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Editorial note

We have aimed for an edition that opens Bollnow’s discussion to the English-language reader, while also respecting the character of the original book. Among the decisions taken we note the following.

Bollnow used an elaborate system of numbering sections and sub-sections, which we have simplified somewhat. In the contents pages at the start of the book we have retained the original edition’s full display of section and sub-section headings. We have added an index of proper names at the end of the book.

In the original work references to literature were given in footnotes. These references we have moved to the end of the book, keeping just Bollnow’s discursive notes at the foot of pages. In these end-notes we have given a full description of a book or article at its first occurrence in each part, and have used abbreviated author and title descriptions subsequently for the rest of the part. Bollnow was often quite casual in his manner of referring to sources and, where feasible, we have done some tidying.

For the literature from which Bollnow quotes and to which he refers, we have where possible found existing English-language translations and used those English-language versions in giving titles, and have given page references to those editions. Our editorial interventions in the text or in the notes have been put in square brackets.

A recurring issue in the translation of Bollnow’s text should be mentioned: how to translate ‘Mensch’ (already there in the title of the book), ‘er’, ‘sein’ and other words that have purely masculine referents in English? We felt that ‘he or she’ and ‘his or hers’ would seem too cumbersome over the course of the book. So where possible we have phrased to avoid the problem and elsewhere have used just ‘he’ and ‘his’. This is at least consistent with usage at the time Bollnow wrote.
Introduction

On the history of the question

The problem of time in human existence has preoccupied philosophers to such an extraordinary degree over recent decades that one could almost describe it as the fundamental problem of contemporary philosophy. Bergson was probably the first to formulate it convincingly as that of ‘durée’, concretely experienced as opposed to objectively measurable, and soon afterwards Simmel introduced this question to Germany. Later Heidegger, in the course of his existential ontology, decisively placed the question of the temporality of human existence at the centre of his entire philosophy, thus making it visible for the first time in its full significance. Sartre and Merleau-Ponty in their turn took up these ideas and disseminated them in France. But the same problem, starting from this impulse, has also proved extremely productive in the individual sciences, and has provoked a very extensive discussion, rich in new questions and results, in psychology and psychopathology as much as in the history of literature and the other disciplines of the arts and humanities. Here we will merely refer, among the extensive and complex literature, to the seminal work of Minkowski on ‘temps vécu’ [lived time].

The problem of the spatial condition of human existence or, to put it more simply, of the concrete space experienced and lived by humans, has in contrast remained very much in the background, which is surprising when one considers the traditional, almost proverbial, link between the questions of time and space. Admittedly, as early as the 1930s, in psychology and psychopathology the question of experienced space was vigorously taken up, evidently under the strong influence of Heidegger, in close connection with the simultaneous research into time. Dürckheim, in his *Untersuchungen zum gelebten Raum* [Investigations into experienced space], was probably the first to develop this question in the German-speaking area. At about the same time Minkowski, in the book on ‘temps vécu’ already mentioned, also introduced the concepts of ‘distance vécue’ and ‘espace vécu’, which he soon afterwards developed further in *Vers une cosmologie*.
psychopathological literature we will mention only the work of Straus and Binswanger, to which we will repeatedly return in the course of our observations. But these very interesting approaches did not impinge on the narrower area of philosophy and seem in fact soon to have been forgotten outside medical circles. Compared to time, which concerns the innermost centre of humanity, space seemed philosophically less rewarding, because it seemed to belong only to the outer environment of mankind.

From a totally different direction, Cassirer encountered a related question in his extensive *Philosophy of symbolic forms*. In his pursuit of the development of human thought from its magical-mystical beginnings up to the formation of the modern scientific consciousness, he also had necessarily to occupy himself with the development of the concepts of space and time. He worked his way through an enormous amount of evidence from the fields of ethnology, history of religion, linguistics and the various individual human sciences, with rewarding results for systematic philosophical questioning. It is particularly interesting for our purposes to see how he explored the initially unfamiliar and incomprehensible structure of mythical space. He did admittedly perceive mythical space as a bygone stage in human development, overtaken by today’s scientific concept of space. Conditioned by the direction of his question, he did not see the problem of experienced space as it is still present in the minds of humans today, and therefore did not ask to what extent spatial structures analogous to mythical views of space may have a more general significance, still valid for people living today, or at least how the mythical forms may be made rewarding for the understanding of experienced space. In addition, because of his emigration, Cassirer’s work came to be largely forgotten in Germany and therefore did not exercise the influence on later development that was its due.

Since then, in the domain of philosophy, Lassen, himself under the influence of Cassirer, was probably the only one, in the context of his special question, namely a phenomenology of experience, to emphasize the basic importance of spatiality for the structure of human existence by comparison with the priority of temporality represented by Heidegger. His work too, however, seems to have met with little attention.
Only in more recent times has the question of experienced space come more strongly to the fore. On the one hand, in the yearbook *Situation*⁸ (of which unfortunately only the first volume was published), the circle of Buytendijk collected, from the point of view of phenomenological psychology, a series of important works on the development of concrete experienced space, to which we will also need to refer in detail. On the other hand, Bachelard, after a series of books, profuse with ideas, on the four elements,⁹ had developed a systematic ‘poetics of space’.¹⁰ Thus the general acceptance of this question seems to have been achieved from a philosophical perspective too. The problem of the spatial element of human existence takes its place with a weight and question of its own beside that of temporality. In any event it seems idle to speculate in advance about the possible precedence of one question over another. It might be more rewarding to tackle the new problem of experienced space as impartially as possible and see what comes of it. But all previous approaches have only been in the form of individual contributions from home or abroad, originating from various disciplines, and dealing with the problem from their own particular point of view. What has been missing so far is an approach to a coherent systematic interpretation. This is what will be attempted here.

**Contrast with mathematical space**

For a start we will try to outline a little more precisely the guiding question. Even though it will soon become evident that the problem of experienced space cannot be developed simply as a counterpart to that of experienced time, the first steps can still be taken following the process successfully adopted with the latter. Just as, with reference to time, the abstract mathematical time to be measured with clocks has been differentiated from time specifically experienced by the living human being, so one can also differentiate in the case of space between the abstract space of the mathematician and physicist and specifically experienced human space. If, in everyday life, we speak without further consideration of space, we are usually thinking of mathematical space – space that can be measured in three dimensions, in metres and centimetres – as we have come to know it at school and which provides the basic system of reference when measuring spatial relationships in everyday life: for example,
if we are thinking about how to furnish a new apartment with our old, perhaps generously sized furniture. Rarely, on the other hand, do we become aware that this is only a certain aspect of space, and that concrete space, directly experienced in life, by no means coincides with this abstract mathematical space. We live so naturally in this environment that its singularity does not surprise us, and we give it no further thought. Investigating it is for this reason a special philosophical task, which takes for granted a reversal of the way of looking at it that has become almost self-evident to us, and a return to the basic principles of life which are as a rule disregarded.

Just as Bergson explained ‘durée’, the time actually lived by humans, by opposing it to the more familiar mathematical time, we can also best visualize the singularity of experienced space, at first still difficult to grasp, by contrasting it with the more familiar mathematical space. In doing so, for the sake of simplicity, we will confine ourselves to the well-known three-dimensional Euclidean space, and base it on an orthogonal system of axes.

The decisive quality of mathematical space is its homogeneity. This means:

1. No point is distinguished above any other. The coordinates in this space have no natural origin, and for reasons of practicality one can make any point as required the origin of a coordinate system by means of a simple shift.

2. Likewise, no direction is distinguished above any other. By means of a simple turn, any direction in space can be made into an axis of a chosen coordinate system.

Space is unstructured in itself, and regular throughout, and in this way extends in all directions into infinity.

However these qualifications do not apply to experienced space.

1. It has a distinct centre, which is in some way, as will be discussed in more detail, given in the location of the experiencing human being in the space.

2. It has a distinct system of axes, which is connected with the human body and its upright posture, opposed to the force of gravity.

In anticipation, we can immediately expand on this with some further qualifications:

3. Areas and locations in it have qualitative differences. Based on their relationships, a structure of experienced space is built
up, rich in content, for which there is no analogy in mathematical space.

4. At the same time there are not only flowing transitions from one area to another, but also sharp demarcations. Experienced space manifests pronounced instabilities.

5. The problem of infinity too becomes considerably more complicated. Experienced space is first given as a closed finite space, and only through subsequent experience does it open up to an infinite extent.

6. As a whole, experienced space is not an area of neutral values. It is related to the human being by vital relationships, both supportive and obstructive in nature. Whether supportive or obstructive, it is the field of human conduct of life.

7. Every location in experienced space has its significance for human beings. Thus it is the categories used in the humanities that we must employ in order to describe experienced space.

8. It is not a question of a reality released from a specific reference to humanity, but of space as it is present for humanity, and accordingly of the human relationship to this space; for it is impossible to separate one from the other.

**The concept of experienced space**

Let us formulate these relationships as concepts. When we refer to experienced space, we mean space as it is manifested in concrete human life. Dürckheim, in the work cited above, instead speaks of a lived space, and Minkowski uses the same term in this context, ‘espace vécu’. This term is in some ways more apt than that of experienced space, because the latter can too easily be understood in a subjective sense, as the way in which a space is experienced by humans, which as such is already independent of the manner of its being experienced – in other words where the qualification ‘experienced’ applies only to the subjective colouring which is imposed on the space. The term ‘experienced space’ can therefore easily be understood as meaning the same as ‘experience of space’ in the sense of a merely psychological reality. By contrast, the term ‘lived space’ is preferable as it expresses no psychological meaning, but refers to space itself and, in so far as humans live in it and with it, to space as medium of human life.
Nevertheless I hesitate to use this factually much less ambiguous term; for ‘living’ is an intransitive verb. ‘Living’ means being alive, as opposed to being dead. It can also be modified by adverbial elements. One can live well or badly, but the word cannot be combined with an object in the accusative. One may say, at most, that one lives one's life, as the poet says: ‘I live my life in widening circles,’ or in the same way one may speak of a ‘life unlived’. But one cannot say that man lives something, such as space or time, and therefore one cannot describe space or time as ‘lived’. Thus, despite all my reservations, I will stay with the term that is linguistically correct, although factually less apt and more easily misunderstood, ‘experienced space’ [erlebter Raum]; for it seems to me inadmissible to infringe the laws of language, even for the sake of greater clarity. I will at most speak occasionally, where it seems more appropriate for the sake of clarification, at the same time of ‘experienced and lived’ space.

One might perhaps also have been able to speak of ‘Lebensraum’ as the space available for the expansion of life, if this word had not entered the German language in another, narrower sense. To avoid confusion, we had better do without this term and instead speak of experienced space. But this experienced space is not, as should be explicitly stressed to avoid misunderstanding, anything psychological, anything merely experienced or pictured or even imagined: it is the actual concrete space in which our life takes place.

Factually we are here in total agreement with the way that Dürckheim and Minkowski, at the very beginning of this question, framed their concept of experienced space. When Minkowski, for example, in the final chapter of his profound work extends his observations on ‘temps vécu’ to ‘espace vécu’, he begins by contrasting the latter with the mathematical concept of space. ‘Space,’ he writes here, ‘cannot be reduced to geometric relations, relations which we establish as if, reduced to the simple role of curious spectators or scientists, we were ourselves outside space. We live and act in space, and our personal lives, as well as the social life of humanity, unfolds in space.’

And Dürckheim, from the start, formulated the problem in such an apt and comprehensive way that his remarks can be placed here, at the beginning of our own observations. ‘Lived space’, he
The concept of experienced space

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says, ‘is for the self the medium of physical realization, counter-
form or extension, threatener or preserver, place of passage or
resting-place, home or abroad, material, place of fulfilment and
possibility of development, resistance and borderline, organ and
opponent of this self in its immediate reality of being and life’.14 In
these formulations, it is important to note the typically repeated
contrasting terms: ‘threatener or preserver’, ‘organ and opponent’,
etc. Space is, as has already been profoundly perceived here, given to
humanity in a double manner, as supportive and as obstructive, in
fact even more profoundly, as something that belongs to humanity
like a limb, and then again as something which faces us from the
outside as hostile or at least as foreign.

In this double definition, as ‘possibility of development’ and
as ‘resistance’, space is for Dürckheim not a neutral, unchanging
medium, but full of meanings in the references to life that have
opposing effects, and these meanings again change according to
the various locations and areas of space. These meanings too are
not to be attributed to merely subjective feelings, but they are
genuine characters of lived space itself. Thus Dürckheim stresses:
‘The concrete space of the developed human being is to be taken
seriously in the entire fullness of the significances experienced by
him, for in the singularity of its qualities, structures and orderings
it is the form of expression, test and realization of the subject living
in it, experiencing it and reacting to it’.15

How strongly this space is linked as a correlative to the human
being living in it again emerges from the fact that it is not only
different for different individuals, but also changes for the individual
according to his specific state of mind and mood. Every change ‘in’
the human being entails a change to his lived space. Dürckheim
stresses: ‘Concrete space is different according to the being whose
space it is, and according to the life that takes place in it. It changes
with the person who conducts himself in it, changes with the
topicality of certain attitudes and orientations which – more or less
immediately – dominate the whole self’.16

Here we must also differentiate against the term which
Bachelard has recently used to sum up his significant contribution
to the philosophy of concrete experienced space, namely that of a
‘poetics of space’; for this term may be too cautious and therefore
finally inappropriate to be applied to what he has so brilliantly
expounded in individual analyses about the house and the universe, about lofts and cellars, chests and cupboards, about the whole experienced human world of space. This is certainly understandable in view of Bachelard’s philosophical background. It originates from the philosophy of the natural sciences and a concept of realization oriented on this. Seen from this point of view, experiences in experienced space seem to him to contain no objective realization. He therefore interprets them as something merely subjective, that is, as the work of the poetic power of imagination.

On the other hand, however, he sees within the frame of his expanding metaphysical world view which he himself, in connection with Novalis, once described as ‘magical idealism’\(^\text{17}\), in this power of imagination an achievement that goes well beyond what is normally understood by this name. For him it has, as a human creation that finds its expression in language, as ‘imagination parlée’, only to dream along with the ‘dream of things’, the ‘imagination matérielle’ or ‘imagination de la matière’ which itself produces reality.\(^\text{18}\) As a result, creative writing acquires for him a particular dignity: it is ‘not a game, but a power of nature. It illuminates the dream of things.’\(^\text{19}\) Therefore he sees philosophy as dependent on the achievement of poets which precedes it: ‘How much the philosophers would learn, if they would consent to read the poets!’\(^\text{20}\) Accordingly, in his own method, which, in reference to Minkowski, he describes as phenomenology, the interpretation of poetic images takes up a broad space; for ‘poets and painters’, to use the phrase he borrows from Van den Berg, ‘are born phenomenologists’.\(^\text{21}\) In this deeply formulated sense of poetic power of imagination we will, even without examining this concept in detail, easily be able to include the results of his analyses of poetic space in our investigations of concrete experienced space.

**The spatiality of human life**

Even though we have refused to regard experienced space, in the sense of mere experience of space, as something merely psychological, it is on the other hand not an object removed from the subject. As we have stressed from the start, it is a question of the relationship between the human being and his space, and thus also of the structure of human existence itself, insofar as this is
determined by his relationship with space. It is in this sense that we speak of the spatiality of human existence. This term does not imply that life – or human existence [Dasein] – is itself something spatially extended, but that it is what it is only with reference to a space, that it needs space in order to develop within it.

It is in this sense that Heidegger in *Being and time* very clearly worked out the question of the spatiality of human existence, even if he could not develop it more detail in the general context of that work. Just as, according to him, one must distinguish between temporality as a structural form of human existence and time as an objective process, so we must also distinguish between space – whether it is experienced or mathematical space is irrelevant to this question – and spatiality. Spatiality is a definition of the essence of human existence. This is the meaning of Heidegger’s statement: ‘The subject (Dasein), if well understood ontologically, is spatial.’\(^\text{22}\) That it is spatial does not therefore mean that the human being occupies a certain space with his body, in the same way as any other mass, and also occasionally – like the proverbial camel at the eye of a needle – is prevented from slipping through openings that are too narrow. It means that the human being is always and necessarily conditioned in his life by his behaviour in relation to a surrounding space.

This is also what Minkowski has in mind when he stresses: ‘Life spreads out into space without having a geometric extension in the proper sense of the word. We have need of expansion, of perspective, in order to live. Space is as indispensable as time to the development of life.’\(^\text{23}\)

At the same time we are still expressing ourselves carelessly if we say that life takes place ‘in space’. Human beings are not present in space as an object, let us say, is present in a box, and they are not related to space as though in the first place there could be anything like a subject without space. Rather, life consists originally in this relationship with space and can therefore not be separated from it even in thought. It is basically the same problematic of ‘being-in’ that Heidegger develops with reference to ‘Being-in-the-world’, when he stresses: ‘Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein’s Being; it is an *existentiale*. So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) “in” an entity which is present-at-hand ... Being-in is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its existential structure.’\(^\text{24}\)
The question of space is thus a question as to the transcendental nature of humanity. This on the other hand does not mean that space is simply there, independent of the human being. There is space only insofar as man is a spatial being, that is, a being that forms space and, as it were, spreads out space around itself. And this again is the well-understood meaning of the Kantian thesis of the ‘transcendental ideality’ of space. Nevertheless, space is more than a mere form of human experience. Here the Kantian approach must be extended by the inclusion of full life with its multiplicity of vital relations. Space then becomes the general form of human living behaviour. Meanwhile mathematical space results from experienced space, when one disregards the various concrete vital relations and reduces life to a mere subject of understanding.

As this space-forming and space-spreading being, man is however necessarily not only the origin, but also the lasting centre of his space. This again should however not be understood in a coarsened manner, as though man carried his space around with him as the snail does its shell. Rather, it makes total sense when one, without thinking too hard about it, says that man moves ‘in’ his space, where, therefore, space is something fixed in relation to man, within which human movements take place. And so we can probably also understand the other Kantian thesis, that space has ‘empirical reality’. How these two definitions can be reconciled even with an extended method of observation still remains an open question, which we must see here from the very start as a guiding perspective, but for the time being put aside; for it cannot be dealt with before concrete analysis, or independently of it.

The spatiality of human life and the space experienced by the human being thus correspond to each other in a strict correlative. Every statement about the one at the same time contains a corresponding statement about the other. At the same time the path of investigation necessarily starts from the exploration of experienced space, and then draws conclusions on the structure of human spatiality. For the analysis of experienced space produces a wealth of definitions of content and a multiplicity of questions, such as would not have sufficiently come into view with a direct approach to the structure of spatiality. For this reason we will deliberately put aside the question of human spatiality and will attempt for a start, as impartially as possible, to approach the analysis of space experienced and lived by the human being.
The present investigation aims to make evident, in an initial, preparatory manner, the importance and the productiveness of the question of experienced space. In order to take a view of the multiplicity of the questions that thrust themselves forward, one must first look around on all sides in order to gather together from a philosophical point of view what is made available for this purpose as a contribution by the individual sciences, and see to what extent it can be assembled into a uniform picture. The collection of this complex material must therefore be accorded a wide space, and inevitably digressions in various directions will sometimes threaten to break through the uniform path of representation. Only in the great number of the perspectives that come together here can the productiveness of the guiding question be preserved.

Completeness, of course, cannot be achieved here. It must suffice to bring together suitable examples according to the various directions. In particular, two groups of questions have been deliberately eliminated, because their problematic, leading to entirely new connections, would have broken through the circle of these first, elementary reflections. These are, first, the question of conscious construction of space in the visual arts, and second, the transition from directly experienced to mathematical-physical space.*

* A discussion of the detailed description of this development given by Cassirer in the third volume of *Philosophy of symbolic forms* would be outside the scope of the present work. For the development of the mathematical-physical concept of space, see the excellent account by M. Jammer, *Concepts of space* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1954).
II

The wide world
1 Expanse, distance and the foreign

A new question

While observing the behaviour of humans in space, we noticed above all the one basic dynamic of ‘there and back again’. Man does not move arbitrarily in space, rather all his movements are ultimately based on an opposition between going and returning. But so far we have only remarked in passing on this starting-point, in order to determine from it a natural centre within space. We must now return to this concept.

The designation of the spatial centre as a zero point already is insufficient. We must ask what it is that gives the zero point this outstanding significance, so that the return to it appears to be the deepest fulfilment of man’s being. And in this way we will find that the mere unexpanded middle point is replaced by a spatially expanded individual area with quite specific characteristics of its own. This area, to which we ‘return home’ and where we feel ‘at home’, this area of ‘homeland’ and ‘house’, needs to be more precisely understood. But equally, we must ask ourselves what it is that drives man out of this centre, when the meaning of his life is supposed to consist in his return, and how different a space he enters in this way.

Thus the double movement of going away and returning at the same time mirrors a division of space itself into two areas, of which a narrower inner area is concentrically enclosed by a wider outer one, namely the narrower area of house and home and the wider outer area, from which man advances forward and from which he once again returns. This division into two areas emerges as the most important in the structure of total experienced space. It is these two areas that we will examine more precisely in what follows. The order in which this examination takes place, whether we start from one area or the other, is basically unimportant, and however one begins, it will never be done without a certain measure of force, because the two areas can only artificially be separated from each other. I will try to take the path from the outer to the inner area, that is, I will begin from the situation where man has removed himself from the centre of his space, and will try from that point to return to the nature of the centre and the process of returning home.
Pushing forward into the infinite distance of space

Before we can get down to opening up this outer area of space according to its different directions, a brief historical view is required. For this wider area can be given in very different ways. Today we very readily think straight away of the infinite distance of outer space. But this is not the necessary or original concept, and what a historical view shows us in terms of earlier possibilities, again throws light on certain hidden features of our own consciousness of space. Once again we recall the interpretation of the German language, which developed the concept of space from the idea of the clearing, and we recall even further back the ancient idea that space was limited by the heaven of fixed stars as the outermost of the circling spheres. We can summarize this as the cavity theory of space. Here, space is everywhere fundamentally limited and easily comprehended. Here too there is certainly a distance, that is, plenty of room available for movement, but to speak of an infinite expanse is not as yet sensible or meaningful.

This background must be borne in mind if one wishes to grasp what a cataclysmic alteration of the sense of space has taken place in early modern times: in the experience of a new expanse, which has come about through the opening up of infinite space.¹ We must place at the beginning the event already much singled out as significant: Petrarch's ascent of Mont Ventoux in 1336; for the view from the top of the mountain is the situation in which humans most directly experience the sense of expanse. But a long stage of development had to be passed before human beings climbed mountains at all, merely for the sake of the view of far-off places, and in that respect Petrarch's ascent is rightly described as a turning point on the way to the modern sense of space.

But it is surprising at first how little expression is given in Petrarch's account to this new sense of space, in fact how little he writes about what he sees from up there. From contemplating space, he immediately goes over to contemplating time, to looking back over his own life in critical self-examination. And after returning once more for a moment to the wide view from the mountain peak, he turns his attention straight from the greatness of the mountains to the greatness of the soul: 'Beside its greatness, nothing is great.'² This is an astonishing outcome. Burckhardt too remarks: 'We indeed await in vain a description of the view, but not because the poet is
insensitive to it, but on the contrary, because the impression has too powerful an effect upon him. But I believe that this connection can be more precisely defined: it is neither that he is indifferent to the view of the landscape, nor that the too powerful effect upon him leaves him speechless, but rather that the mood of the soul induced by the spatial expanse is directly converted into a new expanse of the soul itself. So the direction of his thoughts towards the immeasurable expanse of the soul stands in an indissoluble relationship with the expanse of the spatial view. It is the same expanse of the view that is now directed towards temporal distance, and it is the same emotional feeling of the immeasurability of space that is also manifest in the immeasurability of the inner world, as the immeasurability of the soul. The emotion of the inner soul is made possible only by the uplifting experience of spatial expanse. And one senses from the account, even from the return to the plain, how profound is the emotion experienced at the top of the mountain.

This same alteration of the sense of space, however, is what is now expressed in the advance into the expanses of the ocean. What happened a century and a half later, on the discovery of America, and in fact on the enlargement of the known world in the age of discovery, is only the heightened development of what began with Petrarch’s mountain climb. Today we must first of all visualize what this meant for the sense of space in the new age; for it was not just that new, hitherto unknown lands were added to those already familiar, but it was a radical transformation of our entire sense of space. It was the opening up of entirely new worlds. It was the expanses of the oceans that lured explorers to unstoppable advances into the open horizons, whereas earlier they had kept anxiously to the coastlines. It was thanks to this intoxicating sense of expanse that Charlemagne later boasted that the sun did not go down on his empire.

These discoveries were as inspiring as they were dizzying; for the discovery of distance necessarily went along with a relativization in spatial orientation in general. No longer could one, with the same naïve certainty, believe the place of residence of one’s own people to be the centre of the world. As soon as the surface of the earth had rounded itself into a sphere, there was no longer a distinctive centre. No country was distinguished above any other. So the intoxication of distance could only in passing conceal the fact that with the new
discoveries, the secure foothold of a centre had been lost, and man's place on earth had been relativized beyond recall. This was when, to use Sedlmayr's phrase, in a quite directly spatial sense the 'loss of the centre' began.⁴

Certainly it was some time before the final conclusions were drawn from Columbus's discovery. The foreign continents, as colonies of Europe, were for a long time considered in relation to Europe as their actual centre, and it is only in our own days that we are experiencing the disappearance of European precedence and the dissolution of the European point of view in a real world history.

But even more profound are the changes that took place in a corresponding fashion in the area of astronomy, in the space of the heavens, and are associated with the discovery by Copernicus. As we have already mentioned in passing, the ancient sense of the world, that of the Ptolemaic system, remained that of a closed space, finally that of a great cavity, even if in its most perfect form, that of a sphere. The outermost of the spheres, that of the firmament of fixed stars, was at the same time the border of the entire world. Copernicus's discovery, however, did not simply mean a change in the system of coordinates: that the central point was moved from the earth to the sun, but at the same time it exploded the earlier idea of the firmament of fixed stars. Behind it, new expanses, new worlds opened up, wider even than those discovered by Columbus.

Giordano Bruno seized upon these new possibilities with inspiring zest. As he wrote in one poem that he placed at the head of his 'Dialogue on the infinite universe and worlds' (the title itself is significant):

Confidently I may unfurl my wings,
I fear no crystal vault,
[by which he means Ptolemy's firmament of fixed stars]
when I divide the blue fragrance of the ether
and hasten upwards to worlds of stars,
leaving this earthly sphere behind.⁵

A much depicted woodcut from this period shows a man pushing with his head through this crystal sphere and looking into the open universe of new worlds.⁶ In its own medium it illustrates exactly the same overpowering feeling that must have overcome people of that time in the face of the new vistas that opened up for them,
and that was taken up by Bruno in his pantheistic exuberance. He too speaks enthusiastically of ‘those splendid stars and shining bodies that are as many inhabited worlds, mighty living creatures and sublime deities, which appear to be innumerable worlds, and indeed are so, not very different from the one in which we live.’ The striving for infinity at this period made people dizzy with the perspectives opened up by astronomical thought. They positively revelled in the celestial spaces. For this reason, we can speak of the achievements of Columbus and Copernicus as a positive revolution in the consciousness of space. The concept of the closed nature of a finite space surrounding and sheltering mankind collapses, and opens up into the hitherto unknown expanse of infinity.

But as with discoveries on earth, the new experience of the infinity of outer space at the same time has another, much more dangerous aspect. Its expanse at the same time means emptiness. And when the impetus of the first enthusiasm dies down, returning sobriety allows us to observe a sense of being lost, the ultimate loneliness of man in this space. Only a few decades later, Pascal says in his ‘Pensées’: ‘The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me.’ Here we have not only the other side of Bruno’s pantheistic enthusiasm, but at the same time the point at which the consequences of this revolution extend into our own time, and we realize that a reference to these connections is not only an interesting excursus into the history of ideas, to which we could have abandoned ourselves with undimmed pleasure, but it also leads us directly into the burning questions of the present day.

The Baroque interior

By invoking the names of Giordano Bruno and Pascal in explaining the conflicting effect of these developments on man’s sense of being, taking place over centuries, we have already placed it in the general intellectual context of the Baroque. Indeed, here this intoxication with infinity reaches its final heights. How deeply this transformation in consciousness of space has taken hold of man can be recognized by the fact that it was able even to dissolve the apparently most immovable finite space, the inner space surrounded by solid walls, into infinity. Thus we find in Baroque interiors a clear example of this impulse towards infinity. Although
in other respects we have excluded aesthetic questions from our observations, a brief glance at art history may now clarify these connections from another point of view.

Baroque space may, somewhat paradoxically, be described most aptly as an unlimited interior. In other words, the clearly limiting wall which generally determines the nature of inner space, is here consciously veiled in our spatial perception and made to disappear. The means used for this by Baroque architects are well known. The limits of parts of space that were clearly delineated in the Renaissance are veiled by overlapping sculptural decoration, the bordering wall becomes invisible to the observer, because he feels confused by a tangle of projecting and retreating parts, by one view and another, so that he finally no longer knows, and no longer asks, whether anything solid is still to be found behind all these views.

In the bewildering sequence of intersections and viewpoints, solid space breaks up into perspectives leading into the infinite. This is aided by conscious play with illusions, for example in the extravagant use of reflective mirrors. Inaccessible spaces often only serve to produce the optical illusion of an infinite distance.

As the final height of these possibilities let us merely remember the unreal distance from which emerges the silver-gleaming St George of the high altar in the monastery of Weltenburg on the Danube – or from which he rides out, as if caught in the moment when an incorporeal phenomenon becomes corporeal, when, as Pinder says, ‘everything becomes a mystical dream, when a silver St George rides out of a bright distance into the twilit altar space.’ Dehio describes it in similar fashion: ‘It is no longer twilight that reigns in the narrow presbytery, but complete darkness. The back of the area is totally occupied by the high altar. Built up like a triumphal arch. In its centre there is no painting, but an empty opening, and through this we look through into a space of uncertain form and size, a world of light of wavering shapes, seeming infinitely distant. Perhaps the illusory effect would not be as strong without the addition of another artistic medium. For in the centre of the opening stand three over-lifesize statues: the knight St George on horseback, seen from the front, on his left the rearing dragon, on his right the fleeing princess. These figures are still in the dark region; but reflected light enters from the back and glides over the golden armour and the silver horse, so that the impression of three-dimensionality is not affected,
and at the same time provides communication between the dark at the front and the brightness behind.10

I have quoted this apt account by an art historian verbatim, in order to make this effect of space more vivid (better than any illustration could do it): the inner space dissolves into infinity, without in the process ceasing to be inner space. In fact the extraordinary thing is that this turbulent endlessness of space, this boundlessness, this transition from finite space to non-spatial infinity, this interpenetration of finite and infinite can be experienced only in an interior. For the exterior space becomes clear and visible just where its full breadth opens up, at the endless horizon of the sea. Thus we can also comprehend that the Baroque striving towards infinity is fulfilled precisely in the interior while the outer structure is often, comparatively imperceptibly, left behind.

