An introduction to Hegel

by G. R. G Mure

Hegel: A Very Short Introduction - Very Short Introductions In a sense it would be inappropriate to speak of “Hegel’s system of philosophy,” because Hegel thought that in the strict sense there is only one system of Hegel’s system of philosophy, because Hegel thought that in the strict sense there is only one system of...
first of his aims. The word introduction is a
Writing an introduction to a translation of Hegel's Logic is an even more formidable task than the translation itself. There are serious issues that immediately confront the author, and it will not be amiss to indicate them at the start, and also to declare how I have chosen to settle them. First, there is the issue of defining the task that an introduction should perform. An introduction cannot be a step-by-step guide for the neophyte across the intricacies of the Logic. Fortunately, it need not be.\(^{xii}\) Introduction. Hegel should ever have wanted to attempt it needs historical explanation. And this I have done with as much detail as space allowed. Introduction Opinions about Hegel are, to say the least, mixed. Some see in him 'a thinker of great argumentative strength and depth of vision' and are profoundly convinced of the 'originality and permanent interest of his ideas'.\(^1\) One recent commentator has even claimed that Hegel's philosophy is so important that existential and political problems in today's world 'cannot be adequately approached by those not thoroughly experienced in Hegelian dialectical.\(^{\text{Â With this book I try to offer such an introduction. The book covers almost all of the main areas of Hegel's mature philosophical system: the philosophy of history, the sciences of logic and phenomenology, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of subjective spirit, political philosophy, the aesthetics and the philosophy of religion. The Hegelian method, therefore, is not at all à€œdialectical\(^{\text{â€}^\text{Â}}\): it is purely contemplative and descriptive, or better, phenomenological in Husserl's sense of the term. In the Preface and the Introduction to the Phenomenology, Hegel insists at length on the passive, contemplative, and descriptive character of the à€œscientificâ€ thought only because there is a dialectic of the Being which that thought reveals. As soon as the revealing description is correct, it can be said that ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio r