays dealing with the French-British-Amerindian conflict in North America and its consequences, Phillip Buckner and John G. Reid (eds.). *Revisiting 1759: The Conquest of Canada in Historical Perspective* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 2012). One author, the accomplished Matthew Ward, contributed a chapter to each book. The Buckner-Reid volume is tightly focused and consistent in both approach (essays aimed at a scholarly audience) and quality (uniformly excellent). *The Seven Years’ War: Global Views* is quite diffuse in subject matter and varies between surveys for a general audience and very detailed essays designed for specialists. A few of its chapters are well researched but not very conclusive or are confusingly translated from German. In spite of its unevenness, however, this on balance is a very valuable book.

There are several fine chapters by established authors on familiar topics such as Ward’s on Amerindians, Richard Harding’s on the war in the Caribbean, John Oliphant’s on the Cherokee war, and Nicholas Tracy’s on the Manila campaign. What were to me the most exciting were the chapters on less familiar aspects of the Seven Years’ War. I was particularly impressed by G. J. Bryant’s two brilliant surveys of the British East India Company’s role in the war (aided by the Royal Navy), Johannes Burckhardt’s sophisticated analysis of the religious dimensions of the Austro-Prussian conflict, Virginia Akson’s explanation of Turkish neutrality in the war, Gunmar Aselius’s penetrating study of the Swedish part in the anti-Prussian coalition, James F. Searing’s very original presentation of the social dimension of the British conquest of the French trading posts in Africa, and Patrick Speelman’s perceptive survey of the war in Portugal.

Nowhere else is there such a wide ranging introduction to what is generally regarded as the first worldwide war.

It is unfortunate that such an informative and stimulating book is priced outside the range of all but major library collections. Given its cost it is surprising that there are only four pages of illustrations (all black and white) and six maps. The bibliography and index, however, are fairly good. Anyone interested in the Seven Years’ War who does not have a rich uncle or access to a well stocked university library should rush to an interlibrary borrowing service to obtain a copy.

Jonathan R. Dull
Hamden, Connecticut


*Shining Sea* provides a wealth of information about Captain David Porter, one of the most fascinating figures in the early United States sailing navy. George Daughan opens strongly to “hook” the
reader. By means of rhetorical devices, he produces an impact that keeps the reader’s attention and exposes the temperament strengths, flaws and underlying psychology of his characters through their actions, usually within the context of trying situations. Daughan includes a great deal of historical and technical maritime background information to set the scene for the events chronicled. Finally, he employs a clear narrative style that places his readers in highly varied scenes, an example of good creative non-fiction writing.

David Porter, Jr., was the son of Revolutionary War naval veteran, David Porter. The elder Porter sailed in the 32-gun frigate *Raleigh* under Captain John Barry. He and his brother Samuel were incarcerated as prisoners of war on board the infamous British hulk *Jersey* off Brooklyn, New York. His son, David Porter, in turn, was the father of David Dixon Porter, a prominent Civil War hero. James Glasgow Farragut became a foster member of David Junior’s household when he was nine years old. While being raised in their home, Farragut changed his name to David Glasgow Farragut. As a pre-adolescent midshipman, he served beside Porter during the captain’s exploits in the Pacific. Farragut was the first American to attain the rank of admiral in the United States Navy and David Dixon Porter was the second to earn that distinction. Certainly the Porters were an extraordinary naval family. The people with whom Porter served or mentored read like a “who’s who” of naval history. They include Captains Thomas Truxtun, John Rodgers, Edward Preble, William Bainbridge, Stephen Decatur, Jr., and acolytes Charles Stewart and John Downes.

Porter, as captain of the frigate USS *Essex*, was the first American to defeat a British warship during the War of 1812—HMS *Alert*. The story of this event serves as a first chapter “teaser” for Daughan’s fast-paced book. Porter was the first lieutenant under Bainbridge on the ill-fated voyage of *Philadelphia* to Tripoli during the Barbary States War of the early 1800s. Although he was a pupil of the sometimes brutal Preble and Bainbridge, “Porter had high standards and was a disciplinarian, demanding attention to duty from everyone, and strict obedience. At the same time he was fair... Porter believed in leading by the force of his personality, rather than by terror, and he encouraged his [subordinates] to do the same” (p. 24). Porter’s imprisonment by the Tripolitans after the foundering of *Philadelphia* was a sobering experience that fostered a fierce, unwavering determination to fight to the death in battle, an idea that served his career well—up to his next and last defeat.

As the War of 1812 commenced, Porter was ordered to be part of a task force under Bainbridge’s command to harass British shipping in the South Atlantic. The planned rendezvous did not take place because Bainbridge, in command of USS *Constitution*, had engaged and defeated HMS *Java* off the coast of Brazil near St. Salvador. Porter, now alone in the South Atlantic, talked himself into the idea that “wreaking havoc on Britain’s whaling fleet [in the Pacific] would significantly impact her economy [and] the British were not expecting the *Essex* in the Pacific” (84). Porter sailed *Essex*, without specific orders, to “double Cape Horn” thus becoming a one-vessel American naval presence in a vast ocean vividly described by Daughan. Porter had great success capturing many unsuspecting whalers using deception and many clever ploys. British whalers of the day went to sea armed with cannon. Therefore, Porter was able to turn some of the vessels into auxiliary warships and thus manufactured his own small fleet of quasi-warships.

*Essex* and her companions reigned freely over the eastern and central South
Pacific. Daughan, meanwhile, chronicles the arcane political upheavals that were taking place during this time on the west coast of South America. In one strange episode, Porter got involved in a tribal civil war on the island of Nuku Hiva, part of the Marquesa chain. After the captain determined that the disputes had been resolved, he unilaterally annexed the island as part of the United States. One of Porter’s favourites on Essex was marine Lieutenant John Gamble. At one point, Gamble was put in command of a prize vessel, earning the distinction of the only American marine officer in history to be appointed a navy ship’s captain. When Porter decided to resume his naval patrol of the South Pacific, he appointed Gamble as a quasi-United States chargé d’affaires along with a handful of lightly armed men on Nuku Hiva. The annexation proved to be a cruel delusion and disastrous for those men left behind.

While Porter easily took his prizes in the Pacific, the British Admiralty learnt of his exploits and sent several warships to capture the brash American. Rather than trying to avoid capture by returning to the safety of the United States and “cashing in” his many prizes and cache of whale oil, Porter sought further glory by winning a decisive one-on-one naval battle with a formidable British frigate. Essex took refuge and resupply in the neutral Chilean port of Valparaiso while Porter awaited an old acquaintance and naval rival, James Hillyar, commanding HMS Phoebe and a consort vessel, HMS Cherub. Porter and Hillyar feinted and dueled in and around the harbour for many weeks. Porter hoped to find an advantage in weather, vessel speed, seamanship and tactics. When a pitched battle finally ensued, superbly described by the author, Essex was lost and Porter was defeated. Courageous, a motivator, an imaginative naval tactician, and a resourceful leader, Porter’s character was flawed by a short temper, a narcissistic streak, bad judgement upon occasion, and an abundance of hubris beyond the confines of common sense. His being mesmerized by the pursuit of military glory overwhelmed these conflicting personality traits.

Porter’s seventeen-month cruise in the USS Essex during the War of 1812 arguably resulted in the most remarkable group of American naval long-term engagements in the age of sail. Daughan’s book recounts these actions from the American point of view. John Rieske’s recent publication Hunting the Essex: A Journal of the voyage of HMS Phoebe 1813-1814 by Midshipman Allen Gardiner provides a primary source account of the events off Valparaiso from the British standpoint, a thought-provoking contrast. In summary, Shining Sea is an outstanding biography, a fascinating read and worth owning in one’s library.
account, though there is no corroboration for this, his father took him to Canada when he was two years old after a trivial altercation with the local police. Following his expulsion from school at the early age of twelve “for being unmanageable,” Geddes tried his hand at many occupations. These included being a professional boxer and a rum-runner in Newfoundland which is where, he claimed, he acquired the name Tex.

On the outbreak of the Second World War, Geddes joined the Seaforth Highlanders, and in 1942 he served in the Special Forces alongside the naturalist Gavin Maxwell. They would have made an interesting pair at the training camp in Arisaig, where they both were instructors: Maxwell, an officer and aristocrat who aspired to be an author and painter, and Geddes, a sergeant who specialized in amphibious warfare and explosive demolition. On demobilization, Geddes became a shark fisherman on the west coast of Scotland, first as Maxwell’s harpooner and then as crew on the 1946-built Spindrift and, later, as owner of his own boat, the Traveller.

This book focuses on the everyday life of fishermen in the area of the Minch between the Inner and Outer Hebrides, which was where Geddes and his crew stalked the massive basking sharks. Measuring up to thirty feet in length and weighing as much as seven tons, these huge fish swam and fed on the surface and were killed solely for their livers, a valuable source of oil for the food-processing industry. The author recounts how he spent much time and a lot of ingenuity in adapting a whaling harpoon to shoot the sharks, whereas Maxwell fished with a powerful but cumbersome ex-Army gun that, coupled with his financial naivety, led to the ultimate failure of his business.

Geddes also relates in some detail the ups and downs of the fishermen’s daily lives at sea as well as in port. This ranged from crewing the local lifeboat, ring-net fishing and lobstering to deer-stalking and salmon poaching. He also describes how his expertise as a knife thrower and bayonet fencer entertained the local children! Although the author heaps praise on his fellow fishermen for the frequent risks they took to kill sharks, some modern readers may feel uneasy about the descriptions of the deliberate slaughter of wildlife for sport and commercial gain.

This book shows clearly that Tex Geddes was a talented and well-disciplined writer. His detailed recollection of his own and others’ lives during this post-war period has resulted in a book where every chapter is packed with action and scattered with anecdote. Coupled with his well-observed descriptions of sky, sea, mountains and wildlife in the Scottish Highlands, his interpretation of the events that he lived through has created a record that will be of interest to readers of natural, social and maritime history.

*Hebridean Sharker* is distinguished from others on the delicate subject of the conservation of wildlife and the promotion of nature. Although it is possible that some readers will be attracted to the book by its connections to Gavin Maxwell, they will find Geddes’ account of a long-past Scottish industry interesting on its own merits. It is both a sympathetic adventure story and a stimulating record of a seagoing life and by the final chapter, readers will understand why Tex Geddes’ colourful character gave him a near heroic stature on the west coast of Scotland.

Finally settling on the remote Island of Soay near Skye, with his wife Jeanne and son Duncan, Geddes eventually became the laird. He died in 1998 when returning home from a bagpiping competition in the Outer Hebrides. While there are no doubt many advantages in Birlinn’s reprinted classics, the one that
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would appeal to most book buyers is that while an original hardback copy of *Hebridean Sharker* in reasonably good condition can cost up to £300 in a secondhand bookshop, this paperback edition can be on their shelves for under a tenner.

Michael Clark
London, England


Readers will be familiar with the events which occurred off Midway Atoll 6 June 1942 which led to the sinking of four of the six Japanese (IJN) naval aircraft carriers that carried out the 7 December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, President F.D. Roosevelt’s “day that will live in infamy.” Some readers may also be aware of the pinprick strikes carried out by the USN’s carriers, the only capital ships available to the commander-in-chief (C-in-C) Pacific, Admiral Chester Nimitz, after the destruction of the battle fleet. These attacks and Lt. Col. Doolittle’s raid on 18 April 1942 provoked the IJN’s Naval General Staff and their Combined Fleet C-in-C to deal with their opponent in a decisive battle by seizing the Midway outpost standing at the end of the Hawaiian Island chain.

Probably more than any other naval action in American history, this was the battle that had everything—the all-conquering IJN navy and its *Kido Butai* (carrier striking force) flushed with six months of victories tempting the battered U.S. Navy to total defeat; a David and Goliath battle; the initial air attacks seeing a slaughter of the U.S. aircrews; moments of terrible indecision by the force commander Admiral Nagumo; the tide of battle being turned in an uncoordinated but overwhelming five-minute dive bomber attack; and, at the back of it all, the idea that Nimitz was able to orchestrate the victory due to the work of US codebreakers. But it was still said “they had no right to win.” After six months of running riot (Admiral Yamamoto’s own words) in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the seas between the Dutch East Indies and Australia, the Japanese *banzai* charge was halted in conclusive fashion (though it had been blunted in the Battle of the Coral Sea a month earlier). This is why Midway was described as USN’s greatest victory of the Second World War, and probably of all time.

Initially, it is difficult to understand Hone’s thesis, as he has not provided an introduction, although there is a scene-setting introduction by Lt. Cmdr. Thomas Cutler. So what is it that makes this book stand out from all the rest that have appeared about Midway? The most obvious point is that this is an edited work by Thomas Hone and in reviewing this type of work, it is important to concentrate on the editor’s choice of authors, the particular parts of their material that he has selected and how he has organized its presentation. But it is also important to remember the subtitle of this book, *The Naval Institute’s Guide to the USN’s Greatest Victory*.

Hone has organized this work in eight roughly chronological parts: Midway Anthology, Approach to Midway, The Battle, The End of the Battle, The Official Report of the Battle, The Commanders, Codebreaking, and Assessments of the Battle. Each of these parts contains a number of chapters, fifty in total, ranging from one to seventeen pages in length. There are excerpts from various books, magazines and other publications, official
documents, retrospectives by some of the participants, and, in one instance, a review of a book by one of the revisionist authors (but not a selection from the book itself). Each part begins with an introductory page or so by the editor, and each chapter has a brief note about the author at the end. There are also three appendices, photos, maps and a helpful chronology (useful as the battle crossed and re-crossed the International Dateline and Japanese and U.S. times also differ). So far so good.

How well has the editor succeeded in his choice of authors and their articles? With so many works to choose from, this probably presented the editor with some difficulty, but he has managed to include something from almost every author who has written about the battle, though there are one or two notable exceptions. These authors’ works range from the 1955 translation of Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya’s *Midway–The Battle that Doomed Japan* to a number of very recent works including Craig Symonds’ 2012 contribution.

Surprisingly there is no place for an excerpt from Volume 4 of Samuel Eliot Morison’s 15-volume *History of the USN Operations in WWII* or the Bates Report of 1948 prepared by a committee set up by the then-president of the Naval War College (no less than Admiral Raymond Spruance, one of the victors of Midway) or Walter Lord’s *Midway – Incredible Victory*. If, however, the omission of these early works was to avoid the mistakes they contained, the earlier chapters of Hone’s selection does tend to rely heavily on Fuchida’s work, which has now been largely discredited by the work of Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully. Another criticism is that although the authors chosen are some of the most respected authorities on the recent reassessments of the battle, the pieces selected by Hone are often not from their best known works. Many of them are excerpts from the Naval Institute Press’s own *Proceedings*. How much of Hone’s choice of articles was due to stipulations by the publishers and their desire to elevate Midway to the same status as Trafalgar is an open question. For example, the contribution of Parshall and Tully is their 2001 article on “Identifying Kaga” rather than their best-known work, *Shattered Sword–The Unknown Story of the Battle of Midway* (2005), which was published by Potomac Books.

The selections fail to resolve several outstanding issues. There is Marc Mitscher and Stanhope Ring’s performance as captain and commander, air group (CAG) of USS *Hornet*, respectively, during the battle. There are some hints about this, but less than in Peter C. Smith’s *Midway: Dauntless Victory. Fresh Perspectives on American’s Seminal Navy Victory of WW2* (2007), of which the highly critical review by Ronald Russell is featured in Chapter 52. Also, what was the reason for sidelining Rear Admiral Frank Fletcher after Midway and the Guadalcanal campaign later in the year? To find out, readers would need to delve further into John Lundstrom’s biography of Fletcher in *Black Shoe Carrier Admiral* (2006).

To some extent, the final Part VIII of the book, Assessments of the Battle, introduces some highly fanciful ideas about the importance of the battle, again possibly at the publisher’s prompting. In Chapter 48, Midway: the Decisive Battle? Geoffrey Till raises the point that had the USN lost at Midway (after the earlier drawn battle in the Coral Sea), FDR would have been forced to re-think the “Germany First” strategy agreed with Churchill and the chiefs of staff and devote more resources to the Pacific, as was being demanded by his chief of naval operations (CNO), Admiral King. This is certainly a point that deserves further consideration.

This book is not a single-author
volume with a particular theme, though it is a useful scene-setter containing short selections from most of the individual works produced over a long period. As such, it will appeal to readers seeking an overview. It is not a thorough covering of the battle or even one aspect of it. Readers looking for that will need to turn to the recent works of some of the authors. It will, however, prompt readers with more detailed knowledge of the battle to look at these other works with a fresh insight.

John Francis
Greenwich, England


On 2 April 1982, Argentine forces occupied the Falkland Islands—known in Argentina as las Islas Malvinas—and started an armed conflict with the United Kingdom that lasted for 74 days and ended with the Argentinian surrender on 14 June 1982. There is a rich historiography on the conflict that is known in English as the Falklands War and in Spanish as la Guerra de las Malvinas or Guerra del Atlántico Sur. British and Argentinian historians, in particular, have shed light on nearly every detail of the conflict, of course not always without a national bias or the expression of more or less strongly-held opinions. One wonders whether Johnson-Allen’s book simply offers another British take on the subject, 30 years after the actual conflict, or if it is an attempt to take advantage of a time when tensions between the two nations seem to have intensified again, partly due to rich oil deposits assumed to lie under the continental shelf of these remote islands in the South-Atlantic?

Johnson-Allen definitely writes from a British perspective and leaves no doubt about this, but he does not attempt to justify the war or the issues behind the actual conflict. Instead, the book provides insights into a field that has not been the subject of any substantial historical research up to now: the contribution of the British merchant navy to the British military campaigns during the Falklands War.

Based on an extensive array of diaries written by crew members from the merchant vessels involved, recollections provided to the author by merchant mariners, and some archival sources, Johnson-Allen tells the stories of the individual ships involved. Often arranging various first-hand accounts into the coherent story of an individual ship, the book definitely allows the reader to understand the situation on board the respective vessels and the merchant mariners’ thoughts and behaviour as part of a naval operation. This strength, however, also seems to be the book’s weakness; keeping it on a descriptive, sometimes emotional, level as far as the history of individual vessels is concerned, instead of combining these individual stories into a larger, analytical history of the role of the merchant marine during the Falklands War. By organizing the book by ship instead of chronologically, the material occasionally become repetitive as ship after ship sails to the Falkland Islands. This makes it feel like an edited collection of autobiographic source materials and personal experiences with comments that can and should be used for a more analytically-oriented research approach in the future.

While the book deals exclusively with the role of the British merchant navy in the context of the Falklands War, its relevance for historical research seems by no means limited to an analytical understanding of this particular conflict. Whenever any kind of military operation takes place in a
theatre of war far away from one of the belligerent nations, supply logistics play a major role in the context of the conflict and merchant navies were often the backbone of these logistics. From the German Hapag providing coal supplies for the Russian Imperial Navy en route to Tsushima to the convoys of the Second World War, and Maersk Ltd. transporting supplies for U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, merchant navies have been involved in nearly all major military conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Johnson-Allen provides a fascinating look into such an operation by showcasing not only the factual history of the British long-distance supply operations during the Falklands War, but also the difficulties that arose between the navy and the merchant marine. Their attempts at cooperation were often hampered by different operating protocols, different technical standards and the very different cultures of navy sailors and merchant mariners.

This book is a welcome addition to the bookshelf of any maritime/naval historian whether interested in this particular conflict or the wider context of navy-merchant marine cooperation. An index, maps, photographs and the bibliography provide useful information for further research, although it needs to be mentioned that the bibliography is mostly limited to the literature on the Falklands War and provides only a little information on the wider field of the history of merchant navies operating in support of military activities. Anybody interested in the conflict or the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas will appreciate the story of how determined British mariners were in securing the islands as a British Overseas Territory.

Ingo Heidbrink
Norfolk, Virginia


Born in 1764, Nicolai Rezanov was a minor Russian aristocrat in the time of Catherine the Great and the Tsars, Paul and Alexander I. Like others of his class, he competed for honours and preferment at the court of St. Petersburg. But he was also a man of vision and ambition for himself and for his country and sought his fortune at the far frontiers of the Empire. He was primarily in search of wealth, which he achieved, largely by marrying the daughter of Grigory Shelikov, a millionaire explorer and fur trader. Wealth, however, was not enough; Rezanov wanted fame as well as fortune. His ambition was to extend the Tsars’ dominions from Alaska to Northern California as well as to open relations with the “hermit kingdom” of Japan. He dreamt of a North Pacific dominated by Russia with trade routes stretching from Siberia, Alaska and California to Hawaii, China and Japan, taking as his model the British East India Company.

In this book, Rezanov’s story is told by Owen Matthews, a British journalist whose mother was Russian. In the summer of 1986, when he was sixteen, Owen visited an aunt in Moscow and was taken to see the hit musical Junona i Avos. By then, the Cold War was warming up enough to allow the production of a Russian rock opera with Western-style music based on a hero who was a Tsarist aristocrat. This was the young British student’s first encounter with Nikolai Rezanov and his romance with Conception de Arguella, the teen-age daughter of the Spanish governor of the outpost of San Francisco. In the nineteenth
century, their romance was well known in America through stories by Bret Harte, and the novelist Gertrude Atherton, but in Russia, Rezanov and his romance had largely been forgotten until Junona i Avos achieved unexpected success. The title is incomprehensible unless you know that it is the name of two ships.

Owen Matthews went on to become a distinguished journalist and the author of the acclaimed 2008 book Stalin’s Children. In due course, he set out to show that Nicolai Rezanov’s life ought to be remembered for more than the San Francisco episode. In so doing, he has followed Rezanov’s journeys from the luxury and intrigues of the court of St. Petersburg to Irkutsk on Lake Baikal, headquarters for his father-in-law, and on to Okhotsk, the departure point for ships trading to Alaska, where the Russian America Company held a tenuous toehold. The distances are enormous and travel took months, even years. Eventually, Rezanov returned to St. Petersburg with a scheme to open up diplomatic relations and trade with Japan, which was resolutely avoiding all contact with foreigners, except for one small Dutch trading post which had been there since the early seventeenth century.

With Imperial backing, Rezanov organized an expedition with two ships laden with expensive presents for the Shogun of Japan. The Nadezhda and Neva were commanded by the naval captain Krusenstern, with Rezanov as the Tsar’s representative and ambassador. Since it was also going to be a scientific expedition, a Dr. Langsdorf went along as a naturalist. The trouble was that both Rezanov and Krusenstern considered themselves in charge of the project. This was a recipe for disaster and Rezanov’s autocratic ways soon alienated the naval officers who made no secret of their dislike. He, consequently, had a miserable time throughout the long voyage. Worse was to come. At Nagasaki, the only way of communicating with the Japanese officials was through one of the Dutch traders and from him to a Japanese interpreter. Suffice it to say that after months of negotiations, the Japanese firmly rejected all proposals but generously resupplied the Russian ships and sent them on their way.