**Narrowness and expanse**

We will now try to comprehend this space, extending into infinity, in its inner structure, and in doing so we will pass gradually from the most general definitions to more specific subdivisions. In highly general terms, the German language has three concepts to express the expansion of space in contrast to the inhabited vicinity: expanse [Weite], the foreign [Fremde] and distance [Ferne]. For each of these, the relevant relationship is expressed in a different way. I will try by means of a comparative analysis of these three concepts to work out the spatial reality as comprehensively as possible.

I will begin with the concept of expanse. Perhaps what is meant by this becomes clearest from its opposite. The opposite of expanse is narrowness [Enge]. An article of clothing or a shoe may be tight or loose [eng oder weit]. It is too loose if it is not filled adequately by the wearer's body and hangs slackly around it. It can become too tight if the wearer's body has increased in size. A living space can also be too wide. On the other hand one may feel 'beengt', cramped, by the prospect of a new building too close to one's home. And again, the view widens out when one emerges from a narrow valley onto a plain. There are narrow streets and alleys, there are also narrows in the sea, passages where the land is too close on either side, but again there are wide or spacious places and landscapes. We speak of the endless expanse of the sea.
Not only space, but also the human heart may be tight or open. In a state of fear (the word angst, like ‘Enge’, literally means narrowness), the heart clenches tightly, and in a state of happy fulfilment it expands once again. From this notion there arises at the same time a wealth of figurative meanings of narrowness and expanse. There are ‘engherzig’ [narrow-minded] interpretations of existing legislation, and on the other hand, a ‘weitherzig’ [wide-hearted, that is liberal] attitude of mind. A person may have a clear [weit] conscience, if he is not inhibited by excessive pangs of conscience. There is the regrettable narrowness of an intellectual horizon, but also the oppressive narrowness of poor living conditions.

Narrowness, to summarize these examples, always refers to the prevention of free movement by something that restricts it on all sides. An article of clothing is ‘eng’, tight, in this sense, if it clings closely to the body, and a house is too narrow if it does not allow the people living in it sufficient space to roam freely. ‘Wide’ on the other hand describes liberation from this restriction. A door, in this sense, may be opened wide if it allows one to pass freely through it. A person may also open his or her mouth or flare his nostrils wide, if unable to comprehend something strange or surprising.

In general, therefore, man perceives restricting space as a pressure which torments him; he seeks to break through it and to press forward into the liberating distance. Distance thus always means the openness of a field of movement, in which the human urge to expansion, its conquering push into space, is no longer impeded in any way. Hence the references to the wide landscape or in general the wide world. Roads, as the means for overcoming space, lead into the distance. The distance, as a possible space for development, here always refers to human activity, to man as the centre of an expansive, centrifugal urge. ‘Wir traben in die Weite’ [we ride into the distance], says the song of the German youth movement. Here ‘the distance’ contains no notion of an actual destination in the sense of a movement towards something, but designates the open field of a forward movement, out of an oppressive confinement. ‘The distance’ is thus entirely undirected. This also applies in the figurative sense, when the chest expands; it extends itself and becomes open to all the riches of the world.

Of course it is a different matter if one applies the concept of expanse – if only as an adjective – to distant places, and speaks of a
long journey. It is still a long way to a certain place – this means that I must travel for a long time until I get there. The concept is often combined with that of breadth [Breite]. ‘Far and wide’ is a common expression; for example, we say that in a wasteland there is no tree to be seen far and wide. Now breadth generally refers to a transverse direction in relation to length. So there are broad [breite] streets, in which traffic can move, but wide [weite] squares. Above all we should observe this spatial meaning in verbs such as ‘to broaden’, which refer to an extension of a surface.

The foreign

With the concepts of distance [Ferne] and the foreign [Fremde], on the other hand, we enter quite different realms. Even though both these German words linguistically mean almost the same thing, they have by now diverged into quite different directions. The opposite of the foreign, that which is unknown or strange, is that which is known and familiar, in general one’s ‘own’. Thus the familiar and the strange are placed in opposition to each other. There are strange people, strange customs and practices, strange lands, etc. ‘Foreign’ is always the ‘other’, whatever contradicts our own nature, whatever disturbs us and shocks us out of our own sense of security. Strangers, for a child, are people he does not know, and it is typical of the original relationship that for a long time a child thinks of strangers as bad people. What is familiar is good and what is unknown is bad. The unknown may then become merely odd. A foreign language appears to a naïve person to be comical gibberish and makes him laugh. But the meaning can fade even further: a house is built with one’s own money or borrowed money [fremdes Geld]; an inheritance falls into strange hands, and so on.

What remains central is always the spatial relationship. In the earliest linguistic usage, strangers are foreigners, those who do not live where we live. Modern tourism [Fremdenverkehr] seeks to entice these people towards us. But it is a very late development when someone travels to a foreign country merely for the pleasure of change. The word ‘Elend’, which originally meant exile, where someone must go when driven out of his homeland, also means misery or wretchedness. A child ‘fremdelt’, is afraid of strangers, when in an unfamiliar world, and what comes out of such a world
is ‘foreign’, strange. As opposed to the free and open expanse, in which man strives towards something outside himself, the foreign is something unpleasant, a menacing area. Rilke, in particular, has expressed in a deeply moving fashion the feeling of being taken over by an overpowering strangeness. He writes of the view from the window of a hotel room:

It all seemed to warn me off, 
the strange city, whose unconfiding landscape 
gloomed as though I didn’t exist. The nearest things didn’t mind if I misunderstood them. The street would thrust itself up to the lamp, and I’d see it was strange.

And further he writes:

and strangeness, in narrowing circles, 
hunggrily prowled round my casual flares of perception.\textsuperscript{11}

This is how it is in general. One is thrown out of a familiar world into a strange environment. The feeling of intimacy, taken for granted, with the people and things that surround us has been lost. It has moved from the world of the understandable into a world of the inexplicable, in which one feels uncertain and excluded from the lives of others:

The others they rejoice and let the stranger stand alone\textsuperscript{12} for in foreign parts, one is oneself a foreigner to others. Then one is gripped by irresistibly powerful homesickness. We know of strange, sudden irrational acts, for example by children who try to leave a foreign place in order to return home. Indeed, man can feel altogether a stranger on this earth.

But this foreign does not have to be some spatially distant realm. It reveals itself in its power to overcome us through the fact that it invades us even in our most sheltered areas. Even in one’s own house, strange people and powers may intrude, and even our own lives may become strange to us. Hesse movingly describes, repeatedly (for example, in \textit{Demian}), how for the child the dark power of strangeness as the demonic, deeply shocking to us, penetrates the familiar realm of security. The child is gripped by fear and becomes lonely.
But on the other hand, we may go to foreign parts of our own accord, for example if forced to do so by our work, or if we want to learn something new in foreign lands (as the travelling journeymen used to do). We despise those who have not gone out into the world or learnt to look beyond the steeple of one’s own parish church. But there is always a sensible reason for people to travel abroad, never an uncertainly sensed need. We want to expand our knowledge, to learn what we cannot learn at home, or to bring home, as a merchant or a thief, the products of foreign lands. The foreign is always a temporary residence, from which we return when we have achieved our purpose.

Thus we reach a productive confrontation between what we know from home and what we have learnt abroad. Human culture (in the widest sense of the term) grows in the new acceptance and acquisition of what is strange or foreign. But there can also be an excess, a state of domination by foreign influence, in which the strangeness we have adopted suffocates one’s own life.

This is why it is important to find the right balance between one’s own power of assimilation and the degree of foreignness to be acquired. Nietzsche recognized this very clearly in the second of his *Thoughts out of season*. ‘A living thing’, he writes, ‘can only be healthy, strong and productive within a certain horizon: if it be incapable of drawing one round itself … it will come to an untimely end. Cheerfulness, a good conscience, belief in the future, the joyful deed, all depend … on there being a line that divides the visible and clear from the vague and shadowy.’ Nietzsche then applies this in particular to his relationship with his own past, and it serves to escape from an excess of historical knowledge, but it is also, and even primarily, true of the human relationship with other human life forms and here precisely described the demand for a border between what is one’s own and what is foreign. Nietzsche adopts the geographical concept of the horizon in a figurative sense in order to describe this demarcation from an excess of foreignness.

**Distance**

The concept of distance [Ferne] leads us into yet another area. At first it seems to describe in a neutral sense a merely spatial relationship. The opposite of distance is nearness, while the concept of
distance has an emotionally neutral meaning. But we must take care to neutralize the concept too much in the sense of a mere gap or difference, and must try to grasp it in its full significance for life. Unlike expanse, in which man can actively advance, unlike the foreign, into which he is exiled, distance has a certain enticing quality, which attracts the passive individual and for which he yearns. There is a longing for distance which is portrayed in the sweetest tones by the Romantic poets. The blue mountains faintly seen on the horizon symbolically embody this distance. We speak of the unattainable distance, and in German the obvious rhyme for ‘Ferne’ is ‘Sterne’, stars, as in Tieck:

You little golden stars,
you remain always distant from me.¹⁴
[Ihr kleinen, goldnen Sterne
ihr bleibt mir ewig ferne.]

While the foreign is entirely attainable to humans in real terms, and we may be within the foreign even against our will, we can never be in the distance. Like the horizon, it retreats when one approaches it. The distance is by its own nature unattainable. There remains only an unfulfilled longing for the mysteriously enticing distance. And despite its unattainability, we long for the distance which draws us irresistibly towards it. It must therefore be a deep inward condition of life characteristic of man in his very nature that expresses itself in this attraction to the distance.

So what is it that we seek in the distance? With the Romantic poets, perhaps most clearly with Novalis, it is striking how much the longing for the distance is linked with ‘the mysterious inward journey’, how the return home is the final aim of longing. Homesickness and longing for distance are so close to each other that one must ask oneself if the two things are not basically the same. It is part of the inmost nature of mankind that we seek so far beyond ourselves in the distance.

From this point we may perhaps understand the origin of longing. For how can we seek so far beyond ourselves in the distance what is after all our very own nature? Only when we have lost ourselves in the hustle and bustle of everyday life, when we are no longer ‘at home’ in our homes, when home has become the foreign to us, in this unsatisfying state of self-alienation the direct path to
the renewal of our own nature seems to be denied to us, and then, in the fading distance, the image of our lost home appears to us. Longing for the distance is, in fact, a yearning for our lost origins, when life was still genuine.

Thus, for an animal (if we use its schematically constructed image in order to contrast it more sharply with human nature) there can be no longing for the distance; for an animal is sheltered in its environment, it is deeply rooted in its home and takes it with it, even if it covers great distances on earth. It is only because mankind, according to its nature, is subject to homelessness that we can seek our lost home in the distance. Only for humans, therefore, can there be true distance.

Hans Kunz, in his profound book on the anthropological meaning of imagination, has convincingly worked out a definition of the nature of distance. Only with a certain violence can we extract from the multi-layered connection developed there the train of thought that is of direct importance to us. For him, distance arises from the loss of nearness, from the loss of an original home, in particular from the loss, inevitable in human life, of the sheltering nearness of the mother experienced at the beginning of life. The loss of nearness is transformed into the melancholy allure of the distance, and in the latter he seeks to recapture the former. The distance is therefore not a spatial realm which can somehow be objectively established, but is rooted as a spatial definition in human nature itself. ‘Thus, distance’, as Kunz formulates it, ‘dwells in the inmost centre of existing humanity.’

In everyday life, distance is concealed. So it is not experienced in the same way at all times, but for us to hear its call, we first need a particular awakening event, designated by Kunz an ‘invasion of distance’ [Ferneinbruch]. It can be best elucidated in his own words: ‘The call of the tawny owl in early February from the old parks of the city; the quail’s song in the middle of the night or at high noon, when summer broods over the ripening cornfields; a song dying away in the street at night: such ... events ... can clothe themselves in a shimmer of distance that exercises an unspeakable magic on us.’ For Kunz it is always the fading, the drifting, the ‘nearness slipping away’ of that which affects us so strangely and yet is ungraspable, that allows distance to come into being from the foreign. And always, at the same time, a faint breath of death
wafts towards us: ‘When through receding nearness the possibility of passing away comes to us as the most common image of death, the invasion of distance takes place.’