After leaving Rezanov in Kamchatka, Krusenstern took the ships back to the Baltic and arrived to much acclaim and rewards for himself and his crews. Rezanov, determined to justify himself, went back to Alaska, finding the outpost of Sitka at war with the local natives. Eventually, he sailed south in the company ship Juno, arriving at San Francisco in March 1806 starving and suffering from scurvy. The Spanish nursed Rezanov and his crew back to health, with Rezanov, by now a widower, proposing to the young Conception, usually called Conchita. In May he left, promising to return and marry her but he never made it. Exhausted and ill, he died in Krasnoyarsk on the Yenesei River on 8 March 1807.

The achievements of Krusenstern (or Kruzenshtern) were acknowledged by the Soviets, who named the great, four-masted barque Kruzenshtern for him. Matthews plainly feels that Rezanov deserves to be recognized for his vision and determination, not just as a tragic lover and has written this detailed but fascinating account.

C. Douglas Maginley Mahone Bay, Nova Scotia


The impact of industrial fishing in Europe increased throughout the twentieth century and, by the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, employment on a steam-powered herring drifter offered British
fishermen a high level of financial security. Offshore fishing dominated the coastal regions of Scotland, as it was here each summer that basking sharks—the second largest fish in the world—cruised for food. It was also here that author Gavin Maxwell began his enduring love affair with the west coast of Scotland.

Born in southern Scotland in 1914, Maxwell came from a wealthy family and was educated at a succession of schools before obtaining a degree in Estate Management at Oxford. In 1939, he enlisted in the Army’s Special Operations Executive as a small weapons instructor and promised himself that he would buy an island if he survived the war. After demobilization in 1946, he was as good as his word and borrowed money to buy Soay, a small, sparsely inhabited island in the shadow of the Isle of Skye. For three years he tried in vain to make a living as a portrait painter. 

*Harpoon at a Venture* was Maxwell’s first published book and it has recently been reissued some sixty years after its first publication, but it is still just as relevant today. It describes his attempt to develop an industrial shark fishing business on Soay and is packed with action and anecdote. He has also illustrated it with his own drawings that complement his acute observations of sky, sea and the Hebridean Islands as well as the west coast wildlife, ranging from gannets, puffins, Manx shearwaters and fulmars to dolphins, seals and whales.

A lack of private enterprise in the post-war Highlands encouraged the British government to establish new local businesses but Maxwell blamed the inaccessibility of the Western Isles for missing out on these opportunities. Gambling on an expectation of a rising market for fish oil, he founded his own commercial fishing business on Soay and built a small fishmeal plant and rudimentary laboratory to recover the oil of basking sharks.

These giant fish, weighing up to seven tons and measuring five to eleven metres, were easily injured by marine craft as they swam and fed on the surface. They were, however, greatly sought commercially for their huge livers which contained oils that were previously used for industrial purposes. Maxwell graphically describes the drama of a shark-hunt off Canna in the summer of 1947, when some 250 sharks were killed, including 83 recorded in a single day. In fact, the fishing industry went through a relatively prosperous period in the fifties.

The post-war decline of herring shoals in Europe and a growing domestic market for white fish encouraged an influx of ever larger steam drifters into Scottish waters. Maxwell was convinced this would lead to a dwindling of herring fisheries and spent much of his time learning about the habits of the basking shark. He acquired a second boat which he armed with obsolete army weapons, built harpoons of his own design and constantly developed new catching techniques. He also complained about the difficulty of taking photographs with cumbersome cameras in poor lighting, yet this reissued book contains the wealth of informative pictures that Maxwell would have originally wanted.

Gavin Maxwell died in 1969 and he is now probably best remembered for his otter books, *Ring of Bright Water* (1960) and *The Otter’s Tale* (1962), which many adult readers still feel were unfairly classified as children’s books. He also wrote a critically acclaimed book about the marsh Arabs of Southern Iraq, *People of the Reeds* (1957), as well as *The Rocks Remain* (1968). The popularity of the film of *Ring of Bright Water*, loosely based on his book, spawned a series of feel-good nature movies.

This book includes several
fascinating appendices by contemporary natural and zoological experts on the anatomy and biology of the basking shark. Hopefully, its reissue will reignite the controversial subject of hunting these magnificent sea-creatures to harvest their prized livers. Sixty years on, the book makes interesting but uncomfortable reading and buyers will draw their own conclusions about how far we have or have not travelled since Maxwell wrote it.

Although it was not until 1994 that basking sharks could no longer be hunted and they achieved protected status only in 1998, the outlook is not all gloom. An official survey in 2012 recorded 73 basking sharks shoaling off the island of Coll, and 50 others were seen around Hyskier near Maxwell’s former base at Canna. A recent project to tag the basking sharks that gather in Scottish waters is to be extended and the timely reissue of this book should be a reminder to all that we must never return to the practices of six decades ago.

_Harpoon at a Venture_ raised many serious issues of nature conservancy when it first appeared and, on balance, the publishers should be congratulated for presenting this relatively inexpensive book to a new generation of readers who fortunately seem to believe more in conservation than exploitation. It is a book that should find a niche on the shelves of any reader who is concerned about the future welfare of our planet.

Michael Clark
London, England


The tenth volume in the splendid _Seafarers’ Voices_ series published by Seaforth, an imprint of Pen & Sword Books, and edited by Vincent McInerney, _Rolling Home_ is an abridged and edited version of the original 1931 English issue. In keeping with the spirit of the series, that is, to bring vividly to life sailors’ experiences since the early modern period of seafaring for new generations of readers, this welcome addition reveals the colourful tales of William Morris Barnes (1850-1934) from his early days shipping out of St. John’s, Newfoundland to his harrowing exploits at sea during the First World War. While it wants for more substantive editorial analysis, this work delivers a collection of enjoyable and insightful anecdotes from a true salty dog during a transformative period of seafaring.

Barnes’s remarkable life stories are shared through twelve comfortably-sized, engagingly-written chapters, each one a pleasing combination of fast-paced action, sincerity of expression, quick wit, and below-decks perspective. Born into a ship-owning St. John’s family, Barnes went to sea as a boy before being apprenticed to a Liverpool firm making runs in the triangular trade between those two ports and Pernambuco, Brazil. As he gradually climbed the ranks from mate to captain, Barnes felt most at home on voyages that traversed the Atlantic. Following marriage and a brief stint as a shopkeeper for a St. John’s grocery, he returned to sea, making the jump to steam-powered vessels. Hardly feeling his age, he volunteered for the navy at the age of sixty-four at the outbreak of the First World War and served on several vessels that were either mined or torpedoed.

The reader is presented with an extraordinary life, bursting with spectacular incidents yet also featuring stories about the more familiar personal need for routine and relationships. From being arrested for stealing a mandarin’s idol and spending a night in an Aracajuan jail, to being set adrift in the North Atlantic for three days in...
February after his ship was torpedoed by a German U-boat and being pronounced dead and prepared for burial at sea, these extreme examples of a sailor’s lot are tempered by descriptions of regular shipboard behaviour and a desire for companionship. The final episode in Barnes’s life comes as a retiree in a home for aged sailors on the north shore of Staten Island, as he encounters a New York couple, Denys and Hilda Wortman, who persuade him to share his personal stories.

Serious researchers, despite being entertained and enthralled, will wish that the publishers had considered the book’s rich resource potential. Based on one person’s oral testimony about a lifetime of events, such an account must, of course, be viewed with the usual degree of caution and skepticism, for memory is selective and vulnerable to modification over time. Memoirs, like any other primary document, must be explored for validity and accuracy. McInerney, a former editor for the BBC, playwright and broadcaster of seafaring stories, does an admirable job of preserving the rollicking narrative but offers little in the way of objective commentary. Though he provides a fairly informative introduction and states that “exaggeration is never far away” (p. 2), it would be helpful to occasionally know just how far away it is.

This account first appeared during an age of high nostalgia for the sailing ship and it is very much a creation of the particular pressures and sensibilities of Depression-era America. Harking back to a time when life seemed simpler, hence the subtitle of the original publication: When Ships were Ships and Not Tin Pots, such products marketed romanticism. McInerney is sensitive to this only to the point of mentioning Barnes’s relationship with the Wortmans and the latter’s creation of a cartoon character based on Barnes. Additional context is sorely needed. Denys Wortman was a renowned New York cartoonist for publications such as The World and the New Yorker from the 1920s to the 1950s. His most famous character, “Mopey Dick,” along with his sidekick “The Duke,” was a street person offering commentary on the life of the city and the country during this tumultuous period of the nation’s history. Barnes was initially approached by the cartoonist’s wife, Hilda, who made a practice of observing, listening and recording the language and tales of New Yorkers as she sat on a Manhattan park bench. Barnes was every bit an outcast to a landlubber as a hobo on the streets of New York City was to society’s elite. The timing is also peculiar, for the highly anticipated John Barrymore-led motion picture Moby Dick premiered in New York City in August of 1930, the same year the American edition of Barnes’s tales appeared. Though that edition credited Hilda with her editorial contributions, the English edition did not. More needs to be said about this influence and how it relates to the stories told. At the very least, there are wonderful stories whose value to researchers could be significantly enriched through the non-intrusive explanatory endnote, lending much-needed context and correction. An index would also be essential.

The above criticism should not detract from readers’ enjoyment of this volume, for it provides them with stories they will take great delight in reading. Rolling Home makes a fine addition to this important series, whose affordability, portability and animated writing style makes this history accessible to broad audiences. It will be of particular interest to those seeking adventure and a good yarn and may even hook others into delving deeper into the study of seafaring.

Michael F. Dove
St. Thomas, Ontario

In the monograph, *Ireland and the War at Sea, 1641-1653*, Elaine Murphy examines naval activity in Irish waters between 1641 and 1653. This period encompassed Irish involvement in the civil wars that ended with parliament’s victory and the creation of the English republic (later the Protectorate under Cromwell). In order for Parliament to put down the rebellion led by the Catholic confederacy and subdue those Irish royalists supporting the Stuart monarchy, the parliamentary navy needed to maintain unrestricted access to Ireland; something they struggled to achieve as events in England often prevented the allocation of necessary resources. Naval historians have made this point, yet the particulars of what occurred in the waters around Ireland have not been studied in detail for the entirety of the civil wars. It is Murphy’s goal to explore and explain naval conflict around Ireland and tie the narrative to wider political considerations.

Murphy faced the difficult task of piecing together confederate and royalist warship activity from English primary sources, as few originating from Ireland survive, if they ever existed at all. Nevertheless, the principal source materials have been combed for all references to parliamentary naval activity against confederate and royalist forces operating in Irish waters. Especially relevant are the High Court of Admiralty papers dealing with reprisals. Court witnesses, through their depositions, often provided important information and detail on war at sea in Irish waters beyond testimony relevant to their particular case.

The monograph is divided into two sections: the first details naval activity in Irish waters chronologically, while the second engages in thematic analysis of how Irish and English forces waged small-scale naval war in the waters surrounding Ireland. Murphy argues that early confederate strategy did not extend to capturing key ports, and neither the royalist nor the parliamentary forces could seize any advantage from this. This set the tone for later maritime activity, which centred on confederate employment of privateers to disrupt parliamentary shipping, while royalist forces utilized any procurable resources to support their enclaves in Ireland. Meagre assets frequently restricted confederate and royalist naval efforts, and this can be demonstrated with the royalist squadron under Prince Rupert. Although sailing a strong force of seven frigates to Ireland to join local privateers during the winter of 1649, insufficient funds and a shortage of sailors prevented Rupert from employing local numerical superiority to exploit a parliamentary gap in coverage. The next spring, Parliament deployed force sufficient to trap the royalist squadron in Kinsale Harbour, yet insufficient to attack the port and destroy them. Nevertheless, the parliamentary navy did its best to secure Ireland by establishing defensive patrols, convoying supplies, and supporting sieges at important ports. Even when sufficient force could be made available to provide Ireland with strong naval support, however, it was still not enough to eliminate privateering completely. For instance, by the summer of 1651, Murphy points out that the increase in merchant shipping travelling to Ireland in support of Cromwell’s invasion forces far exceeded the navy’s ability to protect them, although enemy (primarily royalist) privateers at this stage could not inflict enough damage to compromise parliamentary effectiveness.

This book will be useful for
scholars interested in examining small-scale naval activity during the “Age of Sail,” especially commerce raiding and trade protection. Naval activity around Ireland usually consisted of routine patrolling and convoying, punctuated with the capturing of prizes or battling for control of an important port. This contrasts with the more familiar, large-scale battles fought during other conflicts that have frequently provided the foundation for naval historical knowledge. Murphy contributes to our understanding of what occurred at sea on a daily basis during the civil wars, and is to be commended further for squeezing as much information as possible from difficult source material. Unfortunately, this material is too frequently not connected to the broad context of war at sea or civil war and rebellion in a consistent or concentrated fashion. The discussion is directed at readers with detailed knowledge of the civil wars who might be less familiar with warfare at sea. Only vague mention is made within the introduction as to exactly what the confederate rebellion was and only passing mention is made of royalist activity in Ireland. These themes have to wait until the main body of the text to be identified properly and, even here, crucial turning-points for Ireland in the conflict are not discussed to the level required fully to comprehend their importance within broader contexts. An important example: in 1643, the confederates and royalists in Ireland entered into a cessation of arms with the parliamentarians, permitting royalist reinforcements to be sent to England. The Cessation is never explained clearly by Murphy, although it is argued to have changed the tenor of conflict in the Irish Sea because it gave royalists and confederates time to regroup and muster fresh resources. The monograph could have benefited from deeper discussions on such events, as well as on processes such as commerce raiding and trade protection outside the narrow window of the mid-seventeenth century.

While 148 pages of the book are devoted to text, the 70 pages following consist of six appendices that identify and catalogue all references found within the source material to ships and vessels employed by the belligerents, as well as surviving information on the prizes they captured. Such basic compilations are informative, useful, and the result of painstaking research and compilation, but they also suggest that the monograph has not evolved too far past its apparent origins as a doctoral dissertation.

William R. Miles
Fredericton, New Brunswick


Man-of-War Life is the first of Charles Nordhoff’s books about his various sea experiences that include The Merchant Service, Whaling and Fishing, and Stories of the Island World. First published in 1855 by Dodd, Mead & Company, Man-of-War Life has gone through a number of editions, the second, in 1883 with a new preface. Vincent McInerney decided an abridged version of the original 766 pages might make the well-told story about life on a sailing warship of that era more accessible. This reviewer downloaded a copy of the original edition as PDF from the Internet to compare random abridged sections with the Nordhoff first publication. The editor did an excellent job of retaining the book’s integrity while pruning the flowery language popular at the time into an easily-read 191 pages.

The book is a boy’s detailed view of naval life in the first third of the nineteenth century and the workings of an American sailing warship. Nordhoff describes the routine, discipline, and
training exercises that characterized the navy of the day, also noting its evolution into a humane society. The author offers insight into the mind of an articulate young man who volunteered to go to sea at the lowest level of naval rank, clearly describing his fears, trials, and triumphs. One also learns about the rampant illnesses, physical challenges, and unexpected hardships that accompanied the life of an American sailor on the 74-gun ship-of-the-line *Columbus*. Also included, if covered somewhat scantily, is a sailor’s eye view of *Columbus*’s mission to open American Far East diplomacy and trade protection under Commodore James Biddle.

Nordhoff’s many prejudices included anti-Semitism as well as anti-Chinese, Korean, Chilean, Mexican, and Hawaiian bigotries. The only nationality that he appeared to respect was the Japanese. This narrow-mindedness likely reflected shipboard xenophobic culture. Nordhoff did show some unusually mature perceptions for a young seaman, as can be seen the series of quotations that follow.

He noted that although being in the navy gave him the opportunity to visit and explore foreign cultures, being part of the naval brotherhood limited his horizon to the quasi-legitimate waterfront businesses that catered to seamen. “The Sailor sees nothing really worth seeing. Seaports, devoted entirely to the shipping matters, contain little of real interest to the traveler… And if one tears himself loose from the restraints and influences of the ship, and undertakes to explore the country? He finds that he has not the powers of observation, nor the knowledge of other places with which to compare that which he is now witnessing, powers indispensable to those who really would study other countries and people” (p. 157).

Few of Nordhoff’s comrades cared about anything besides drink and women while on shore. He described one group of his mates returning from liberty as follows: “black eyes and contused faces, many still intoxicated, and nearly all,… Looking as if they had been boarding in the market, sleeping on benches” (p. 152).

Nordhoff did leave the reader with a positive philosophy. “Sailors are rough fellows, and have their full share of weaknesses, but, whether careless and light-hearted, or sometimes positively wicked, no man has a warmer or more easily touched heart. Tough plain spoken as he is, there is no tenderer heart than Jack’s [Nordhoff’s sobriquet for sailors]. No kinder nurse in sickness, no less selfish companion in the everyday pursuits of life, no more open-handed and free-hearted giver to the poor and needy than he of the bronzed cheek and tarry frock” (p. 178).

A sailor’s life created a touching camaraderie between one another and their vessel. “I regarded the old craft, the scene of many, to me eventful, passages in my life, with a feeling of affection which I had never before experienced. I was not alone. Old Tars and young lads were all walking about, taking their leaves of the various familiar objects and places about the decks. Here was a powder boy, holding up to the light, for the last time, his bright priming wires. There, a greybeard seaman was brushing dust off his cutlass, and placing it carefully in the overhead rack… Others fidgeting about decks, evidently feeling themselves sadly out of place, and half-wishing the Columbus was yet off the Horn” (p. 191).

Nordhoff, and his editor/abridger McInerney, present an illuminating view of shipboard life during the last days of the American Navy under sail. The abridged version is well done. McInerney expresses Nordhoff’s work in more contemporary language and usages. It is, therefore, very accessible and likely to be noticed and read by naval and maritime historians. The abridged book might have been more
valuable had it retained more of the original’s chapter headings and summaries, serving as a quasi-index document where one might look to quote from the primary source. Still, this is an enjoyable read that offers a unique perspective on the seafaring history of the time.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


Two types of ships dominate the common perception of the Great War at sea: the awe-inspiring dreadnought, bristling with huge guns and covered in armour, responsible for the naval arms race that many point to as a proximate cause of the war; and the unterseeboot, or U-boats, the German submarines that plied the North Atlantic sinking ships and spreading terror. The two ship types, so markedly distinct and uniquely associated with specific belligerents, have framed the historic dialogue concerning the maritime dimensions of the First World War. It helps that historians and strategists alike can link each ship with a naval strategist, the dreadnoughts clearly designed for Mahanian contests between fleets, and the u-boat, the embodiment of a wider Corbettian conflict over commerce and shipping lanes.

A glance at Phillip G. Pattee’s new work, At War in Distant Waters, indicates that it branches out from the traditional narratives. The Australian battle cruiser, HMAS Australia, graces the front cover, the photograph taken during its June 1913 sea trials. Cruisers, wireless stations, and British imperial partners play prominent roles in Pattee’s book, for he seeks to revise the dominant Great War battleship/submarine duality to explore a fuller and richer perspective on the war’s maritime conflict. At War in Distant Waters convincingly argues that the British, although focusing the majority of its surface fleet in the North Sea, keenly recognized the vulnerability of trade and commerce throughout its far-flung empire. As such, the Britain enticed the members of the Commonwealth and their allies into an economy-of-force campaign against German commerce raiders and battle cruisers prowling the international shipping lanes.

Rather than fashioning a revisionist history of Britain’s naval war during the First World War, Pattee instead outlines a British grand strategy that sought to leverage every element of national power—diplomatic, rhetorical, military, and economic—to counter the threat of commerce raiding from the Germany navy. Starting in the decade prior to the war’s outbreak, Britain expanded its underground cable and wireless networks so that in future conflicts they could rapidly identify troubled locations and surge war ships to meet German threats while diverting cargo vessels from area of known German raiding. To further ensure the security of their commerce, any strategy executed by the British navy in colonial waters had to counter two German capabilities: Germany’s own cable and wireless networks and the battle cruisers and other ad hoc commerce raiders mobilized to attack British trade. If the British defeated these, the German threat to Britain’s over-the-water trade would collapse.

The book builds over several chapters to the rapid British and Commonwealth victory in the sea lanes. By mid-1915, British and Commonwealth battle cruisers had either isolated or sunk most German surface raiders while
capturing or destroying all significant cable and wireless stations. This swift move to secure imperial trade carried strategic ramifications beyond the colonial regions. The German navy, Pattee contends, sought to avoid a climactic battle in the North Sea early in the war, hoping that success with commerce raiding would siphon British combat power from the North Sea. Once British and German forces reached parity, German strike groups could break the British blockade, with follow-on operations taking place in the channel or against the home islands. Pattee ably demonstrates how Britain’s early success against surface commerce raiding became a crucial component of the strategic equation in the North Sea. Thus, Jutland, while a tactical defeat and an operational draw for the British, served as a clear British strategic victory. Unable to either harass trade or break the North Sea blockade, the Germans found themselves forced to turn to submarine warfare. This decision to counter British strength with an asymmetric capability threatened the naval balance of power in the Atlantic…but not before drawing the United States into the war in 1917.

The strength of At War in Distant Waters lies in its ability to link naval affairs with national grand strategy. Beyond the admiralty, the British found success using diplomacy to close neutral ports to commerce raiders and enforce international law to seize ships infringing upon neutrals’ responsibilities. At the same time, British propaganda fomented righteous rage against German mining of international waters, laying the rhetorical groundwork for future anti-German fury during the U-boat campaigns after 1916. Those looking for either an in-depth analysis of the naval operations in colonial waters or a scathing critique of prior books on the subject will find neither here. The majority of the text examines the formulation of the colonial economy-of-force strategy, briskly covering the operations themselves. Pattee situates his work within the historiography, avoiding knocking down straw-men or tilting at windmills. He effectively drives home a central point: the British earnestly sought a Mahanian engagement and mastery of the sea, but realized that they would have to listen to the whisperings of Corbett in their ear to get there.

Andrew J. Forney
West Point, New York


Winning a war (or a naval battle) often allows the victor’s perspective of the action to become the historical view. Obviously, antagonists may differ with regard to the event’s details. Hunting the Essex is a British midshipman’s journal-account of an Anglo-American naval mêlée in the Pacific during the War of 1812. History records that the British clearly prevailed, yet the American who lost the encounter, Captain David Porter, published his version of the episode, Journal of a Cruise to the Pacific Ocean by Captain David Porter in the United States Frigate Essex, in the years 1812, 1813, and 1814 (Philadelphia, PA: Bradford and Inskip, 1815) in two volumes; revised by Wiley and Halsted (New York, 1822). Porter’s work, arguably self-serving, has largely furnished the American view of the events of this episode. Until this publication of Midshipman Allen Gardiner’s account, Captain James Hillyar’s British chronicle of the defeat of the frigate USS
Essex off Valparaiso has largely gathered dust in official Admiralty files.