Only a being that, like man, is torn through the deep shocks of nothingness and the knowledge of death out of the natural security of the familiar connections of life, out of the original home of his childhood, and feels delivered up to homelessness, is capable of hearing the voice of the distance. When man, shaken to his innermost depths, gives himself up to the call, no sooner possessed than immediately disappearing again, then longing arises within him in the form of a need to follow this call, and the fantasy that springs from this longing, and directed by it, creates a new image of his lost home. For the work of longing is for Kunz ultimately ‘the formation of home’, and specifically of the irrevocably lost real home of one’s childhood as a new ideal home realized only in dreams. Its effect is to that extent a ‘cosmogonic event, by means of which man attempts to secure the other, unreal, “supernatural” home’, where one must only take note that this ‘supernatural’ home is not to be thought of as a hereafter separated from the existing human being: ‘It remains inseparably rooted in him as something pervasive that prevails throughout his inmost being.’

More cannot be said at this point without allowing ourselves to be torn by Kunz’s train of thought, leading us into new depths, out of our own context, in which we pursue the specific phenomenon of spatiality. At any rate, a close link is seen to exist between the distance experienced in space and the innermost nature of man himself. Once again we will leave this thought open to a certain extent, because in any case we must return to it immediately from a different point of view, for a discussion of wandering.
Notes

Introduction

7 Harold Lassen, *Beiträge zu einer Phänomenologie und Psychologie der Anschauung*, Würzburg: 1939
8 *Situation. Beiträge zur phänomenologischen Psychologie und Psychopathologie*, vol. 1, Utrecht and Antwerp: 1954
11 'Ich lebe mein Leben in wachsenden Ringen', Rainer Maria Rilke, *Stundenbuch. Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 2, Leipzig: 1930, p. 175; see also p. 242, 'All life is being lived ... God, do you live it – life?' ['Alles Leben wird gelebt ... Lebst du es, Gott, – das Leben?']
12 Examples in *Trübners Deutsches Wörterbuch* for the accusative are modern and seem adverse to syntax
I The elementary structure of space

1 Aristotle, *Physik*, translated by P. Gohlke, Paderborn: 1956, 208 b
2 Aristotle, *Physik*, 200 b
3 Aristotle, *Physik*, 208 b
4 Gohlke therefore emphasizes: ‘The translation of τόπος creates
difficulties because it can mean both place as well as space’ (p.322).
   Thus he uses both translations or alternatively “Space and place”, where
   Prantl [who translated Aristotle in 1857 ] would have spoken of “space”.
5 Aristotle, *Physik*, 209 b
6 Aristotle, *Physik*, 212 a
7 Aristotle, *Physik*, 211 a
8 Aristotle, *Physik*, 211 b and 212 a
9 Aristotle, *Physik*, 211 a
10 Aristotle, *Physik*, 212 a
11 Aristotle, *Physik*, 212 b
12 Gohlke here translates ‘place’ [Ort]
13 Aristotle, *Physik*, 212 b
14 Gohlke correctly says: ‘The vault of heaven therefore has an inner, yet no
   outer boundary’ ['Die Himmelskugel hat hiernach also nach innen eine
   Hülle, nach außen dagegen nicht’], Aristotle, *Physik*, p. 324
15 ‘Raum auch in der kleinsten Hütte’, Friedrich Schiller, Der Parasit.
   Sämtliche Werke, edited by Eduard v. d. Hellen, vol. 9, Stuttgart and Berlin:
   n.d., p. 305
16 ‘einen Raum, d.h. eine Lichtung im Walde schaffen, behufs Urbarmachung
   oder Ansiedlung’, Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch,
   Leipzig: 1854 ff.
17 ‘freier Platz, Lagerstätte, Sitzplatz, Bett’, Friedrich Kluge, Etymologisches
   Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, Berlin: 1883 ff.
19 ‘Auf der Diele ward getanzt, das heißt, wer zwei Fuß Raum erobert hatte, drehte sich darauf immer rund um’, Annette von Droste-Hülshoff, quoted in *Trübners Deutsches Wörterbuch*
23 Further references to *Trübners Deutsches Wörterbuch*, which I am consulting repeatedly, are omitted
26 ‘Gegen alle war sie freundlich, gefällig und aufgeräumt’, Gottlieb Wilhelm Rabener, quoted in *Trübners Deutsches Wörterbuch*
33 ‘Schwindel der Freiheit’: Søren Kierkegaard, *Der Begriff der Angst*, translated by Christoph Schrempp, Jena: 1884, p. 57
36 Binswanger, *Drei Formen*, p. 1
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37 Binswanger, *Drei Formen*, p. 4
38 Binswanger, *Drei Formen*, p. 6
39 Binswanger, *Drei Formen*, p. 7


43 Eliade, *Das Heilige und das Profane*, p. 21 ff. [p. 35]
45 Eliade, *Das Heilige und das Profane*, p. 20 [p. 32 ff.]
46 Grönbech, *Kultur und Religion der Germanen*, p. 110

48 Eliade, *Das Heilige und das Profane*, p. 18 [p. 29]

51 Wilhelm Weischedel, *Das Denken zwischen Raum und Zeit*, Berlin: 1960, p. 7

52 Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 8, p. 134
54 Frobenius, *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas*, p. 176
58 Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, vol. 2, p. 121 [p. 98]

60 Brunner, ‘Zum Raumbegriff der Ägypter’, p. 617

II The wide world

2 Petrarca, *Dichtungen, Briefe, Schriften*, edited by Hans Wilhelm Eppelsheimer, 1956, p. 87
8 Blaise Pascal, *Über die Religion*, Berlin: 1940, p. 115 [Pensées, no. 206]


16 Kunz, *Die anthropologische Bedeutung*, p. 297


18 Kunz, *Die anthropologische Bedeutung*, p. 297

19 Kunz, *Die anthropologische Bedeutung*, p. 294

20 Kunz, *Die anthropologische Bedeutung*, p. 308 ff.

21 Kunz, *Die anthropologische Bedeutung*, p. 309


26 Linschoten, 'Die Straße', p. 259

27 Linschoten, 'Die Straße', p. 259


29 Linschoten, 'Die Straße', p. 260

30 Linschoten, 'Die Straße', p. 259

31 Linschoten, 'Die Straße', p. 260

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Humans are orbiting the planet Earth right now, aboard the International Space Station. The station facilitates the growth of a robust commercial market in low-Earth orbit. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program is working with American aerospace industry partners to launch crews of four to the station aboard next-generation spacecraft.