As the journal’s author narrates, with the declaration of the War of 1812, HMS Phoebe (46 guns) and the merchantman Isaac Todd sailed from England for Oregon with Admiralty orders to take possession of Fort Astoria, an American fur trading post. Stopping at Rio de Janeiro to replenish supplies, the British commander of the Brazilian station, Rear Admiral Manley Dixon, altered the original orders. The small sloops of war Raccoon (18 guns) and Cherub (26 guns) were to assist Phoebe in her protection duties. Dixon had learned that Captain David Porter’s American warship USS Essex (46 guns) was seizing British whaling ships in the Pacific. The aggressive Porter might challenge the British attempt to capture Fort Astoria.

Porter had risen rapidly through the ranks in the fledgling American Navy from a midshipman in 1798 to captain by 1811. Promotion came after earning the respect of the naval command for his heroism and courage under fire during the Quasi War with France and the Barbary States War. Porter’s primary mission at the onset of the War of 1812 was to interdict British warships and marine commerce in the Atlantic. Without specific orders, Porter sailed around Cape Horn and began to disrupt the British Pacific whaling fleet. His successful capture of twelve whalers and burning of three others was the result of British surprise at encountering an American warship in the Pacific.

Badly damaged during a violent storm after leaving the Atlantic Brazilian port, the Isaac Todd’s guns, supplies, and many of its crew were transferred to Raccoon. The small warship would be better able to navigate the treacherous shifting sand bars at the entrance to the Columbia River. Raccoon now sailed for Oregon to capture Fort Astoria as Phoebe and Cherub hunted Essex. Combined, Phoebe and Cherub would likely defeat the lone American warship.

On 3 February 1814, Porter sailed into the harbour of Valparaiso, Chile, for provisions and minor repairs aware that the British squadron would almost certainly find him there. This being a neutral port, Porter was safe from attack and should be able to sneak back out to sea when an opportunity arose. Indeed, Phoebe, commanded by Captain James Hillyar, glided into Valparaiso on 8 February, followed shortly by Cherub. The enemy ships stayed close by at anchor for seven weeks carefully eyeing each other and playing maritime cat and mouse games. On 28 March, Porter decided to make a run to international waters past the British ships. Under close-reefed topsails and topgallants, Essex sailed from Valparaiso. A sudden violent gust damaged the main-topmast hurling it and several crewmen into the sea. The American frigate was now crippled and at the mercy of the weather—and the British. Hillyar would not let the opportunity pass and Phoebe and Cherub quickly set sail.

The battle between the three warships began in late afternoon. Phoebe raked Essex’s stern, while Cherub fired at the starboard bow of the virtually helpless Essex. Essex had suffered heavy damage to her rigging and many casualties among her crew. Porter fought back with his short-range carronades, but the Essex’s long guns were even more effective, forcing both British ships to disengage and repair damage. In desperation, Porter ordered grappling irons thrown outboard to fasten his vessel to Phoebe, but Porter’s attempt to board the British ship was unsuccessful. Fires broke out on Essex forcing her crewmen to abandon their guns to battle the flames. In panic, several men deserted in the only intact boat. Of the 255 men on board the Essex at the start of the battle, 58
were killed, 66 wounded, 31 were missing and presumed drowned. Some 24 men reached the safety of shore, bruised and battered. By contrast, the Phoebe lost four killed and seven wounded and Cherub, one killed and three wounded. Two and a half hours after the first shots were fired, Porter struck his colours. Midshipman Gardiner was given command of the battered prize ship Essex. As prisoners of war, Porter and his surviving crewmen were ultimately paroled, arriving in New York on 6 July 1814.

Gardiner’s graphic version of the actions of February 1814 presents Hillyar and his naval battle tactics as heroic and brilliant. He places Porter in a far lesser light. One’s vantage points in the fog of war can obscure details of events and a hard-fought victory can be intoxicating to a young midshipman. Still, this journal is a first-person account of a rare and significant War of 1812 Pacific battle. On another level, Gardiner rambles on about shipboard life, his disdain for bull fighting, the economic potential of Chile, and South American society of the time. He writes a lyrical description of the Andes at Sunset, yet displays a bit of annoying class snobbery.

In summary, Hunting the Essex is a primary source document focused upon the War of 1812 in the Pacific and in particular an episode involving the naval service of David Porter. It offers a different insight into the events of the Phoebe and Cherub verses Essex battle, thus putting Porter’s better-known account into a fresh perspective.

Louis Arthur Norton
West Simsbury, Connecticut


The basic underpinning of Mark Stille’s book is a comparison of U.S. and Japanese destroyer class ships in the war for the Pacific. He examines first the technical design elements of the ships, then training and doctrine, and finally their operations in the Central and Northern Solomon Islands group. In a series of actions, the two destroyer fleets were engaged during extremely high tempo operations designed to maintain control of the seas and by extension the islands and their garrisons that depended on supply by sea for survival.

The idea for the book is sound. After all, these ships were designed for similar duties and missions. Comparable in terms of size and complement, it is natural to look at the encounters of these ships in the Solomons actions to see the strengths and weaknesses of the destroyer forces in both navies. To do this, the author provides in a series of short chapters a brief treatment of the key issues in ship design and technical specifications, crew training and composition, the strategic situation in which combat took place, followed up with the ships’ experience in a series of battles, and a statistical analysis. The book also includes a chronology of events and a short conclusion.

Good as is the conception, the final product lacks depth. At a total of 80 pages that includes the bibliography and index, and lavishly illustrated with both photographs and art, it puts a lot of emphasis on image over substance. The extremely short discussion of each of the important issues addressed is probably the greatest liability. In the first chapter on “Design and Development,” for example, the author examines both American and Japanese design principles and several areas of doctrine, but does so in only two pages of
text for the United States Navy (USN) and less than half page for the Imperial Japanese Navy. Yet, there were ten different designs of U.S. destroyer in the early stages of the war and seven Japanese, based solely on the ships described by the author. Moreover these designs evolved over time, under a variety of constraints. To be fair, the author does provide some technical breakdown on a class by class basis later in the book. This is a handy reference and thus helps mitigate the brief discussion of design. Perhaps a better integration of the technical data into the text would have made for a more effective presentation.

The discussion of doctrine focuses on night operations, and on the gun vs torpedo schools of thought. This is useful, but there is no substantive treatment of anti-submarine and anti-aircraft doctrine, even though these roles helped shape the design of the vessels.

While the discussion of torpedo and gun design is fascinating, it is extremely brief and provides no greater understanding of issues like torpedo design flaws and the optics of the fire control instruments for accuracy in gunnery, let alone the gunnery doctrine practiced by the fleet in preparation for operations. How did the optics in the gunnery sights function? What types of shells were carried by the fleets? Were the munitions effective or did they have problems? What was the torpedo doctrine? The gaps in the discussion of torpedoes is particularly perplexing. The single page of text on the U.S. torpedoes says little about mechanical problems with the Mark XV steam torpedo. Most scholars focus on the submarine version of the torpedo, the Mark XIV, and its problems and forget that the destroyer version suffered from the same faults. The author’s short statement that these problems were fixed by mid-1943 gives no insight into how the problems were overcome, and appears simply to equate the improvements to those carried out for the submarine variant.

The author does include a valuable discussion of gunnery radar used in the U.S. ships, and important in the battles around the Solomons. This provides a rare glimpse into a valuable piece of kit usually ignored by scholars. But the author really needed to go deeper. How well integrated was the use of radar in the gunnery drill of U.S. destroyers and was it truly effective? Did commanding officers grasp its value? There are numerous examples of Admirals ignoring it during the battles off Guadalcanal, and this is not addressed directly. The battle narratives only partly fill this gap.

For scholars who need a quick outline of events, the chronologically organized battle narratives and clear maps are a good starting point. These accounts take up a little more than a quarter of the book, and are interesting to read. In every case, however, they are brief, bare bones treatments. Fuller analysis of the battles could have fleshed out much that is missing in the earlier sections on design, doctrine, and training.

A direct comparison of similar ship designs and their utilization in key operations that pitted the American and Japanese warships against each other had the potential greatly to sharpen our understanding of destroyer operations. As it is, the book is a nice coffee table volume. There are some good pieces of information for reference purposes certainly, but its value over all is limited for scholars. Great for the general population with an interest in the subject matter, but a good scholarly comparison is still needed.

Rob Dienenesch
Windsor, Ontario

When scholars come to write the historiography of our times, they will surely reflect on the widespread use of the term and concept “strategy.” Indeed, beyond academic studies, the word is now extremely widely used in politics, the media, and in universities. In many cases, it is now deployed without its old partners, tactical methods, and operational considerations. In this way, it has come to serve as a justification for action and as a template for an intended or hoped-for outcome, rather than in its more concrete and old-fashioned sense, as a realistic and achievable final aim which conformed to the tactical and operational realities on the ground and corresponded with the economic, social, and political conditions of the countries involved. As Eric J. Grove notes in his thoughtful introduction to this volume, the origins of America offer a clear lesson to its present-day leaders: “in any era the pacification of a hostile, unwelcoming country can be more difficult than it promises to be at first sight.”

The difficulty in applying concepts such as “strategy” and “strategic ambitions” without registering them in more mundane logistical, political, and economic contexts is a particularly acute one when studying the American War of Independence. In the first place, it has been observed by N.A.M. Rodger that the modern concept of strategy was almost entirely alien to the political and military leaders of this period. As the contributions to this volume demonstrate, the conflict might best be viewed as a series of emergency campaigns undertaken with an imperfect knowledge of previous events, of the intentions of the enemy, and of the realities of war on the ground. All actions took place against a background of impending financial crisis, a consideration which served to make planners abandon any idea of long term planning or goals. On the one hand, a French or Spanish “strategy” in the conflict of 1775-83 was largely absent (as James Pritchard and Thomas E. Chávez demonstrate in their respective contributions); in Madrid, planners could hardly see beyond the re-conquest of Gibraltar and Minorca; in Versailles, war aims were shaped by the rivalries between court factions, the ever-deepening financial deficit, and the sense that the rebellion constituted a unique chance to get one over the old enemy on the other side of La Manche. Even in Britain, strategy could be largely ascribed to the decisive intervention of George III, which served to overcome the Tory-Whig political divide and the latter’s sympathy for many of the goals of the transatlantic rebels. In America itself, allegiances were bitterly divided: not only was there a strong loyalist body in the southern states (see Ricardo A. Herrera’s paper), but the indigenous Indian communities were also generally more sympathetic to the cause of Hanoverian Britain than to that of the rebellious colonies. The American War of Independence was also a civil war.

Contingency, rather than intention, was the defining characteristic of this conflict. Farce, rather than strategy, characterized the French and Spanish declarations of war in 1778 and 1779 respectively. On the other hand, the final outcome—the independence of the former colonies—was the declared intention of George Washington and his followers from 1776. Washington famously formulated a Fabian strategy following the reverses in the early stages of the war; it was subsequently
adopted by Nathanael Greene but not, curiously, by Benjamin Lincoln. At this point, a pedant might wonder whether the term “a Fabian strategy” is not oxymoronic, on the basis that avoiding battle and hoping that the enemy trips up can hardly be described as a strategy: Rome avoided defeat in the Second Punic War by appointing Fabius Maximus, but the conflict was won by the rather more direct actions of Scipio Africanus; the American War of Independence was largely decided by Lieutenant-General Charles Cornwallis’ over-ambitious campaigns in North Carolina in 1780 and 1781. Greene clearly recognized that had the British commander fortified and defended the series of positions situated along the rivers of South Carolina, then the Patriot position in this region would have been very precarious. Like Napoleon’s favourite generals, he was lucky. Cornwallis allowed himself to be seduced by the dream of being Scipio Africanus, of chasing the confederates from North Virginia, a plan which was in large part based upon the attractiveness of rallying “the numerous loyalists” of the state by demonstrating “the superiority of our arms.” In this sense American independence was brought about by History itself, by the classical education which conditioned the plans and dreams of the leading actors.

This collection of learned papers brings together eight essays showcasing a variety of perspectives. Jeremy Black and John Reeve take issue with Paul Kennedy’s classic argument about British failure in the conflict being due to London’s inability to enlist a European ally in the war. The principal losers were the Native Americans, who were abandoned by British negotiators in Paris in 1782. As Karim M. Tiro notes in his fascinating study, at the end of the fighting the indigenous tribes could foresee the future course of events. The Dutch fared only slightly better, while Russia thought about intervention but ultimately chose not to become involved (see the essays by Victor Enthoven and Leos Müller). Donald Stoker and Michael W. Jones provide a very scholarly and detailed chapter based around a narrative of events, in which the genius of Washington emerges as the main determinant of the war. Naval strategy is examined in chapters by Kenneth J. Hagan and Professor Reeve: again, it seems worth wondering if John Paul Jones really was driven by a concept of strategy, an idea which may have been beyond the emotional and intellectual horizons of an honest privateer and self-aggrandising lobbyist such as he.

All of the essays are interesting, scholarly and engaging. The editors have performed an excellent job in avoiding the repetition or duplication of material. The volume will be of great use to lecturers teaching third-year undergraduate and postgraduate courses; the engaged general reader will find much of interest in it. Perhaps the only criticism that can be made would be that some idea of what “strategy” might have meant to Washington or Greene would have made an interesting chapter: an exploration of their understanding of history and war might have been illuminating.

It hardly needs to be said that the outcome of the American War of Independence was one of the pivotal events of history and the war involved nearly all of the leading European powers of the day; on the other side, the forces deployed on the ground were often very small in number, the terrain over which they fought was apparently very poor—in much of North and South Carolina the land appears to have been deserted, if not an actual desert. The colonial armies carried portable windmills with them, which they disassembled and re-assembled whenever circumstances allowed. Greene’s decision to build boats on “four wheels …to be moved with little more difficulty than a loaded wagon” was a
stroke of genius that helped to save his army in the Chase to the Dan River. In this sense the central protagonist in the American War of Independence was not strategy, or the future first president, Greene, or George III. The decisive factor was the terrain itself — the hills around Boundbrook, New Jersey, from which a wary Washington spied on the Redcoats; the sand bars at the entrance to Cape Fear River, and the shallow lakes on which hybrid warships tentatively sailed (they appeared normal vessels above the waterline, “but were like flat-bottomed scows below”); the plains of North Carolina trodden by desperate men “as ragged as wolves”; the malarial swamps around Charleston; the complex of forts on the Hudson River; the harbours around Chesapeake Bay — which was to have such a profound outcome on the result of the war. Perhaps more than any other war, this conflict was one in which the environment shaped all stages of the fighting, which took place in a land of vast expanse, with sparse civilian populations and tiny armies. In this sense, the central protagonist in the War of Independence was America itself; its mountains and prairies, rivers, swamps and lakes.

Philip Williams
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As many in the United States seek to distance themselves from the protracted, unsatisfying wars of the last thirteen years, defense analysts and commentators have taken on the difficult task of considering future wars and strategies to win them. Sam Tangredi’s latest book, *Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies*, is another such effort. For the most part, Tangredi succeeds in giving an informative examination of past and modern “warfighting strategies focused on preventing an opponent from operating military forces near, into, or with in a contested region” (1). While not necessarily ground-breaking in its scope and content, the book effectively leverages history to elicit strategic insights into the potential wars of tomorrow and how to fight them.

Known today as anti-access and area denial, or A2/AD, this term describes the “primary strategic challenges” to American security objectives (p. 1). Using historical and contemporary cases, Tangredi argues that confronting any A2/AD strategy will require more than just military operations. In the future, access challenges will require a full government approach that employs all national instruments of power to execute a coherent “counter anti-access” campaign. The author contends that any use of the military instrument will have to rely on maritime capabilities when countering a potential adversary’s A2/AD operations. To that end, Tangredi’s book is a constructive, open-source contribution to the larger discussion of countering access challenges.

Tangredi organizes his book logically with theoretical concepts and examples. He begins with an introduction that uses the Battle of Thermopylae and Desert Storm to establish “five fundamental elements” of “anti-access and area denial strategies across history” (p. 13). Similar to Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett a century ago, Tangredi creates a framework to analyze and assess his theory. To paraphrase the author, he asserts that the fundamental elements of anti-access warfare are firstly the perception that the attacking force is strategically superior; secondly, geography has the most influence on time
and aids in the attrition of the enemy; thirdly, the maritime domain is the predominant conflict space; fourthly, information and intelligence are as critical as operational deception is deceptive; and lastly, outside events can have an impact on the outcome of the A2/AD contest. Tangredi’s framework becomes much of the organizational scheme for the remainder of the book.

The main body of the book includes a modern concept of anti-access followed by an overarching strategy of how to defeat an “Anti-access Campaign.” He then describes three historical cases where the anti-access sides achieved victory and three examples of where they failed. For the victories, Tangredi considers the English defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the Ottoman defense of the Turkish Straits in the First World War, and Britain’s victory over Germany in the Battle of Britain and Operation Sea Lion in 1941. The three anti-access defeats are Germany’s loss of “Fortress Europe” in 1944-45, Imperial Japan’s loss to the Allies in the Pacific in 1945, and Argentina’s failure to retain the Falkland Islands in 1983. His last four chapters explore present-day anti-access cases facing the United States in the twenty-first century. Specifically, he examines challenges presented by China in East Asia, Iran in Southwest Asia, Russia in central Eurasia and North Korea in Northeast Asia.

Perhaps the most appealing aspect of Tangredi’s analysis is the fact that he examines each potential anti-access case from conflict initiation through the various possibilities for war termination, something not normally done in the current open-source literature covering anti-access. He asks the rhetorical, yet uncomfortable, question of what happens after the anti-access power fails to keep the countering power out—“Now what?” (p. 250). Acknowledging that gaining access is often an interim goal, Tangredi postulates how counter-access campaigns could be successful. He also notes that there is still much uncertainty in how any of these new wars might end, especially against America’s greatest potential foe in the People’s Republic of China. With that in mind, he suggests that the best way for the U.S. to solve the anti-access problem is to keep the potential adversary “blind” to any maritime and joint capabilities entering the region, thus eliminating the wall before it can be put up. Indeed, this is an intriguing recommendation, but here, Tangredi might have also echoed his earlier call for a “whole of government” approach in order to avoid any misunderstanding of the book’s central purpose—explaining why all the tools of national power must be used in a counter anti-access campaign.

Given his reliance on open-source materials, mainly coming from defense think-tanks and official Department of Defense publications, Tangredi’s treatment of anti-access and area denial is at times unwieldy and disjointed. Missing from his sources are the writings of Milan Vego, Proceedings articles written by the current Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Jonathan Greenert) and the open-release brochures provided by the AirSeaBattle Office in the Department of Defense. As a result, there are lapses in style and some over-reliance on doctrinal jargon, however, Anti-Access Warfare is a must-read for anyone interested in understanding the prospect of A2/AD warfare in the maritime domain.

Jon Scott Logel
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Canadian naval policy has seldom generated much interest in Great Britain, with the notable exception of the Naval Aid Bill introduced to the Canadian House of Commons by Robert Borden’s Conservative government in the autumn of 1912. This legislation was intended to provide for the construction, in British shipyards, of three new dreadnought battleships for Britain’s Royal Navy. The naval arms race with Germany was placing considerable strain on British finances at this time, and the possibility that Canada might alleviate some of the burden was warmly welcomed by the British Admiralty, and especially the young first lord, Winston S. Churchill. Behind the scenes, the up-and-coming British cabinet minister worked closely with the more senior Dominion prime minister, supplying him with information and documents to persuade Canadians that Britain urgently needed their aid. Borden’s Naval Aid Bill was highly controversial, however, and was ultimately rejected by the Canadian Senate, where the Liberal Party commanded a majority.

These events have typically been treated either as a colourful episode in Canadian political history or as a minor distraction in the development of pre-war British naval policy. This volume is the first attempt to give equal weight to events on both sides of the Atlantic, an approach that allows the author to explore the close collaboration that developed between Borden and Churchill. The two politicians corresponded regularly during this period and a strong degree of mutual trust appears to have developed. Borden was clearly impressed by Churchill’s arguments for a Canadian contribution to bolster the Royal Navy, a policy that had the added benefit, from Borden’s perspective, of upsetting the plans of his predecessor, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, to develop an autonomous Canadian navy. Churchill, on the other hand, was grateful for Borden’s efforts and was willing to take political risks on his behalf. The most obvious challenge faced by the First Lord was to make the case that Britain faced a genuine naval emergency without creating a panic in Britain or suggesting that his own preparations had been inadequate.

Thornton’s efforts to provide a mid-Atlantic perspective on this episode achieve mixed results. The book’s strength is its treatment of the Canadian side of the story, and in particular, the author’s skillful dissection of the highly-charged debates over naval policy in the Canadian Parliament. Borden’s case for the contribution of ships to the British navy and a more centralized imperial defence policy ran into strong opposition from many quarters, including French Canadians and nationalists, who preferred the development of a distinctly Canadian naval service that would remain under Ottawa’s control. Despite the best efforts of both Borden and Churchill, many remained skeptical of the idea that Britain faced a naval emergency. Moreover, Churchill’s attempts to support Borden were not always successful. Many Canadians were offended by the first lord’s observations that the Canadian shipbuilding industry was not up to the task of building dreadnoughts, and that the vessels could be built more economically in British shipyards.

The book pays far less attention to the British side of the story, and provides only the most superficial treatment of British naval policy. The bibliography, for example, contains just a single file from the Admiralty records in Britain’s National Archives. This is a serious shortcoming.
Thornton is seemingly unaware of the complexity of Admiralty policy in the years before the outbreak of war, and consequently fails to understand Churchill’s motives. The first lord’s commitment to obtaining Canadian dreadnoughts was not, as Thornton implies, motivated simply by the need to keep up with Germany. In the summer of 1912, the British Cabinet made a momentous decision to compete against both Germany and its ally, Austria-Hungary. Churchill was not unduly alarmed by the naval balance in the North Sea: the “emergency” he faced was Britain’s declining margins in the Mediterranean Sea, which could only be met if the dominions were able and willing to put dreadnoughts at Britain’s disposal. Similarly, Thornton is unable to place Churchill’s Canadian policies in the context of his evolving views on imperial naval defence, and therefore, cannot explain important developments like the proposal to assign the Canadian dreadnoughts to a mobile “Imperial Squadron.”

It should also be noted that the book has little to say about Anglo-Canadian naval relations after the Senate’s rejection of Borden’s Naval Aid Bill in May 1913. This is unfortunate, since the fate of the Canadian dreadnoughts continued to be an important issue for Churchill, especially during the British Cabinet crisis over the 1914 naval estimates. Thornton mistakenly suggests that Churchill felt he might need to resign over the failure of the Canadian government to supply three new dreadnoughts. It is true that Churchill came close to resigning in January 1914, but for different reasons. The British Cabinet threatened to cancel the construction of new British battleships, which would have made a mockery of Churchill’s public claims that Britain required urgent aid from the dominions to bolster its strength in capital ships. This would have been humiliating for Churchill, and would have caused Borden considerable discomfort as well. The first lord promptly enlisted Borden’s aid, but the Canadian prime minister’s role in the resolution of this crisis receives no attention here. Nor does the author explore how Borden’s failure to deliver Canadian dreadnoughts forced the British to reshape their naval policy on the eve of the First World War.

This book fails to deliver everything the title promises, but the Canadian subject matter is generally well handled. Whether it represents good value for money is another matter. The text, excluding appendices, runs to only 136 pages, which hardly seems to justify the publisher’s hefty price tag.

Christopher M. Bell
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Geoffrey Till examines the naval situation in the Asia-Pacific region between 2000 and 2012 to answer the question: does the expansion that is occurring now constitute an arms race? The work presents an analysis of four of the largest participants: China, India, Japan and the United States, to determine whether an action-reaction dynamic is present. While referring occasionally to the other naval powers in the region, he seeks further to determine whether likely future events “might this have the de-stabilizing consequences often associated with an arms race?” (p. 12)

The author’s explanation of geopolitics, strategy, doctrine, and procurement is highly generalized and
presupposes a detailed knowledge of weapon systems and events. The intended audience includes planning staffs and war colleges, according to the back cover. The work is divided into chapters headed: Introduction; Naval modernization, Action-reaction dynamics and their drivers; Sea control; Traditional missions; Non-traditional missions; Conclusions.

The introduction gets off to a shaky start in the first line with the assertion, “The strength of the navies of the Asia-Pacific region has increased in an unprecedented fashion in the first decade of the twentieth century” (p. 11). While probably a typo, since the author certainly means the twenty-first century, this does not inspire confidence in the fast-moving account of complex information that follows.

There is a discussion of Chinese interpretations of Mahan’s theories. Then the author introduces the major complicating factor of the current sea trading system that involves a high degree of economic interdependence between nations that are also competitors, like China vis-à-vis Japan, the U.S.A., and increasingly, India. He also introduces the complexity of the threats in terms of proliferating political sources and the mind-boggling pace of technical change. Under the sub-heading, Problems of analysis, he includes the vexing problem of “words” used to describe the “public discourse” of each navy’s publications. There is an obvious gap here in that sources cited are almost exclusively English-language, including newspapers and journals like Straits Times and Jane’s Defence Weekly, and translations of the official publications of each country. The author points out that primary sources are non-existent, and secondary sources very fragmentary, in the case of China. He infers the likely course of future events from behaviour as reported in the media.

To determine whether there is an arms race underway, the author’s yardstick is the British-German naval arms race leading up to the First World War. In the discussion of procurement and modernization, the author looks for evidence of an arms race via “action-reaction dynamics and their drivers.” Technology is a major factor, now including directed-beam weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles. The author alludes several times to the interplay between possible theatres of combat in addition to war at sea: land, space and now the cyber sphere. This discussion becomes concrete dealing with the interplay between the services: army, navy, air force, and in America’s case, the Marine Corps and Coast Guard.

In the chapter on sea control, there is a discussion of emerging concepts like Anti-access/Access denial strategy and the effect that rapidly proliferating technology might have on each nation’s quest for sea control. The analysis of doctrine descends into linguistic complexity based on acronym-studded terminology: “Semi-official and official American interest in developing an alternate ‘Off-shore Control’ and anti SLOC strategy” (p. 73). The concepts and doctrine expressed use the language the U.S. military, for example, “air-sea battle” and “warfighting,” as well as Eastern renditions of concepts such as “an informationised local war.” The discussion becomes more obscure for Chinese planning, with terms such as “China’s alleged ‘Strings of Pearls’ concept for an extension of their areas of concern” and “Confucian notions of the ‘Harmonious Ocean’” (p. 74).

In the chapter on traditional missions, there is a section entitled Gunboat diplomacy, referring to the visits of Indian and Chinese naval vessels. This is curious since the situation today is a remnant of pre-1949 Asia, when there really were gunboats, not only at sea, but far into the interior on the rivers. Non-traditional
missions include sections on expeditionary operations and disaster relief. The author’s prediction for future events is equivocal, but leans toward a cooperative and inter-dependent relationship. The time-scale of procurement in China is comparatively lengthy. With the events surrounding North Korea and the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, Till asks whether policy moves in Japan to regularize the military increase the likelihood of a destructive arms race to replace the balance in the current situation.

The exclusion of Russia in a discussion of Asian naval expansion is problematic. Expelled from mainland China in 1949 and, thereafter, allied with countries of the “First Island Chain,” notably the Philippines, Taiwan, and Japan, Russia is an Asian naval power by virtue of its geography and history. While an example of the author’s American-centric stance, it likely reflects restricted access as well as the intractable problem of words. Another is his reliance on the work of Yoshihara and Holmes as “authoritative,” whereas they claim only that it is intended to help the U.S. Navy manage the situation.

Accompanying the text, there are a few simple graphic representations which are valuable for comparison. Maps are basic but purport to show quickly the region with sea lanes; East China Sea, and “Chinese island chains.” Tables transmit information quickly and succinctly but the only photograph is on the cover. It is a dramatic shot of a massive U.S. aircraft carrier, a few hundred metres away and headed straight at the camera at high speed.

Does the book work? Once the author’s point-of-view and method are understood, it does, offering a snapshot of the situation as of 2012. As a monograph in the Adelphi Series published for IISS, it is the author’s view reflecting the institute's values, of a rapidly-moving situation. Although the author never claims it to be an academic work, it is presented as one, but without the hallmarks of a scholarly, balanced work. It relies on a severely restricted set of sources, which are almost exclusively English-language. The lack of a bibliography or consolidated list of sources is more than an inconvenience, since the notes that contain the information on sources are fragmentary and often refer to earlier notes. The lack of a list of acronyms restricts the audience to specialists and academics who have a command of the terminology and subject matter. The author’s point of view is illustrated most clearly in the reverential tone he reserves for the U.S. Marine Corps. He asserts: “The U.S. Marine Corps continues to set the gold standard.” In this he shows himself, as he does throughout, to be standing very close to the U.S. position.

IISS has produced (at least) two supporting videos, an eight-minute Q and A with the author and a longer lecture with the identical title to this work on youtube. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBSu51HkSA8.

Kathy Crewdson and Ian Dew
Thunder Bay, Ontario


In his introductory chapter, Williams discusses the early years of the practice of natural history at sea, and how this gradually evolved from collecting species for medicinal or commercial purposes, to collecting for research and classification. He places the turning point at which the interest became purely academic in the last decades of the seventeenth century. The
following ten chapters are written portraits of sea-going naturalists and their work, from the end of the seventeenth century until the 1830s. William Dampier is the first, an English buccaneer with a scholarly inclination, who published books on his circumnavigation of the world and a voyage to Australia, both including illustrated reports on natural history. Dampier was not schooled in this field, but was a keen observer who described rather than classified what he saw. His collections and observations included plants, fruit and animals, as well as aspects of ethnography and anthropology; Dampier was the first European to collect plants in Australia. The second portrait is of Georg Wilhelm Steller, a young German mineralogist and botanist, who joined Vitus Bering in 1741 on his last voyage from Kamchatka to Alaska. There, Steller was allowed a very brief visit on the shore; unfortunately, Bering did not let him take on board specimens he had gathered. Steller’s accounts of the voyage were published long after his death, as is often also the case with later naturalists. Next is Philibert de Commerson, a Frenchman with a passion for collecting plants. He took part in the first French circumnavigation of the world, under Louis-Antoine de Bougainville from 1766-1769, leaving the ship at Mauritius. His publication on life on Tahiti overshadowed his research on plants, fish, shells and other objects. Commerson is followed by the work of the English and Swedish botanists Joseph Banks and Daniel Solander during their voyage with James Cook, from 1768-1771. They need no further introduction to the readers of this journal. Next Williams discusses Johann Reinhold Forster, who was born in Danzig and joined Cook on his second voyage, in search of the supposed great southern continent. Forster botanized, and collected plants, fish, birds, shells, and ethnographic artefacts in New Zealand and the Pacific islands and observed their inhabitants. Chapter eight is devoted to the ‘experimental gentlemen’ who accompanied Cook on his third voyage, and thereafter George Vancouver. They are surgeon William Anderson, and David Nelson, a gardener from Kew, and botanist Archibald Menzies. The naturalists who sailed with the French Count de la Pérouse to the Pacific, whose undertaking disappeared there, and those with his countryman, Bruny d’Entrecasteaux, who went looking for La Pérouse, are discussed in the following chapter. With La Pérouse went, among others, the gardener Jean-Nicolas Collignon, the surgeons Claude-Nicolas Rollin and Simon-Pierre Lavaux, and botanist Joseph-Hughes de Lamartinière. D’Entrecasteau’s search for La Pérouse commenced in 1791 and he was joined by the botanists J-J Houton de Labillardière, L-A Deschamps and Claude Riche. The next naturalist is the Spaniard Antonio Pineda, who was seconded by the French-born botanist Luis Née and the Czech-born Tadeo Haenke. They sailed to the Pacific in Spanish service under Italian-born Alejandro Malaspinia, whose expedition was modelled on the voyages of Cook and La Pérouse. The ninth chapter deals with the circumnavigation of Australia by the English lieutenant Matthew Flinders, from 1801-1803, and the voyage along much of the coast of that continent during the same years, by the French hydrographer Nicolas Baudin. Botanist Robert Brown sailed with Flinders, as did gardener Peter Good. Baudin, himself also a naturalist, was joined by zoologists François Péron and René Maugé, and gardener Anselm Riedlé; the latter two died early-on during the voyage. Flinders’ voyage concentrated on natural history, while the French emphasis was on zoology and anthropology. The last chapter in Naturalists at Sea is devoted to Charles Darwin’s voyage in the Beagle, who will need no further introduction.

I have listed the names and
nationalities of most of the naturalists, who often were also the ships’ surgeon, to show what a large field Williams has covered, and what an international company it was. The voyages in which they took part have been written up, but mostly by others and not from the point of view of the naturalists themselves. With the exception of Cook’s first voyage (primarily to observe the transit of Venus), none of the others was purely for science, but for commerce, discovery, or hydrography. As a result, the naturalists’ tasks and their collecting were not always understood or respected by the various commanders and their crews. This often led to opposition, intrigues and conflicts that added to the hardships of cramped living conditions while trying to preserve collected plants, etc. Despite these drawbacks, most of the research eventually led to valuable scientific publications.

Williams places his naturalists and their accomplishments in the broader context of the expeditions in which they participated, and also in the development of natural history in their times, whereby the work of Carl Linnaeus is often the red thread. Naturalists at Sea is, therefore, not just a series of biographical articles, as the title might suggest, but an overview of natural history as practised from ships, between the end of the seventeenth and the first half of the nineteenth century. Williams has managed to find a balance between the accomplishments of the lesser-known expeditions and those of the Banks-Cook and La Pérouse voyages, which often overshadow similar achievements. As the author notes in his introduction, some forty years ago no comprehensive study on the history of the discovery of the Pacific was available, and the bibliography of Naturalists at Sea shows how much has since been achieved. Fortunately, this process continues. Even as Williams was writing, books appeared on the work of Caspar Reinwardt, the German naturalist in Dutch service who visited the Moluccas in the 1820s (Andreas Weber, Hybrid Ambitions, Leiden, 2012), and of Karl August Möbius, the German zoologist who sailed to Mauritius and the Seychelles in the 1870s (Ulrich van der Heyden, et al., Die Reize des Deutschen Forchers Karl August Mobius, Wiesbaden, 2012).

Glyn Williams is an eminent historian of the discovery of the Pacific. His Naturalists at Sea is a well-written, scholarly book on an aspect of natural history that has not been highlighted in this way before. It is handsome and well-illustrated, with 39 colour plates and a map of the Pacific Ocean; one or more maps per chapter with the routes of the discussed voyages would have been helpful.

W.F.J. Mörzer Bruyns
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The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is America’s smallest armed service yet one of its oldest. Frequently overlooked by naval aviation historians and enthusiasts, the USCG’s aviation branch has been a part of the USCG since its present incarnation in 1915. Float Plans and Flying Boats, by Robert B. Workman Jr., a retired USCG officer, tells the story of the early days of USCG aviation and as well, early U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S Marine Corps (USMC) aviation as well.

And what a story Workman tells! Some background is necessary to understand the challenges the USCG faced in developing an effective aviation branch.
The USCG was formed on 28 January 1915 by the merging of two prior organizations: the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service (formed in 1790) and the U.S. Life-Saving Service. Although America had an earlier naval service, that had been disbanded and the present USN was not formed until 1794. Throughout, the USN has had budgetary priorities in both manpower and equipment and the USCG and its predecessor organizations have been in second place for manpower and equipment. Moreover, in wartime, the USCG automatically becomes part of the USN; in peacetime, the USCG reassumes its separate identity. When America entered the First World War on 2 April 1917, the USCG had a mere two years and two months to sort out the difficulties attendant in creating a new organization out of two earlier ones when it was merged with the USN.

From the beginning, USCG aviation has been closely associated with the aviation branches of the USN and USMC. Symbolically, the pilots of all three services wear identical pilot’s wings and part of USCG aircrew training has taken place at USN facilities.

A key player in USCG aviation development is Elmer F. Stone, Naval Aviator #38 and the USCG’s first pilot. Stone is an often-overlooked figure in naval aviation history—undoubtedly because of his USCG status—but it is remarkable how important Stone is to naval aviation. During the First World War, Stone helped the USN develop its aviation branch by testing aircraft and equipment. In 1919, he was the pilot of the NC-4 flying boat, the first aircraft to cross the Atlantic Ocean. Stone was offered a USN commission with a promotion but turned that down—he returned to the USCG and continued working to develop an effective USCG aviation branch. He often tested USCG aircraft and was not hesitant about identifying the aircraft’s strengths and weaknesses.

Later, Stone was detached to the USN, where he was instrumental in developing the first effective aircraft carrier catapults and other aircraft carrier flight deck equipment. When he returned to the USCG, Stone served as executive officer aboard a USCG Cutter. Internal politics played a role here: the senior USCG officers had been ship-trained and did not understand the potential and uses of aircraft. They were, therefore, wary of Stone’s interest in aviation. After that, Stone continued to work on developing the USCG’s aviation branch. He died suddenly of a heart attack in 1936 while inspecting a new aircraft for the USCG. By that time, aviation had become an integral and essential element of the USCG, including land-based aircraft, float planes, and flying boats. All were seen as vital to performance of the USCG’s mission—thanks in no small part to Elmer F. Stone. Stone’s place in naval aviation history is secure and he well deserves his place in the Naval Aviation Hall of Honor in Pensacola, Florida. Workman relates Stone’s life and career in detail and the reader comes away with a full appreciation of Elmer Stone’s many accomplishments.

That, however, is not all to Workman’s book. Workman consulted and reprinted many documents from USCG archives and has illustrated the book with many rare photographs. The inclusion of these items adds immensely to the narrative and often puts the reader almost back in time to when the document or photograph was created. Workman concentrates on the early USCG aviation efforts but does not exclude USN or USMC developments as well. Unusually, he frequently interrupts the narrative flow with descriptions of early USCG aircraft accompanied by photographs of the aircraft described when available. (Some early USCG aircraft were only evaluated and no photographs of them were
This was probably a wise choice on Workman’s part—this type of information is usually placed in an appendix, which the casual reader is likely to overlook or even ignore. Therefore, at the cost of interrupting narrative flow, the reader considers the various USCG aircraft of the 1920s and 1930s. The appendices include a timeline of American military naval operations from 1775 (the outbreak of the American Revolution) to 1938; a description of the technology resulting from the NC-4’s 1919 transatlantic flight; and a list of acronyms used in the book. The format of the chapter notes by page makes it easy for the reader to find the relevant footnote and accompanying citation or information. The cover has a clear photo of the famous NC-4.

Mission interoperability is a key phrase in the modern military world. Workman’s book highlights that this concept is not new; in fact, three separate forewords open the book—one each by USN, USMC, and USMC officers. Workman’s book is a well-written, thoroughly researched work which deserves a place on the shelves of the naval aviation enthusiast. It is highly recommended.

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The concept of Commonwealth Co-operation has had a long and uneven existence. Those of us who served in the Canadian navy in the middle part of the twentieth century had mixed views on the subject, possibly less positive than those who have more recent service. It is notable that most of the contributors to this admirable collection of papers belong to a generation that had little or no experience of naval affairs before the 1970s, and it is most interesting for a sailor who served between 1950 and 1973 (before many of those contributing to this collection had begun their naval careers) to find how an entirely new generation of sailors and scholars sees the background to present naval realities.

Those of us who, until the 1960s, trained regularly with British and Australian as well as Canadian sailors can claim some understanding of Commonwealth co-operation, and this reviewer has perhaps more than average familiarity with the subject. (Sent to Canada as a “war guest” in 1940, he returned to England as a “guest of the Admiralty” on board a Woolworth Carrier in 1943, having promised to join the RNVR if he reached the appropriate age before the end of the Second World War, came back to Canada in 1947, and in 1950 honoured his promise by joining the RCN.) Despite my subsequent service as a naval officer and official historian, which included training with RN and RAN contemporaries, and demanded extensive professional and academic connections with the RN, this book, the sixth King-Hall conference of 2010, suggests that Commonwealth co-operation is a concept in constant transition, one that can, with advantage, be re-examined on a regular basis by every new generation of sailors. Admiral Sir George King-Hall, commander-in-chief on the Australian Station from 1911-1913, after whom this series of conferences is named, was the last of his kind. Subsequently, a rear-admiral commanding His Majesty’s Australian fleet, King-Hall set the tone in the Antipodes for Commonwealth cooperation in the twentieth century. That being said, there is a tendency to overlook the fact that, in spite of the sometimes shaky ground on which it rested, the increased need was something that
policy makers in the Admiralty anticipated when, in the last forty years of the nineteenth century, European developments led to the reduction of a British naval presence on distant stations. In the Australian case, this involved the gradual build-up of local forces already in existence. There was much less to build on elsewhere in the Empire.

Sea militias and provincial marines had supplemented the RN in distant waters to an ever increasing extent in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and sailors who were engaged in such activities on the fringes of empire sometimes entered the Royal Navy: others joined directly as cadets. John Hampden Burnham’s *Canadians in the Imperial Naval and Military Service Abroad*, published in 1891, recorded a growing number of such men from British North America. Even after the two world wars there were Canadians who chose to serve in British rather than Canadian armed forces. (One of them, Commander James Clouston, who had joined the RN in 1918, was killed while directing evacuation from the beaches of Dunkirk in 1940.) There is a similar pattern of Australians serving in the RN. Rear-Admiral James Goldrick, who has had extensive and distinguished service in both the RN and the RAN, informs me that “the first Australian-born person to become a naval officer (Norfolk King, the illegitimate son of Philip Gidley King RN) was born in January 1789—less than a year after European settlement, and the first to become an admiral. Phillip Parker King, (Philip Gidley King’s legitimate son) was born in 1791!” The Great War of 1914-1918 changed the picture, but the Admiralty succeeded, if not exactly in the form expected, and not nearly to the extent hoped, in establishing an Empire Commonwealth naval family after the war. This might be an interesting line of enquiry for a student able to consult records in the British National Archives.

According to the memoir of Commander L.B. “Jogi” Jenson (*Tin Hats, Oilskins and Seaboots*), who first joined the RCN in 1938, the then-Lieutenant-Commander E. Rollo Mainguy, a future chief of naval staff, asked him “why do you wish to join the navy?” Answer: “My uncle is a captain in the Royal Navy and has had a very interesting life. I do not want to stay in Calgary and see the grain elevators every day. I love the water and I want to see the world.” Fast forward to 1950. Captain (ultimately Vice-Admiral) Kenneth Dyer asked this reviewer (then a cadet in the University Naval Training Division) why he wanted to join the navy. The answer, among rather a lot of things, included the fact that a cousin, then a paymaster in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, had exerted some influence on this hopeful candidate. It turned out that the cousin in question had been Admiral Dyer’s classmate at Pangbourne Nautical College. These are not, of course, typical experiences, but they
are not isolated, and they do suggest that navies of the Empire Commonwealth, at all sorts of levels, are, in fact, a widespread and diverse family. Admiral Goldrick leads off the collection with a concise and useful discussion of the British legacy to naval forces that sprang out of Commonwealth cooperation, and the difficulties of adapting the British model to local needs. Canadians who went on sub-lieutenants courses with the Royal Navy in the months and years after publication of the so-called Mainguy Report in the 1950s will recall the disdain with which some of our RN instructors regarded this example of Canadian self-expression. Some senior RCN officers had a similar outlook; they disliked having to wear “Canada” flashes on their uniforms. At the same time, evidence provided to members of the Mainguy Commission revealed that lower deck personnel had no time for officers who seemed to have adopted English accents and aped British manners. As events would prove, and as Admiral Goldrick has documented, cooperation went deeper than that. “A similarity in outlook in how navies should be employed has resulted, …as demonstrated in both world wars and many other conflicts, in producing navies that were much more effective in military terms than such small services have had any right to be.”

Understandably, the contributors to this conference were for the most part Australian, and although the Australian emphasis was really unavoidable, participants from New Zealand, South Africa, Canada and the United States put the discussion into a wonderfully wide framework. The dreadful term AUSCANNZUKUS, which appears in the final essay in this book, written by two U.S. Navy Strategic planners and an Australian strategic planner, proclaims that the relationship has grown into an entente cordiale, and that it embraces the American as well as Dominion naval presence on the Pacific. Hardly mentioned in this collection, but perhaps to be taken into account, is that NATO reflects a similar situation in the North Atlantic. Comparisons of dominion naval activities over the past hundred years provide a texture that is all too rare, and put the post-Second World War situation in a much better context than a limited discussion of the post-war period would have permitted. Nevertheless, it is clear from the papers in this collection that there is also room for some modern Corbett or Mahan to take advantage of all the scholarship being devoted to international naval cooperation of the present day, for a comprehensive and multi-dimensional account of modern strategic realities. Until that happens, this collection serves a most useful purpose.

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